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MODERN SOCIOLOGISTS



PARETO



Vilfredo Pareto

[Frontispiece

MODERN SOCIOLOGISTS

PARETO

By
FRANZ BORKENAU

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CONTENTS

	PARETO (Portrait)	<i>Frontispiece</i>
CHAP.		PAGE
I.	Biography	9
II.	Logical and Non-Logical Actions	21
III.	Residues	33
IV.	Derivations	78
V.	The Theory of Non-Logical Actions as a Whole	91
VI.	Elites	106
VII.	Circulation of Elites	127
VIII.	The Importance of Pareto's Sociology	164
IX.	Bolshevism	176
X.	Fascism	196
	Index	215

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CHAPTER I

BIOGRAPHY¹

NOT much is known about Pareto's life, but of this we can be certain—that it was devoid of extraordinary events. Nothing has been published about his wife; we do not know whether he had children and much more important, we know nothing about his relations with his own family, in his youth. But from his work it may not be too difficult to reconstruct the essential fact which determined his whole outlook on life. This fact, though not stated in any document, was clearly the conflict with the ideas of his father.

Pareto's father was a Genoese nobleman, Marchese di Pareto, who belonged to the party of Mazzini. On account of his revolutionary activities, he had to leave Piedmont, his native country, and stay for a long time in Paris as a refugee, where he married a French woman. It was there that Vilfredo was born on August 15th, 1848. It was not until 1858, after the political amnesty of this year, that the family was able to return to Italy. So Vilfredo began his education at Paris and finished it, like all the youth of his rank, in an Italian secondary school, where every emphasis was laid on the classics.

* It is these revolutionary influences against which he

¹ Cf. G. H. Bousquet, *Vilfredo Pareto, sa vie et son œuvre*, Payot, Paris, 1928.

is in continual rebellion throughout his life. We know nothing concerning the personal opinions of his father whilst in the Mazzinist movement. But there is no reason to assume that he differed in essentials from the views of the party for whose sake he had accepted exile. The Mazzinists were fervent republicans, democrats, humanitarians, believers in progress, in the harmony of all interests, in the natural goodness and perfectibility of human nature, in nationalism but also in international collaboration; finally they cultivated a vague and sentimental hope of an all-comprehending religion, rationalistic and emotional at the same time. It is difficult for us to take this naive and sentimental idealism quite seriously to-day. To be sure it has proved itself utterly inefficient in politics, but on the other hand it provided the more realistic makers of Italian unity with indispensable emotional forces without which their aim would never have been achieved. But after the victory of the national cause in 1859-60, 1866 and 1870, the disillusionment in the ranks of the Mazzinists, who instead of heaven on earth received a not too well ordered, weak, and somewhat corrupted national state, was very deep. Most of them fell into a melancholy pessimism, whilst their sons turned away from the old ideals partly towards anarchism and socialism, and partly towards participation in the easy and lucrative political activities in the monarchical government. Vilfredo Pareto participated fully in the swing of the movement, which widely separated the generation which became adult after the accomplishment of national unity, from their fathers who had fought for it. One difference, however, between him and the majority of his generation, is that he was not

BIOGRAPHY

simply driven away from the ideals of his father, but retained a hatred for them until his last days. In his work on general sociology, which he attempted when he was over seventy, this boiling hatred, contempt and disgust of the Mazzinist ideals is to be felt almost in every page. He attacks humanitarianism, the "God Progress," and the other deities of Mazzinism, in season and out of season, never naming Mazzini personally, but hinting unmistakably at his characteristic attitudes. As soon as humanitarianism is in question, all moderation disappears from his work. He never mentions it without adding some insulting or abusing term. In a decisive passage describing the antagonism between humanitarians and men of force, he contends that the latter accomplish a useful business in killing humanitarians like noxious beasts.¹ This antagonism to those ideals which his father held has dominated all his problems, all his research and all his solutions. In the light of this insatiable hatred which breaks through on every occasion, his repeated assertions as to his objectivity, serenity and detachment² can be discarded as a lack of psychological self-knowledge. It would of course be very desirable to know whether a personal conflict existed between Pareto and his father corresponding to their ideological antagonism, but as we cannot gratify our curiosity, all evidence being absent, we have to content ourselves with the fact of Pareto's ideological standpoint being in direct contradiction to that of his father. Of this there is too much evidence in his work to admit of any doubt.

¹ 2191 (if no special remark is added, the figures in these notes refer to the paragraphs of the Italian edition of the *Sociologia generale*. The paragraphs of the English Translation (1935) have the same numbers.

² 142 and *passim*.

This antagonism towards the family tradition was, however, not fully formed from the very outset. Not even in his earliest writings does Pareto seem to care particularly about political ideals of the humanitarian mould, but his profound hatred towards them developed only with growing age and the deceptions of life. At the start he seems rather to have tried to keep to a certain extent to the standards of his family. He entered the Politechnic at Turin, passed through it with success and then chose the same profession as his father; he became an engineer. Serving in the railways, he at a comparatively young age obtained the highest position available, that of a director of the "Ferrovie Italiane." In the meantime he was also busy in politics, probably, under the influence of his family, which must have held political matters to be the most important concerns of life. He threw himself into the struggle for a liberal economic policy, discarding purely constitutional questions, which still were the primary concern of the epigoni of Mazzinism, and concentrating entirely on practical economic issues.

He deals almost exclusively with the question of free trade, which he believed to be an essential condition of economic prosperity, carrying on a violent agitation for it in alliance with a small group of liberals. He did not care at first which was the political party most likely to accept his programme. But he soon had to realize that there was little hope for his aims in the Italy of his day. It was the time when Depretis, the leader of the so-called "left" party, was the all-powerful Premier, combining all the old groups of the Risorgimento into one unshakable parliamentary majority by the famous method called "Transform-

BIOGRAPHY

ismo," that is by corrupting them with state subventions, protective tariffs, lucrative employments, bribery and sometimes by winking at evident theft. This regime aroused the hatred of the decent part of the upper classes, irrespective of their political opinions, but there was no hope of overthrowing the majority under a regime, where the bureaucracy still "made" the elections. Also the revolutionary mass movements of the proletariat and the poor peasants were much too weak to create serious difficulties for the government. Neither would there have been any hope for a free trader in the success of these revolutionary parties. Caught between an all-powerful government which had made up its mind not to renounce the powerful instrument of economic state intervention, and powerless socialist revolutionaries, Pareto's free trade programme was quite hopeless. It drove him almost to despair, and for some years he struggled in vain, becoming increasingly bitter. His attacks on economic protection developed into attacks on the government, drove him into abuse of leading persons (which sometimes may not have been entirely unjustified), and led to reprisals on the part of the government, which prohibited some of his lectures, and made life impossible for him. At one given moment he went so far as to declare himself a republican. But he was certainly not quite in earnest. The result of these activities was that he retired from public life, and at the same time from his professional activities, which had become impossible on account of his conflict with the government.

This was the turning-point of his life. His practical career was wrecked, and his liberalism had proved a

hopeless concern. Why this defeat? And not only the defeat consisting in his succumbing in the strife with the government, but still more the failure of his prophecies concerning the inevitable economic decline of Italy under a protective regime. Having gone through a violent political and economic crisis under the premiership of Crispi, soon after Pareto's retirement, the country in recovering from this crisis began undeniably to prosper. Now what was wrong with his opinions, and what had been wrong in his political activities? These questions worried him for the rest of his life. They made him criticize, for instance, his own liberalism in the paragraphs devoted to liberal Utopism, contained in *Les Systèmes Socialistes*,¹ and in his theory of the effect of the circulation of elites contained in the *Sociologie generale*, and made him consecrate an important part of his studies to the question of the political regimes, their impact, and the possibilities of their overthrow.

A fortunate accident lightened his task. He had just decided to retire to a villa near Florence when a summons came inviting him to join Lausanne University. The preliminaries of this call were rather romantic. He had made by chance, in a train, the acquaintance of Professor Pantaleoni, the leading Italian economist and a liberal like himself. Pantaleoni called his attention to the work of Walras, the creator of mathematical economics, who then held the chair of economics at Lausanne University, but was contemplating retirement. At that time Pareto had not written one line on economic theory, but had contributed a considerable

¹ *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, Paris, 1902, vol. II, p. 45 a.f.

BIOGRAPHY

number of pamphlets to questions of economic policy. He was deeply impressed by Walras's work, and Walras was equally impressed with Pareto, whose acquaintance he had made through the medium of Pantaleoni. It was arranged that Pareto should take over Walras's chair. The negotiations were carried on with all possible secrecy, in order to avoid an unfavourable intervention on the part of the Italian government. Finally, in 1893, Pareto became lecturer at Lausanne University and one year later, on Walras's retirement, took his chair. For the rest of his life, he stayed in a villa at Céligny near Lausanne, leaving Switzerland only for short journeys and some lectures abroad, avoiding politics completely from the fall of Crispi in 1898 until the accession of Mussolini in 1922. He there led as much of the life of a sybarite as he could, shutting out the troubles of the world, cultivating and storing the finest wines and fruits, calling his villa Angora, not on account of a special attachment to the subsequent capital of Turkey, but in honour of a menagerie of some of the finest specimens of the Angora species of cats, for which he had an intense liking. He was a rich man, desirous of enjoying the material and the spiritual pleasures of life, leading for instance an intensive campaign against a rigorous sex morality. A Puritanical sex morality, of course, had formed part of the Mazzinist creed, and it was perhaps the deep but unpleasant impression of this creed upon his adolescent soul which made him believe in later days, in obvious contradiction to the real trend of developments, that Puritanism in sex matters was in the ascendancy and ought to be strongly opposed if it was not to become overwhelming.

It is between 1896 and 1919 that he wrote his most important works. They present one continuous discussion of the problem of liberalism. On the one hand he theoretically tries to prove by means of mathematics the absolute superiority of a free trade system over any other economic system; that is one of the main objects of his *Cours d'économie politique*, published in 1896-7, and of his *Manuel d'économie politique*, published in Italian in 1906 and in French in 1909. He tries to refute socialism, beginning with an introduction to the *Capital* of Karl Marx, and treating the whole subject at length in *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, completed in 1901-2. But on the other hand he develops the reasons why this optimal solution of the economic problem does not obtain in practice as a rule, and it is this study which leads him to sociology, his results being embodied in his *Trattato di Sociologia Generale*, published in 1915-19. There are a good number of lesser writings, articles and pamphlets, which mostly anticipate arguments developed at length in his later works.

After his political defeat in Italy he was firmly convinced that the time for his political ideal, liberalism, had gone, and that civilization was approaching a stage of stagnation under a bureaucratic regime similar to that in medieval Byzantium. It was probably this deep pessimism concerning the future which strengthened his apparent detachment and his confidence in the objectivity of his views. He felt like a Cassandra who not only is not listened to by any one but, realizing the uselessness of every attempt to remedy the situation, does not even want to interfere with events. Consequently, he felt like an impartial observer of developments. But in reality he was

BIOGRAPHY

simply torn between two incompatible attitudes. Keeping his liberal creed in economics he became evermore convinced of the impossibility of a liberal state. Only now his hatred of the Mazzinist ideals became thoroughgoing. It became his belief that force was much more useful for sound society than the means proposed not only by the humanitarians but even by the political liberals, and that suppression was the thing which was really needed for stability in social life and which was, as he believed, lacking at present.

He believed himself to be isolated in his opinions. In his last pamphlet *La Trasformazione della Democrazia*, published in 1921, he describes the dissolution of the Italian democratic state in the hands of rulers, who are not strong enough to exercise force, and the inevitable rise of the disruptive forces of a new feudalism embodied in the Trade Unions. To-day we know that this work was written only a few months before the final victory of Fascism and in the light of subsequent events his prognostications sound strange. But he himself was convinced that the reaction of force and suppression against disintegrating forces was very far away indeed. In his growing bitterness he had failed to remark that he was simply one exponent of an extremely powerful current of opinion which was about to attain victory. Had he known it, he probably would not have been much happier for the knowledge. For he believed that a vigorous reassertion of authority and religion belonged as essentials to such a reaction, but was absolutely opposed to both of them in his private life. Here again the contradictions in his opinions produce an apparent impartiality, which

deceived himself. But here again he only participated in the large movement which was soon to express itself in Fascism, trying to impose religious beliefs upon the masses without at all sharing in them.

So he welcomed Fascism only hesitatingly. But Fascism had a better sense of its debt to Pareto than had Pareto himself. In the first years of his rule Mussolini literally executed the policy prescribed by Pareto, destroying political liberalism, but at the same time largely replacing state management by private enterprise, diminishing taxes on property, favouring industrial development, imposing a religious education in dogmas, which he did not himself believe in. Moreover, Pareto was loaded with the highest honours available. He was designated as delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva but excused himself on account of his poor health; this was indeed a fact, but he perhaps utilized it as a pretext as well. Then he was made Senator of the Kingdom of Italy and a contributor to Mussolini's personal periodical *Gerarchia*. Here his scientific career with its many contradictory views finished on a characteristic note. Praising the government of Mussolini for its achievements he at the same time asked for liberty of opinion, liberty of university teaching and pronounced a warning against any alliance with the Papal See. This, his political testament, certainly does honour to the uprightness of his political opinions, but it is not precisely proof of his foresight, as in 1923 it was sufficiently evident that Fascism was inevitably driving towards the suppression of all political liberties, and that it either ought to be repudiated on this ground or accepted *in toto* including the harsh suppression which

BIOGRAPHY

in his theoretical work Pareto himself had regarded as a necessity.

The question has been raised whether Pareto was a Fascist or not. No definite evidence can be obtained, as he died on August 19th, 1923, less than a year after the advent of Fascism. He had not cared for it before its victory, but sympathized with it in the short space of time he lived after its advent. What would have been his attitude if he had lived longer we cannot tell. Probably his views would have been determined by the same essential antagonism which dominated his political outlook before, by his dislike of political and his love of economic and intellectual liberty, all three, however, being inevitably bound up with one another. But this of course is the essential contradiction in Fascism itself. Fascism proclaimed itself the deadly foe of Bolshevism and justified its existence by hinting at the danger of a breakdown of the capitalistic society, which could only be avoided by dictatorship. Fascists never hesitated to avail themselves of the teachings of Pareto and to proclaim him their chief precursor. And they are quite right, because in spite of or rather on account of his contradictory attitude, he really is so, irrespective of whether the report of Mussolini having been his personal pupil is true or not.

There is of course still a very deep contradiction in Pareto's teaching as well as in the activities of Fascism. Pareto emphasized the necessity of a return to force, authority, suppression and religion in order to save society, but he knew very well (without, however, noting the contradiction) that such an authoritarian regime could not avoid being the prelude to a Byzan-

PARETO

tine stagnation. He tried to overcome it by advising Mussolini to keep part of the liberal institutions, and Mussolini tried to follow his advice—we believe, sincerely. But in a few years Fascism had done away not only with political liberty throughout, but with economic liberalism as well, instituting a system of state capitalism, which is precisely what is abhorrent to Pareto, but which was nothing but the necessary outcome of the political principles he himself had advocated. This course of events would not have been approved of by Pareto, but it hardly is by Mussolini. So it is just here that his attitudes and theories are most contradictory. Pareto can be best understood when designated as the precursor of Fascism.

CHAPTER II

LOGICAL AND NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

THE first chapter of his sociology Pareto devotes to the method he intends to follow. It is, he asserts, the method applied by modern natural science. His approach to his subject matter will be hypothetical.¹ He will just start with any fact which seems important in social life, will announce some proposition concerning it, draw consequences from it and then compare these deductions with the findings of experience, in order to test the validity of the first propositions. Here we do not insist on Pareto's ideas about the method of sociology, as they differ considerably from the method actually applied by himself. The latter can only be studied in the context of its concrete applications, as it is never presented *in abstracto*. Thus we shall at once proceed to the presentation of Pareto's sociology itself; his method we will treat where our subject matter affords an opportunity, and we will then point out the relation of Pareto's real method to the method applied by modern natural science.

We start therefore with Chapter II of Pareto's "Sociology," which is devoted to the "non-logical actions." It is the problem indicated under this heading which he first takes up, having already noted the

arbitrary character of the starting-point of sociology as well as of any other science.

All actions, according to Pareto, should be divided into logical and non-logical ones. And this division is the one exclusive aspect under which actions in his system are studied. More than two-thirds of his "Sociology" is devoted to the expounding of this division and its consequences. The remainder of his work does not deal with another aspect of actions, but with social differentiation, namely elites. We are certainly justified in saying that for Pareto the main characteristic of an action is its relation to logic.

One further fact must be stated from the outset. Only one of the two main species of actions is studied in Pareto's sociology, namely "non-logical actions." "Logical actions," though not expressly excluded from sociology, appear in Pareto's work only in the way of incidental remarks. Thus we are never told clearly which groups of actions are regarded as logical; we must infer it from incidental remarks, the clearest of which says that economics studies logical actions.¹ Moreover, the whole trend of Pareto's ideas makes it clear beyond any doubt that science to him is logical. Science, in the sense given to the word by modern experimental research, and economic activities seem to be the two main instances of "logical actions." We are at a loss to say whether other types of actions fall under the same heading, but may surmise that at least the well-considered struggle for political power is put in this group; for Pareto treats it at length in the latter part of his "Sociology," in his theory of elites, without ever pointing out non-logical elements,

¹ 263.

LOGICAL AND NON-LOGICAL ACTION

though he never fails to do this elsewhere in his work wherever any non-logical element seems to be present.

As any clear definition of "logical actions" is lacking, we shall be obliged to find the reason why certain actions are classified as logical through studying the concept of non-logical actions, which is fully developed in Pareto's sociology. Logical actions are likely to be the exact counterpart of non-logical ones. Only at the end of our presentation of the theory of non-logical actions will the meaning of the concept of logical actions be clear.

What then is a "non-logical action"? It will be best to explain it by one of Pareto's own examples. Taboo, according to him, is the prototype of a non-logical action.¹ There may be many explanations for a taboo, as for instance, a divine command,² some explanatory legend,³ "nature,"⁴ but of course none of these explanations gives the real cause of the taboo. They are all intended to give some rational account of a fact existing independently of these secondary interpretations, and which, without them, seems to be completely unintelligible. Why so? Simply because there is really no special reason why such a taboo should exist. The explanation of a phenomenon is the correlation of it to other phenomena which we know better. But here there is no such correlation. A taboo has certainly many important consequences, it may be useful or detrimental for a given social group and a given social order. But it would be quite erroneous to account for its existence by indicating these consequences of its activity. It is just an aversion of a given group to a given type of activity, open to no

¹ 322.

² 332.

³ 334.

⁴ 335.

further explanation, a primary fact of sociology, and even of psychology, a true starting-point, a real undeducible axiom of any further study of human behaviour. It is "simply a non-logical nucleus uniting certain acts with determined effects," later on wrongly interpreted in a logical way.¹ Here we grasp one element of the twin concepts of logical and non-logical actions. Logical actions are acts determined by some real aim, non-logical actions are acts not determined by any aim whatever but simply by some impulse inaccessible to any further explanation. •

The quotation just given refers to another example of "non-logical actions," belief in witchcraft. This case illustrates another main characteristic of non-logical actions. The "nucleus uniting certain acts with determined effects," which constitutes such an action, is unchangeable throughout the ages. Michelet accuses "feudalism" of being guilty of the persecution of witches. But what about feudalism in the law of the twelve tables, which too contains measures against witches? Not only is Michelet's historical interpretation wrong, it exposes him to the charge of "non-logical actions." He believes in "feudalism" as the great secret evil-doer, as the Middle Ages believed in Satan. The nucleus uniting certain acts with determined effects, in this case the belief in evil powers, is the same in both cases.² The same applies to innumerable other facts. Does not magic continue in our days through spiritism, Christian Science, and so on?³ Do not our beliefs in progress, democracy, humanity, and so on, simply contain those precise feelings which were once devoted to religious personifications?

¹ 217.² 212.³ 184.

LOGICAL AND NON-LOGICAL ACTION

These unchanging non-logical nuclei then are "residues," and their secondary similitudinal explanations "derivations." The latter, in contrast to residues, are subject to frequent change. Their alterations fill the foreground of the historical scenery, but they represent a very superficial phenomenon. Residues are the real essence of all activities except the logical ones. The two correlated concepts of residues and derivations are the pillars of Pareto's sociology.

Three further chapters, dealing with "the non-logical actions in the history of doctrines," "the theories transgressing the limits of experience," and "the pseudo-scientific theories" contrast the concept of non-logical actions with other sociological and philosophical theories. This polemical appendix to the deduction of his basic concepts is considerably longer than the deduction of these concepts themselves. It shows how great a part polemics have had in the formation of these concepts, and it is only through the understanding of the problems they are intended to solve that we shall be able to have a full understanding of the meaning of the idea of non-logical actions. In reading the three above-named chapters one realizes at once that they are altogether directed against one single adversary, rationalism. Rationalism, as is well known, is a comprehensive name for many tendencies of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, which have in common the belief in "reason" as the dominating force of human life and as the very essence of man. Some of them held reason to be operative and dominant in man as such, others regarded its dominance as a result of development, gradually bringing out the essential characteristics of

mankind in its path from animality upwards. In its first-named form, rationalism is conservative, in its second form it is progressivist. It is the second version of rationalism which has dominated most of the last two centuries, and which has found a particularly emphatic expression in Mazzinism. But Pareto takes even the first form to task, dealing at length with the errors of Aristotle, Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas, and then with Condorcet, Comte, Buckle, Spencer, John Stuart Mill and others. He reproaches them all for despising the non-logical actions which have such an important part in social life, for accepting derivations at their face value instead of seeking residues beyond them, for writing history from the view-point of what ought to be and not of what really exists. He gives a complete classification of all the methods by which non-logical actions are explained away:¹

A. The principles of non-logical actions are denied all objective reality.

- I. They are simply discarded.
- II. They are regarded as absurd prejudices.
- III. They are regarded as artifices.

B. The principles of non-logical actions are recognized as having now more, now less objective reality.

- I. Their objective reality is complete and direct:
 - (a) precepts with partly imaginary sanctions;
 - (b) intervention of a personal God or of a personified abstraction;

¹ 306.

LOGICAL AND NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

- (c) The same intervention supplemented by legends and logical deductions;
 - (d) Reality is ascribed to a metaphysical entity;
 - (e) Reality is found in the agreement between these (non-logical) principles with certain sentiments.
- II. The objective reality is neither complete nor direct. It is found indirectly in facts supposed to be observed inaccurately or understood insufficiently.
- (a) It is assumed that people make insufficient observations and draw logical conclusions from them;
 - (b) a myth is the reflection of a hidden historical fact or simply an imitation;
 - (c) a myth is composed of two parts, one historical, the other imaginary.
- III. The principles of non-logical actions are allegorical.
- C. It is assumed that non-logical actions have no effect on "progress" or are opposed to it; thus they must be eliminated in a study designed solely to promote "progress."

We will try to explain this classification in our own words; it will make the intention of Pareto's polemics perfectly clear. Up to the present non-logical actions have been interpreted in three ways: they have been either discarded, so as to make social life completely logical; or historians have themselves held non-logical beliefs, religious, mythological and so on, and conse-

quently have taken these beliefs as the expression of real facts; or, finally, they have interpreted strange non-logical types of behaviour so as to make them fit in with what they regarded as logical. It is a convincing refutation of the historical ideas of the period of "enlightenment" and of some of its more naive followers in the nineteenth century. Let us observe, however, that here the concept of non-logical actions has slightly changed its meaning. In this scheme it is practically coincident with the concept of superstitions or at least of unreasonable beliefs. Inexplicability and unchangeability are removed to the background. And the one difference between the ideas of the eighteenth century and Pareto's own ideas is that Voltaire mostly rejected and ridiculed what for him was superstition, whereas Pareto stresses its enormous importance in social life; in addition, he charges the rationalists with superstitious, "non-logical" beliefs, where they believed themselves to be following the clearest teachings of reason. Non-logical actions are the substance of many theories which, taken at their face-value, seem to be exclusively produced by logic.¹

Still, after all that, it cannot be very clear what Pareto means by "non-logical actions." They are actions (or beliefs) opposed to science and (as economic activities are logical) to the real interests of the individual as interpreted by experience and logic. The examples of non-logical actions we have met up to now are mostly drawn from what are ordinarily called superstitions, religious and metaphysical beliefs, and in addition from some apparently rational beliefs which Pareto attempts to demonstrate to be meta-

¹ 251.

LOGICAL AND NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

physical and religious in reality. But all that is still vague, and its true meaning can only become apparent through a presentation of Pareto's detailed study of non-logical actions, which is given under the heading of "residues" and "derivations." It will be impossible to avoid repeating ourselves to a certain extent in this presentation, as some features of the detailed application of the theory of non-logical actions have been indicated in our short introductory account. But even these features will appear in a clearer light in the theory of residues, which, as a matter of fact, really is the theory of non-logical action. But before we turn to the presentation and criticism of this theory, we have still to consider his general survey of non-logical actions.¹

His classification of actions may be rendered as follows. Sociology is not interested in aims and desires as such. Its main problem is the relation between the aims of actions and their real results. Actions are of two kinds. There are those which use means appropriate to ends, both in the opinion of the person performing them and in that of the onlookers. These he calls logical actions. Such would be, for instance, the work of a scientist or a technician. There are also those which do not do so either in the view of the performer or in that of others. These are non-logical actions.

The latter fall into four main groups, the first and third of which are of small importance for human behaviour. The first comprises actions which are not logically adapted to any end either from the standpoint of the performer or the observer. Such are

¹ 151.

some people's automatic avoidance of walking under a ladder. In group three come actions which from the performer's point of view are not adapted to any end, but which in fact do serve an end, as for instance the purely instinctive but well-adapted behaviour of insects. There are some who do not kill their prey, but sting it in such a way as to paralyse it, preserving it as fresh food for their larvae.

Actions which from the point of view of the performer are appropriate to their end, but which in fact (or from our own point of view) are not logically adapted, fall into group two. Such are magical ceremonies. Finally, in group four, there come those actions in which the performer's aim and the actual result obtained differ. This last case is the most important one. Pareto himself remarks that man very seldom acts without at least imagining some motive; in this respect men's actions differ from the instinctive action of animals.¹ We may add, though in disagreement with Pareto, that acts without any result may be quite exceptional, or at least no subject matter for sociology.

The scheme is certainly impressive. But on second thoughts doubts will arise about the validity of the generalization contained in it. Does it square with the single instances of logical and non-logical actions given by Pareto himself? Only the detailed study of his theory of residues can provide an answer. But a few preliminary remarks seem necessary. Pareto treats science and economics as specifically logical, religion and metaphysics as specifically non-logical. Is it really the case that science and economic behaviour always

¹ 155.

LOGICAL AND NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

achieve their aims and religion, magic, myth, metaphysics, do not? Such a statement is more than doubtful. Then the thoroughgoing distinction between science and economics on the one hand and all types of so-called supra-experimental beliefs on the other seems rather dictated by some idea about what is objectively true and what not, than by a realistic study of the relation of aims and results. Finally, there is an evident difference between the rôle attributed to aims in the scheme just given and their rôle in the examples of non-logical action we have so far considered. Religious activities on the one hand and economic ones on the other are less distinguished by differences in the relation between their aims and their results than by different types of aims themselves. If all scientific, economic, and such-like aims are logical, and all religious, magical, and such-like aims non-logical, is not then the study of aims the real subject matter of Pareto's theory of non-logical actions, and not their relation to results? As a matter of fact, this undoubtedly is so. Not adhering to the scheme Pareto treats some aims as non-logical and others as logical in his sociology. It is the aims which a modern anti-metaphysical natural scientist would designate as "realistic" or by some similar term, which are "logical" for Pareto, and the ones excluded from this category by certain trends of modern natural science are regarded as "non-logical." Still, it is difficult to conceive how actions can be "logical" or not. Logic seems to be a quality of deductions, not of actions. Generally speaking, the scheme quoted above has very little in common with the practical application given by Pareto himself to his theory of non-

PARETO

logical actions. We reproduce it, as it is the one clear definition of logical and non-logical actions to be found in his work. But it is the study of the theory of residues which will afford a clear idea of the real content of these concepts.

CHAPTER III

RESIDUES

PARETO groups the non-logical actions into "residues" which he calls groups of non-logical actions deriving from one common underlying sentiment. There is, for instance, the sentiment of hierarchy or rather the different sentiments concomitant with domination in the ruling and with submission in the ruled groups of society respectively. These sentiments may express themselves with a great variety of forms, but the underlying sentiment will be always the same, a sentiment of domination and of submission respectively. Thus the actions deriving from this sentiment will always be deriving from the "residue of hierarchy." Residues, in Pareto's concept, are thus defined by two essentials: they represent the common underlying psychological element in different actions, they are invariable and they are incapable of any further explanation. Social life is determined by a considerable number of these unchangeable and uncommutable psychological entities, which, themselves, have neither a function nor a meaning nor even an origin; they are simply there. Or rather it is not society which in the first place is determined by these residues but the life of the individual, no social element entering into the concept of residues itself. Pareto's sociology is individualistic in the extreme, abstracting entirely as it does from the very necessities of social

co-operation in its study of non-logical actions and explaining social life as the automatic and casual result of scores of non-logical actions which are not open to any further explanation. Other individualists have attempted to deduce society from the interests of the individuals; Pareto deduces it mostly—except the working of interests in economic life—from their non-logical reactions.

As residues are essentially non-logical and open to no further explanation, there is no way of grouping them logically. Life being, according to Pareto, mainly a compound of non-logical actions standing side by side without intrinsic correlation, the presentation of these actions cannot start from any logical principle. The very essence of the concept of residues thus makes it impossible to group them under general headings. But Pareto himself seems to have been frightened by the extreme idea of a sociology built on hundreds of types of unconnected non-logical actions. He tried to find out some more general principles of grouping them. Thus he distinguishes between main groups of residues, of which, according to him, there are six, and a considerable number of subgroups under each of these six headings. The distinction between main groups and subgroups of residues is, in Pareto's mind, not only a matter of presentation, it is meant to indicate a distinction of facts. The actions belonging to different main groups are not interchangeable, whereas actions belonging to the different subgroups of one main group frequently are.¹ Unfortunately no reason whatever is given either for the introduction of this new principle or for the concrete grouping adopted; not

¹ 888.

RESIDUES

even Pareto himself keeps to his grouping. Later on in striking contrast with the principle announced, he insists on the close relation of different main groups.

It is generally acknowledged, even by Pareto's admirers, that his detailed presentation of residues is entangled and unsatisfactory. Not so often, however, is it realized that this lack of clear arrangement is due to the very essence of the concept of non-logical actions. One may attempt any mode of grouping Pareto's residues whatever, and will soon be obliged to realize that the presentation becomes not less entangled and unintelligible than with Pareto's own scheme. It would be strange to attempt to give a clear and logical presentation of social life under the concept that social life is entirely non-logical. But again, Pareto has not entirely kept to his own leading idea; he has tried to introduce some logical grouping and it is this tentative introduction of logical viewpoints which seems to have afforded the basis of his grouping of residues.

In his list of residues, soon to be given *in extenso*, two main principles of grouping appear, one being the contrast between conservatism and progressivism, the other the contrast between individualism and collectivism. Progressivism has afforded residue I, the "instinct of combinations;" conservatism residue II, the "persistence of aggregates." This is not apparent from the terms chosen by Pareto, but cannot be doubted on the strength of the interpretation given to these concepts in his later development of them. Collectivism affords residue IV, "residues in relation to social units" and individualism residue V, "integrity of the individual and of his belongings."

Thus the main elements of the grouping of residues have been afforded, not by simple observation of unconnected "non-logical actions," but by the relation of different actions to the political problems most important in the eyes of the author. Conservatism and progressivism revolve round the problems put by the Mazzinist movement, whereas individualism and collectivism are best adapted for a discussion of the problems raised by liberalism. But then Pareto has become aware of the inadequacy of this grouping, which certainly does not comprehend all the actions beyond the range of strictly economic activities. There are, of course, innumerable ones. But only one group seems to have been sufficiently salient to get on the list: actions connected with sex. Still, the casual character of their introduction makes itself felt in the absence of subgroups in residue VI, "sex." Again, there remains a feeling that the list is not complete, but it finds no adequate expression. Pareto only introduces residue III "desire to manifest sentiments by external acts," with two subgroups, "desire of activity issued in combinations" and "religious exaltation"; the first of these most evidently ought to be put under residue I, "combinations," the second under residue II, where other religious feelings are treated.

Being utterly dissatisfied with Pareto's treatment of residues, most authors have simply discarded his detailed development of the problem and instead given a few examples of residues of their own, without regard for Pareto's main group and subgroups. The real merits and shortcomings of a theory cannot, however, be made apparent by such a procedure. We have

RESIDUES

to follow the author, not of course in the mere sequence of his arguments, but in their content, with no omission as to their essentials. Let us take as a guide Pareto's own list of residues.

I. Instinct of combinations:¹

- (a) Combinations in general,
- ✓ (b) Combinations of similar and dissimilar things,
 - (b1) Similarity or dissimilarity in general,
 - (b2) Rare things and extraordinary events,
 - (b3) Terrible things and terrible events,
 - (b4) Happiness, united with good things, unhappiness with bad ones,
 - (b5) Things apparently similar producing apparently similar effects or more rarely effects of an opposite character.
- ✓ (c) Mysterious operation of certain things and acts,
 - (c1) Mysterious operations in general,
 - (c2) Mysterious relation between things and names,
- (d) Desire to combine residues,
- (e) Desire for logical developments,
- ✓ (f) Belief in the efficacy of combinations.

II. Persistence of aggregates:

- ✓ (a) Persistence of the relation of a person with other persons and with certain places,
 - (a1) Family relations and relations between kindred groups,

¹ 888.

PARETO

- (a₂) Relations with certain places,
- (a₃) Relations of social classes,
- (b) Persistence of the relation between the living and the dead,
- (c) Persistence of the relation between a dead man and his property during his lifetime,
- (d) Persistence of an abstraction,
- (e) Persistence of uniformities,
- (f) Sentiments transformed into objective realities,
- (g) Personifications,
- (h) Desire for new abstractions.

III. Desire to express sentiments by external acts:

- (a) Desire for activity expressing itself in combinations,
- (b) Religious exaltation.

IV. Residues connected with social units:

- (a) Particular societies,
- (b) Desire for uniformity,
 - (b₁) Uniformity obtained by self-discipline,
 - (b₂) Uniformity imposed on others,
 - (b₃) Aversion for new things,
- (c) Pity and cruelty,
 - (c₁) Pity extended to others,
 - (c₂) Instinctive repugnance in face of sufferings,
 - (c₃) Reasoned repugnance in face of useless sufferings,
- (d) Self-sacrifice for the good of others,
 - (d₁) Jeopardizing one's life,

RESIDUES

- (d₂) Bestowing one's goods on others,
- (e) Sentiments of hierarchy,
- (e₁) Sentiments of superiors,
- (e₂) Sentiments of inferiors,
- (e₃) Desire to be approved by the group,
- (f) Asceticism.

V. Integrity of the individual and of his belongings:

- (a) Sentiments opposed to alteration of the equilibrium,
- (b) Sentiments of equality in inferiors,
- (c) Restoring the integrity of the individual by actions pertaining to him,
- (c₁) Real subjects,
- (c₂) Imaginary and abstract subjects,
- (d) Restoring the equilibrium by actions pertaining to anyone who has disturbed it,
- (d₁) Real offender,
- (d₂) Imaginary offender.

VI. Sex residue.

We will not consider the single residues separately, a study which is intended to bring out gradually the real meaning of the concept of residues itself. Not much, in this context, need be said about residue VI, concerning sex. It is one of the most impressive parts of Pareto's sociology, full of insight into the secret ramifications of sex desire, but unfortunately psychoanalysis has made that all out of date. The main idea, the presence of the sex instinct in many phenomena where one would least expect to find it, is essentially the psycho-analytic outlook. The detailed presenta-

tion of this idea, however, is unsatisfactory on account of the complete lack of knowledge of the very existence of the work of Freud, which, nevertheless, in 1919, had already attained remarkable results.

There is, however, one aspect of Pareto's sociology of sex which cannot be overlooked. One of his main points is that no moral or physical force is strong enough to overpower real sex life,¹ which is essentially the same throughout all times. The sociologist might be inclined to take exception to this point. There is no doubt that sex desire tends more than any other instinct to overrule moral and rational considerations and that, in every society, there is a considerable gap between accepted standards and actual practice of sex life. But does that mean that sex morals are really of no importance at all? Does it mean that sex life in Victorian England was the same as in the Trobriand Islands, whose customs Malinowski has described in detail? Is there no difference between the sex life of communities where polygamy is an institution of the existing moral code and those where it is strictly forbidden, between those where sex is exclusively recognized in marriage and those where it is, under certain conditions, legitimate even outside marriage? Certainly neither monogamists nor polygamists, neither Puritans nor Trobrianders live consistently up to their own moral standards. But this does not exclude the undeniable fact that those moral standards, though unachieved in practice, have deeply influenced the life of the respective communities, though sometimes not exactly in the sense intended.

Pareto's treatment of the "sex residue", however,

¹ 1329.

RESIDUES

brings out one of the essential features of the concept of residues in general. It is a very good example of what he intends to express by the opposition of residues and "derivations." Derivations, as we already know, are simili-logical interpretations given to actions really brought about by the operation of residues. Moral standards are only derivations, that is, idle talk, which can change without much affecting the real phenomena of social life. On the one hand we have here, according to Pareto, a real phenomenon, unchanging throughout the ages; on the other hand, we are confronted by a host of changing explanations of the phenomenon, but they are without real importance. The character of unchangeability, which Pareto ascribes to his sex residue, is not due to the alleged overwhelming strength and biological uniformity of the sexual urge, it is a common feature of residues in general, as we shall soon see. It is the old truism about the unchangeability of mankind, a psychological truism which appeals to mere common sense but which is in the most striking contradiction with every page of history. In the case of sex, the mere mention of the wide range of possible types of sex life ought to be sufficient to refute it.

Before turning to the residues on which Pareto's main interest centres, we shall consider the residues in class III, desire for external manifestation of sentiments. It is the second of his residues falling outside his main problems. It is, however, very typical of the meaning of his concept of residues. Taking religious exaltation as one instance of this residue, Pareto insists on the aimless activity conspicuous in Welsh revivals.¹

¹ 1098.

Is this not a case of the sheer desire to do something, irrespective of what it is?¹ The idea is ambiguous. Does Pareto simply mean that strong excitement generally leads not only to actions, but very often in addition to concomitant movements, exclamations, and so on, which have no aim in themselves? Then certainly he is right. But then it is incomprehensible why these concomitant acts should appear only in the bringing about of combinations and in religious excitement, the only two cases mentioned by Pareto. Then too, it is unintelligible why those concomitant acts should form a residue of themselves, as they never appear independently but only in connection with other emotions of a well-defined character. But in reality Pareto's residue III means something more than these concomitant activities. It means that man has a desire for any type of aimless activity in itself and that this desire makes itself specially felt in the bringing about of combinations (irrespective of their utility) and in religious excitement. We shall soon see that interpreted in this sense, residue III embodies almost the quintessence of the concept of residue in general. All residues are instincts leading to aimless actions which can only by chance have useful results. In other cases this aimlessness is hidden by the definite character of the particular object of desire in question. In residue III it appears openly.

But we deny that such a thing as an entirely aimless human activity exists. We will keep to Pareto's example, the religious excitement of a Welsh revival. What is "religious excitement"? Is it more aimless or indefinite than any other excitement? We think not.

¹ 1092.

RESIDUES

It is simply a high degree of religious emotion. The people joining in such a revival have not simply the desire to do something, to carry on an undetermined type of activity. Else playing football might serve their desire better. But they want to worship, most evidently because they have not simply a desire for some indefinite activity but for a very specific type of religious activity. But is not football, though not mentioned by Pareto, a good example of his residue III? We do not think so. Leaving aside the social implications of football, sport is certainly a means of satisfying a need for physical recreation. As such it is by no means merely a desire to do just anything, but a desire for fresh air, exercising certain muscles, team activity, and so on. Real unconcernedness for the aim and content of any action is inconceivable in man.

Two essential features of the concept of residues have become apparent through the presentation of the two residues unconnected with his main problems: unchangeability and meaninglessness. They embody the essential content of his social philosophy. Let us now see their application to his main problems. And here we shall take up first his residue IV, embodying sociability. Must we not expect a sociology based, not on needs and functions but on non-logical actions, to lay all stress on the instinctive desire for sociability? Must not the "social sense" be the corner-stone of such a sociology? And indeed Pareto accepts the Aristotelian axiom that man is social. Without a certain amount of sympathy between its members society could not exist. One may think such a starting-point already sufficiently non-logical. If society is not based mainly on its inevitability for the carrying on of human

life but on the sometimes rather doubtful feelings of sympathy between its members, the most extreme anti-rationalist might be content. But still Pareto seems to shrink from a deduction of social life from the social sense in direct line. The axiom of sympathy between man and man, once pronounced, is left, never to be taken up again. The argument deflects towards four other points, which together exhaust the whole of Pareto's theory of the social sense: the desire for uniformity, the problem of cruelty and clemency, the sense of hierarchy and the readiness for self-sacrifice. Clearly, these are not species of the feeling of sympathy but simply feelings "connected with social units," as Pareto calls the emotions grouped under residue IV. But then there is no reason whatever why they should be more closely connected with one another than with any other emotions, why they should form one coherent residue. They are grouped together on the purely external and casual ground of being more directly related to social life than other emotions and on no other ground whatever.

The first of these emotions is the instinct of uniformity. It is not derived, in Pareto's argument, from sympathy, but taken as an independent fact. He bases it on the sense of imitation.¹ Habits, once developed, are imitated, but we are unable to say how they come into being.² Generally, he says, they are as inexplicable as are the taboos. These habits, which spread through imitation, comprehend practically every type of social life, from modes of dressing to religious beliefs and moral standards. Persecution of dissentient individuals, as for instance the burning alive of heretics,

¹ 1117.

² 1120.

RESIDUES

is nothing but an immediate result of the uneasiness created by non-conformity.

Possibly this rather meagre concept of the instinct of uniformity is the most important element in Pareto's whole social theory; not so, certainly, in his own mind. He treats it rather casually. But taking into consideration the subject matter described under this heading, it might be as well to attempt a general criticism of Pareto's sociology at this point. We reserve, however, some of our remarks for a more general appreciation of the concept of residues and for the time being confine ourselves to a few remarks concerning the concept of the sense of uniformity itself. Here we are not concerned with habits of minor importance such as manners, dressing and so on. *Expressis verbis* Pareto comprehends under the notion of habits the most important types of social behaviour such as morality and religion. How they come into being is generally inexplicable. This is the very essence of Pareto's sociology. It is not an incidental remark. Religion, morals and other patterns of social behaviour are, as we shall soon explain, treated under residue II as well as under residue IV. And there again we shall meet with the same idea. Related to the residue of sociability, this belief is expressed in the formula: Habits spread through imitation, but how they come into being is generally inexplicable. Related to the "persistence of aggregates" the same phenomenon will be substantially expressed in the formula: habits once grouped together tend to continue together indefinitely; but again, how they came into being we cannot explain. The underlying idea is the same. Still the same idea prevails

in the repeated assertion that it is vain to seek for the "origins" of things. Perhaps this last formula presents the best opportunity for discussing Pareto's view. Speaking of the origins of morals, religion, art, and so on, in general, Pareto probably is right, at least to a certain extent. To understand the function of morals in a given society we certainly need not know how morals in mankind originated. One may go one step further and contend that in order to understand the function of morals in a given society, we sometimes do not even require a knowledge of the origin of the morals accepted in this particular society. But still, complete incomprehensibility of morals is something entirely different.

One example, taken from comparative sociology of morals, may be useful to make our point conspicuous. Moral philosophy in the Middle Ages generally distinguished two types of justice, "commutative" and "distributive" justice. The first of these comprehends all obligations where equality of the parts implied obtains, above all business based on exchange. The second covers all obligations based on inequality, such as justice in the relations between the lord and his tenant. Certainly, medieval society did not consistently live up to the "commutative" and "distributive" moral standards professed by theologians, but it is equally certain that the theology of the age roughly expressed the general rules prevailing in social conduct. This went along two essentially different lines, market exchange and feudal obligations, which are formulated in the two types of justice generally accepted in the philosophy of the Scholastics. Feudalism having broken down, only the first type of rela-

tion has remained in our times and thus we have got into the "habit" of expressing our ideas of justice in terms of equality of duties and rights, and in no other terms whatever. Now, to understand this modern "habit" of equalitarianism, we certainly need not know the story of its development. A rough and ready understanding of it is obtainable without historical knowledge, and in studying primitive people without historical tradition we must comply with it. Then, it will be sufficient to understand the function of the morals code in a given society by showing the connection between these morals and the other existing social institutions. Thus far the knowledge of "origins" is superfluous for the understanding of "habits" which can be understood on the basis of their function in a given society in a given moment, or, in other terms, can be understood without historical knowledge, if only the statics of a given society are our concern. But as soon as change, historical development, is taken into consideration, as soon as the argument turns to the dynamics of a given society, historical knowledge is needed. The trend of development of a given society can only be understood from its history. If we want to understand the general fact of the prevalence of egalitarian morals in our society, we may be content with our knowledge of its being based mainly on free exchange of goods. As soon, however, as we want to understand the different interpretations of these egalitarian morals, the different schools of morals, their struggles and their succession, we have to turn to history for an explanation.

But all this is far from the mere assertion that habits come into being one knows not how and spread

through imitation. In this statement nothing less than a complete renunciation of any sociological theory is embodied and what is left is no more than the appearance of it. For first we thus renounce an explanation of how "habits," that is patterns of social behaviour, come into being and then, in addition, we renounce an explanation of their spread. Pareto himself knows that many patterns of behaviour compete for allegiance,¹ but the question is, why do some of them succeed and others not? This problem is actually the same as the other one concerning the creation of patterns. For sociology is not primarily interested in the psychological problem of the formation of single individuals but in the problem of how single individuals can make their behaviour a pattern of social conduct. Why, among innumerable competing loyalties, does one obtain while others are discarded? There is no answer to this question in Pareto's sociology. Thus, his idea can be summed up roughly in the following terms: society always presents a certain degree of uniformity and certainly could not live without it. Evidently there is a desire for uniformity in man. How it works, we cannot tell. How it selects patterns, we cannot tell. How patterns come into being at all, we cannot tell. Religion, morals, art, manners, and so on, come into being and transform themselves, we know not how; but certainly they spread through a desire for uniformity. Thus, we can add a third feature to the concept of residues. They are not only unchangeable and meaningless but in addition unintelligible.

To appreciate this last aspect in its full importance we must hint at one feature which will become fully conspicuous only through our later study of Pareto's theory of derivations. There he insists on the uselessness of studying the different morals, religions, and so on, in detail, as they are all essentially the same and vary only in their external presentation, in the similitudinal arguments brought forward in their defence. We have already met this view in discussing the sex residue; Pareto does not acknowledge any real difference between the sex life of different times. Thus, we might present his view more fully in the following terms: the variations of habits are unimportant, their essence is unintelligible; but certainly they spread through a "desire for uniformity."

Still, we have to consider one aspect of the sense of uniformity; but it is an aspect already known to us. The persecution of heretics should be due to the "desire for uniformity," to a feeling of uneasiness created by the existence of dissentients. Here is the place to discuss the "desire for uniformity," on its own merits. Certainly, such a desire exists. It is hardly an ultimate fact, but could probably be decomposed into some simpler elements. Is it really true that most people abhor any kind of non-conformity because it hurts their sense of uniformity? More powerful forces, probably, play their rôle in that. An infraction of good manners does not simply hurt our sense of uniformity, we generally feel it as something impudent. These manners, in those who hold them, have been deeply ingrained by education, and the forces working for their fulfilment are practically indistinguishable from those which in the child originally enforced

morality. Otherwise, infractions of good manners would not create horror but simply a slight uneasiness without consequence. The close relation between manners and morals is conspicuous among primitives. Among the Trobrianders, the most horrifying crime in a male is incest with his sister, and the most shocking infraction of good manners is for others to mention his sister in some casual manner in his presence. Certainly the motive upholding the moral commandment in this case is the same as the motive for the rule of good behaviour. In some cases at least, manners are practically the same as morals and we contend that these are the only ones which create a strong reaction against infractions.

But even granted the working of the "desire for uniformity" in manners, it certainly does not explain the burning of heretics. The heretic does not merely hurt our desire for uniformity, he hurts our moral feelings and our religious beliefs. Would Pareto contend that this difference does not matter? The difference in the reactions to infringements in both cases might teach him that there is a very important difference indeed. The mere desire for uniformity might account for the slight uneasiness created by inappropriate manners of eating—though, in reality it does not even account for that, for it is not our sense of uniformity but our desire for cleanliness which is hurt by seeing somebody eat with his fingers instead of using knife and fork—but it cannot account for the powerful reaction against religious heresy. If only the desire for uniformity (or this desire increased by the "persistence of aggregates") were in question, the reaction towards heresy in man-

RESIDUES

ners and in religion must be the same. But history does not tell us of people burnt because they ate with their fingers. There is something more in the facts, and this something is the essential thing; it is religious feeling, a thing not to be dissolved into "desire for uniformity" and "persistence of aggregates."

Still, one must not forget the rôle played in the burning of heretics by entirely "logical" considerations. The burning of heretics is not specific to the Middle Ages. In the Middle Ages, religious heretics were destroyed, in our own days we are used to the annihilation of political heretics. Again, the religious heretics of the Middle Ages were at the same time, without any exception, social revolutionaries. Pareto would be the first to stress the essential identity of the two phenomena. Let us then test his theory by the contemporary facts. Is it a sheer desire for uniformity which makes Fascists destroy Democrats and Bolsheviki annihilate Liberals? Anyone conversant with the facts knows that a very different explanation suggests itself. Those governments feel their policy hampered and possibly their very existence jeopardized by the activities of their adversaries, and consequently try to suppress them. Some of these adversaries are believed to be absolutely irreconcilable and are therefore persecuted without mercy; others seem to be more adaptable and with them a policy of persecution alternates with a policy of clemency. The history of Fascist governments provides ample material as to their varying attitude towards religious organizations, and the history of Bolshevism gives a great number of examples of sweeping changes of attitude towards different "oppositions." Is all that to be explained by

ups and downs of the sense of uniformity? Furthermore, this alleged sense of uniformity seems to vary strangely with the political institutions of the peoples concerned. There is certainly no society whatever without some amount of social compulsion, but some societies exert such compulsion almost without restraint, others only on a relatively small number of points; still, the points where this compulsion is exerted vary. Sometimes, religious compulsion is stronger than the political one and sometimes it is the reverse. There are people and there are periods of history where some conventional morality is enforced with strictness whereas business behaviour is practically uncontrolled, not only by the administration but even by public opinion, and there are other cases where individual morality is more or less treated as something private whereas business is constantly interfered with by all sorts of official and unofficial factors. These last-mentioned facts do not come within the range of what Pareto describes as logical actions, that is in the range of activities directly determined by individual interests. But, on the other hand, they cannot be explained through the "sense of uniformity," as there is no reason why this sense in one time and place should operate more in one direction and in another time and place more in another. Here the full reality of moral, religious, and political facts intervenes, unintelligible from the view-point of Pareto, for whom all religions, morals, and political creeds are alike.

One is tempted to try to give an explanation for this levelling down of the most various facts to a simple sense of uniformity. One element of this attitude is known to us. It is Pareto's consistent tendency to

explain as many facts as possible in terms of "non-logical actions," that is of meaningless reflexes. He does not wish to acknowledge the enormous amount of "logical actions," that is of direct defence of interests, in these actions, and he still refuses to admit the reality of political, religious, and moral creeds, treating them as mere "derivations" with hardly any practical importance. Thus the mere undefined, purely formal reflex tending to keep up uniformity remains. Essentially, the whole concept of non-logical actions is not an outcome of observation but an expression of a pessimistic mood denying any sense, value or meaning to human actions.

Still, in the case of the "sense of uniformity" there seems to be another motive. Treating the persecution of heretics as something entirely irrational, consistently overlooking its possible necessity from the view-point of certain interests, treating all religions as purely "non-logical" comes to the same as saying that persecution of heretics is simply the result of a cruel superstition. But is that not exactly what every rationalist, every believer in "progress" and in the "goddess science," every Spencerian and Mazzinian would say? The whole difference would be that those believers in progress would be convinced of the gradual disappearance of such an evil, whereas Pareto is convinced of its inevitability. But in the interpretation of the facts, there is no difference whatever. Here, as in so many cases, Pareto, without knowing it, simply accepts the values of his adversaries the rationalists, adding, however, that those values or, in his terms, those logical types of behaviour, will never become dominant.

The "sense of uniformity" is by far the most impor-

tant subgroup of Pareto's residue of sociability. Having treated it at length, we can be much shorter in treating the other subgroups.

Strangely enough, asceticism is ranged among the residues of sociability, possibly on account of the self-denial and service for others frequently bound up with it. The study of asceticism is full of fine psychological observations,¹ and here as in the case of the sex residue Pareto is skilful at tracing the influence of an instinct which very often tends to hide itself. The final explanation, however, is unsatisfactory. "Asceticism has as its nucleus a hypertrophy of certain social instincts."² Here, again, Pareto suddenly falls into the habit of the rationalists, who want to correlate any impulse with some "objective" social utility, taking evident exceptions to this rule as simple aberrations from the "normal."

In two other cases, namely, in his study of cruelty and clemency, and in the one concerned with the sentiments of hierarchy, Pareto's interest is mainly political. Those sentiments, he contends, are to be found in every society.³ The political sense of this statement is evident; if hierarchy is a fact present in every society, then egalitarian ideals are to be discarded. Thus, he tries to demonstrate the feelings of hierarchy in different societies. Always, except immediately before their fall, the higher classes feel themselves to be benevolent protectors, this feeling being combined with the enjoyment of their domination and with pride.⁴ The lower classes feel submission, veneration, fear, and generally have a feeling of being bound up with the ruling class.⁵ These sentiments are analogous

¹ 1163. ff.

² 1174.

³ 1159.

⁴ 1155.

⁵ 1156.

to the feelings of the young towards the old, of the inexperienced towards the experienced, of the plebeian towards the nobleman. To-day this feeling is present in the attitude of the non-organized and of many bourgeois towards the organized workers.

There is hardly any doubt as to the existence of such feelings of hierarchy, any more than as to the natural inequality of human beings. Again, its wide range is certainly a fact and it is indeed a very strong argument against certain types of egalitarianism. Still, one would like to make an attempt at explaining its roots. Such an attempt, however, is incompatible with the very concept of non-logical actions. But even more important is the problem of the differentiation of this feeling. Certainly there is a hierarchy in democratic as well as in aristocratic governments, in trade-unions as well as in armies, in religious life as well as in the political sphere. But this observation does not render useless any research into the causes of the change of government, organizational principles, and so on. To admit that even democracy cannot be kept going without a hierarchy puts an end to any form of absolute egalitarianism. Still one need not be an absolute egalitarian to be a convinced democrat. The democratic type of hierarchy might be better than other types in general, or better under certain conditions. Only a careful investigation into the causes of constitutional change could tell us.

Now such an investigation is not completely lacking in Pareto's sociology. It is attempted under the heading of the "circulation of elites" which we will consider at length in a later part of our study. Yet, so much is to be said at once: in this latter study Pareto

consistently treats the sentiments of hierarchy as unchanging. Only some people possess more of them than others and the share of these people in government varies. Thus the amount of hierarchical attitudes to be found in a society depends on the psychological peculiarities of its rulers. And it is very definitely assumed that any deficiency of the sense of domination in them spells destruction to their society. We shall criticize this theory in a subsequent chapter.

Concerning the theory of cruelty and clemency the attitude is the same. It is a dithyramb on harshness and a violent polemic against any "humanitarian" theories of punishment. It advocates cruelty as the best means of domination, though of course not "unnecessary cruelty." But we had better treat the questions concerned in connection with residue V, the "residue of the integrity of the individual." For in spite of the alleged sharp distinction between the main groups of residues the considerations concerning cruelty are mostly not to be found under residue IV but under residue V to which we now turn.

This, he contends, is the residue of interests.¹ For the moment the reader is puzzled. "Residues" *ex definitione* are non-logical actions or, more accurately, non-logical motives for actions. Interests, according to Pareto, are the prototype of motives for logical actions. How can interests be residues? It is one of the many places where Pareto's applications of his theories are inconsistent with his definitions. In this case, however, the inconsistency is less considerable than it appears. For the "interests" treated under residue V are not at

¹ 1207.

all what would be called "interests" in ordinary life. It is not the interests which an average nineteenth-century European would call "real" interest, but those to which he would give the name of "imaginary interests," essentially magical interests and some others seeming to Pareto specifically non-logical, which are treated under this heading.

The first of these imaginary interests considered by Pareto, and which, to a certain degree, seems to confound itself with interest in general, is the desire for the preservation of social equilibrium. A change in social equilibrium produces uneasiness not only among those who have suffered by it but even among others. If a social status is changed, there arise automatically forces tending towards the re-establishment of the old balance.¹ This follows simply from the concept of equilibrium itself. So for instance, the public reacts against frequent murders because of the well-grounded reflex of self-defence. But it equally reacts against murders where they are quite exceptional and no serious danger for any ordinary member of the group exists.² Then Pareto takes up the feelings of superiority, inferiority and equality. He stresses the irrational side of the class struggle. Then he turns to the question of magic in so far as it is concerned with the restoration of the integrity of an object or an individual. We are faced with a very fine study of the ritual of purification.³ Then there are cases of the artificial restoration of the integrity of a family and another group disturbed by the loss of some of its members. Finally, we find a discussion of the defence of the equilibrium of abstracts such as religion and political

¹ 1208.² 1213.³ 1246.

creed.¹ And thus the discussion of residue V is terminated. Interests in the ordinary sense of the word as directly connected with economic life are conspicuously absent from the study.

The idea underlying Pareto's concept of the residue of the integrity of the individual seems to be that there is an immediate sense of preservation of equilibrium. As with so many other concepts, even the concept of equilibrium is not defined, but from the single problems taken into consideration we may guess that Pareto identifies the tendency towards the keeping of the equilibrium with the tendency of keeping a given state of things, which is generally called conservatism. Conservatism then seems to be mainly an irrational force, and Pareto's chief concern in discussing it lies in affording the greatest possible evidence for the influence of conservatism where we would hardly expect to find it, as for instance, in a ritual of purification. Now, we fully concede that conservatism is not simply the rational attitude taken up by those interested in a given social order, but a powerful psychological force in those who would not have any imaginable advantage in changing things. In the stressing of facts like these the whole value of a psychological aspect as opposed to a rationalistic one becomes apparent. Only, Pareto's psychology is insufficient, mainly on account of its being biassed by his ideas about the meaninglessness of non-logical actions.

Does the public really react against the murderer because he has disturbed the social equilibrium? This equilibrium certainly is not a mystical force embodied in the "soul" or even less in the reflexes of single

RESIDUES

individuals. There seems to be a much simpler and more empirical explanation available. Has the horror of murder not been impressed upon us during the early years of our education, and is it not rather this external influence deeply ingrained in our personalities which has made murder to us one of the most horrifying things on earth? How else could we explain the difference everybody instinctively makes between the kinds of killing allowed and those forbidden? One may question how this teaching became part of the educational activities. But for that history fully accounts. There was a time when murder, far from being forbidden, was part of the ordinary course of events, and powerful social forces had to struggle for centuries to wipe it out from everyday life. We do not intend to discuss here the interests and sentiments which worked upon the social forces in their time. But certainly in the majority of the population there was then no spontaneous reaction against the upsetting of the social balance by murder such as we observe to-day. Certainly, the reaction against murder is not rational; so far Pareto is right. But it is equally certain that this reflex is historically and socially conditioned instead of being a common feature of mankind throughout the ages as Pareto seems to assume.

The problem put by the purification rituals is slightly different. Here certainly Pareto hits on a fact which though perhaps not quite general is certainly extremely common throughout all sorts of civilizations. In such a case one is entitled to suppose one instinct common to mankind, or at least to the greater part of it, underlying actions identical in substance. In such a case even the distinction between form and

essence has its right place. Forms are not superficial as Pareto would like to have us believe. There is a very essential difference between a baptism and some magic purification ceremony among primitive peoples. The social background is largely different and with it the results of the ceremony. In each case it is a purification ceremony. But in one case it simply atones for some breach of taboo whereas in the other case it may be the condition for admission into a more or less voluntary religious community. It remains, however, remarkable, that the same idea of purification is implied in both cases. To trace such common psychological features throughout different institutions is certainly important. But, the psychological explanation given by Pareto is open to doubt. It is difficult to see why at the root of different purification rituals there is supposed to exist a reflex against the upsetting of social balance, and not rather a reaction against a feeling of impurity. The latter in our opinion is the correct explanation. But as all these discussions fall into the sphere of psychology rather than that of sociology, we refrain from any further argument, merely calling attention to one observation: only careful inquiry with the aid of all psychological methods available and not any artificial grouping of facts superficial analogies can solve the problem. But here Pareto's behaviourism makes itself felt. After deserting his behaviouristic intentions and making the object of his research mainly psychological, he then comes back to a method of pure external observation which leads to a grouping of facts arbitrary and uncontrolled.

But sometimes even his argument is definitely biased by political considerations. If the equilibrium

is upset by heretics and restored by priests then the superstitious character of the reaction is stressed. If the reaction, however, is not directed against sceptics but against humanitarians, then its profound soundness is advanced, irrespective of its non-logical motives.

A special paragraph is devoted to a French court case concerning the murder of a child by a psychopath.¹ The court was inclined to take the experts' advice and to release the culprit on the ground of mental incapacity. But the excitement of the populace obtained a verdict of death which Pareto strongly advocates, as in another place he advocates the very intelligent habit of lynching. The reaction here seems to be similar to the one which rouses the public against other murderers, and much more unreasonable than the repression of religious and political heretics. It seems to be the verdict of "logical-experimental science" that this man is in no sense responsible for his actions and that it may be advisable to keep him in custody but unjustifiable to punish him. But this is not the opinion of Pareto, who takes the case as an occasion for the further indictment of humanitarianism. He goes out of his way to assert that the public is quite right, and that mildness is quite out of place if such crimes are to be made abhorrent, and that in addition the more an individual is pathological the more he ought to be destroyed. Both arguments are hardly scientific. The pathological deficiencies of an individual may be an argument for preventing his reproducing his kind but certainly not for killing him. And the argument in favour of vicarious punishments, possibly valid for infractions committed from necessity and mo-

¹ 1301.

PARETO

mentary passions, is certainly worthless for crimes which are committed solely from an insuperable pathological impulse. Here, ruthless punishment may rather incite to crime than deter from it. There is no doubt that into Pareto's continual advocacy of ruthless punishment, ruthless oppression, ruthless use of force, there enters among other motives a strain of cruelty. Assertions as to the purely rational premeditated character of these ideas ought not to be accepted in full where passion so conspicuously overwhelms cool considerations.

We have not yet exhausted Pareto's single residue-groups and have to terminate now by considering residues I and II, instinct of combinations and persistence of aggregates, which in Pareto's view are by far the most important of all. Pareto, in his further developments simply drops all the residues except those two, which enter as essential elements into his theory of the circulation of elites. As to residue I Pareto from the outset insists upon the attraction exercised upon the human mind by combinations themselves, without any regard for their eventual utility. This instinct is most outstanding in science and in play. Confidence in combinations is original, as is evident in the case of the lottery.¹ As a matter of fact, in Pareto's instinct of combinations, two opposite phenomena are united, one being the pleasure in the combining of different things, the other the liking for similar ones.² He gives a fair amount of examples of the last phenomenon, starting with the use of similarity in magic, going on to symbols, myth and other phenomena. As we should expect, one more denunciation of the belief in pro-

¹ 892.

² 910.

gress is not lacking. We shall hardly fail to find it in any of his considerations. This time he comes to grips with the admiration of all good things as "progressive" and "democratic" and denunciation of all bad things as "reactionary" and "aristocratic," terminating with some sarcastic remarks about the goddess "universal suffrage."¹ The fact itself, the tendency to combine similar (or directly opposed) things is undeniable, and we no longer insist that the mere statement of the fact is insufficient. More could be said about the tendency to combine things entirely different. The well-known "play-instinct" seems to be at the root of this concept. But modern psychologists will hardly take such an instinct as a reality. They know well enough that a child is not satisfied with mere playing activity, of no particular kind, that there is no direct liking for combinations in themselves, but that the child constantly wants to express some feeling, symbolizing this feeling in his play. It is the wide range of these childish symbols as compared with the relatively narrow use made of them in the ordinary activities of adults, that gives the wrong impression of a mere pleasure in combinations. The same of course applies to the preference given to the combination of similar and opposed things. This pleasure is not a thing in itself, but in every case the expression of one concrete powerful instinct which wants to express itself in as many forms as possible and tries to remove as far as possible things likely to disturb it. Again, in all those phenomena, apart from the emphasis laid upon similar elements, some tendency to transform dissimilar elements into similar ones will be observable.

¹ 936.

Generally speaking, the shortcomings of Pareto's interpretation here, as so often, result from his inconsistent application of the concept of utility, a mistake closely related to his liberal creed. In a passage quoted above, he emphasizes the impossibility of giving a general definition of utility. Thus utility would simply be what a given individual likes, and the object of research would be to find out what he is really doing in a given activity. But it is not thus that Pareto really understands it. One of his essential arguments is that combinations are enjoyed where they have no utility whatever. Here utility seems to be usefulness or an activity in some "practical" sense, not clearly defined, but probably bound up in some way with economic utility. And as everything else is useless and senseless, it seems that we have to accept it simply as a queer fact since human life is full of such queer facts, which do not agree with the economic principle, or rather is almost entirely filled with such non-logical actions. And as we already know, "non-logical" for Pareto is identical with inexplicable and so beyond the reach of any further research.

The consequences of this attitude are very far-reaching indeed. Pareto constructs a residue of combinations intending specifically to unite different residues, being a form of the residue of combinations. "Man wants a complete whole, without discordant notes."¹ Nothing is more true than this! But how amazing to account for this fact, not by the desire of man to get rid of antagonistic and incompatible impulses in order to be able to act, but by the assumption of a special liking for similitudes! The tendency to unify the

RESIDUES

mass of experiences is probably deeply bound up with the trend towards the unification of personality, a trend which on its side is the same thing as the development of a human being from its first uncontrolled infancy to its maturity. Where there is a lack of success, we find mental debility: where it is undone after having been achieved, we find madness. It is simply bound up with human existence itself, though it would be far from the truth to take it for granted as a given fact instead of looking upon it as the incomplete result of a difficult process of adaptation. But to bring the most vital strictly biological fact of development under the heading of the liking for similitudes is again a deflection from an unbiassed observation to a pessimistic philosophy of the meaninglessness of human behaviour.

Similar remarks apply to another argument of Pareto's. He treats the desire for logical developments as a form of the spirit of combinations!¹ Now he himself has strongly insisted, possibly even overinsisted upon the essential difference between non-logical and logical actions. Now we are faced with the grouping of logic itself under the heading of non-logical actions. To us, logic seems to be one of several means of orientation in the world, and as such a biological necessity for a being whose instincts are evidently insufficient to cope with the conditions of its existence. It may be said that even the desire to act logically is an instinct, though the wording "the non-logical action of desire for logical developments" is rather a peculiar one. But Pareto leaves us in no doubt that he does not mean it like that. "The desire

¹ 972.

for logic is satisfied as well by a rigorous logic as by a sham-logic: finally, men want to argue, and it has little importance whether the argument is good or bad." There is certainly *some* truth in this statement. Truth is not always the thing biologically most urgently needed and biological needs are not always stronger than passion. Then the intellectual organs are restricted in their functions and sham-logic steps into the place of logic. But it is a different thing to say that logic is essentially the desire to argue, irrespective of objective truth. The latter, however, is undoubtedly what Pareto means. On this point, the theory of residues as one dealing with the meaninglessness of sentiments is connected with the theory of derivations as one dealing with the meaninglessness of arguments.

Similar considerations apply to residue II, which is supposed to produce a certain permanent attachment in the continued adherence to things once united.¹ The most characteristic argument in this connection is the one concerning the worship of the dead. Pareto does not believe that the feeling of attachment to the dead is conditioned by the belief in another life after death.² In that he may be right: belief in a life after death is rather a result than a cause of our attachment to the dead. But then he continues by stating that this attachment is simply a continuation of the feeling of personal identity in time.³ Now there seem to be two very valid emotional grounds for our attachment to the dead. First we fear our own death and this fear inclines us to believe in a future life. Secondly we lament the death of people we have loved and it is only with them that any real attachment remains after

¹ 991.

² 1053.

³ 1055.

death, as only with them real attachment existed in life. We may retain for the dead other feelings also originating in their lifetime, as for instance fear. But certainly our feelings and the loss of their object is paramount in everything concerning the dead and the worship of them. We fail to find the slightest allusion to this fact in Pareto's discussion of the matter.

The same applies to his argument about family feeling. It probably originates, he believes, in the long continuance of child-rearing among men.¹ This long continuance is certainly specific for man as compared with other animals and its consequences are far-reaching. The period of child-rearing is shorter among animals, but is there no family-feeling? It is less deeply ingrained, but it is there and is in many species a biological need, without which the race could not exist. The prolonged dependence of human children may account for the lasting character of the feelings concerned, but not for their existence. Is it not peculiar to trace family feelings to long dependence in the sense of a long local community of life, without mentioning the fact of family love, which has so many different origins? Pareto may answer that he certainly does not take family love as a simple fact (which would probably be a great mistake), but wants to account for it. But is it true that any long community of life creates feelings identical with family feelings? Here again, the obvious side of feelings and biological needs fitting into the whole of social and individual life is overlooked, and is replaced by some meaningless adherence to things which have been once seen to be connected.

It is, however, impossible in this connection to over-

look completely the real emotional side of facts. Pareto touches on it in discussing religion. In Rome, there was the worship of a goddess "Annona," the goddess of the provisioning of the City. We are not confronted here with a process of rational personification of a function, but the strong emotions raised by the difficulties of this important business led to the imagining of a goddess whose care it was.¹ That may be so. But such a simple interpretation is not always sufficient. The worship of the emperors during the Roman empire is accounted for by the feelings of gratitude inspired in their regiments.² This may apply to some provinces which had been badly exploited by the senatorial aristocracy in previous times. But the cult of the emperor was mainly a political fact, instituted at once before such feelings could have gained sufficient strength, and kept going under the most despicable and the most hated of the emperors, without any evidence of rebellion against it, unless we take Christianity as an exception. The emotional side in emperor worship seems not to have been very strong at any time. But be that as it may, Pareto certainly fails in applying the same concept to the "God Progress."³ "Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the Western countries have seen their conditions of life progressively improve, and this improvement has accelerated notably at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus arose an aggregate of agreeable sentiments and ideas, crystallized later on around nuclei named "progress" and "Democracy." These mighty and beneficent beings are regarded by our contemporaries with sentiments

¹ 996.² 999.³ 1077.

similar to the ones held by their ancestors for the power of Rome."

The crucial point here is not the treatment of the belief in progress as a religion. It is true, and it is to the credit of Pareto that he has stressed it, that ideas apparently quite empirical, scientific and utilitarian can be vested with the dignity and made an object of the feelings once reserved for religious objects. But does he correctly account for the origin of these feelings? Certainly not. The belief in progress has not arisen as a result of real progress in well-being. It has been outlined by men like Bacon, Descartes and many others, and has been emphasized by social critics during the eighteenth century, when hardly any sign of material improvement was to be seen, and the increase of poverty was the complaint of the day. It has not followed but introduced material progress. It is not our task here to analyse it: but certainly the simple deduction of religious beliefs from an aggregate of agreeable or unpleasant feelings based on actual personal experience is unsatisfactory. It mainly comes back to the old idea of the rationalists of the eighteenth century, which accounted for religion by gratitude to benefactors and fear of thunder and other terrors, together with fear artificially created by imposters. The last side is put into the background by Pareto but the main framework of eighteenth-century rationalism remains. Here again, his opposition to rationalism is more apparent than real.

But all this criticism in detail ought to recede in face of this essential fact: The residue of the persistence of aggregates, to Pareto's mind, will account for the most important "higher" aspects of culture, such as

morals, religion, patriotism and so on. It is hardly too much to say, that in reality it does not even touch these questions. The persistence of aggregates may be quite good for explaining classical Greek and Roman religion, the first being mainly an expression of the cohesion of political units, and the second a ritual for everyday concerns. Neither the Greek nor the Roman religion is so much of a problem in itself as is religion in ancient and modern Jewry, in the movement of Pharaoh Akhnaton, in Chinese Taoism, in Christianity and Islam, in Buddhism and Hinduism and in a number of other cases. Classical religion is less separated from political and everyday facts than any of the forms of religion just named. As to those latter forms, Pareto does not even attempt an interpretation, and it may be best simply to give up any application of his theory to such facts, as they are entirely uncongenial to him. It is worse in the case of morals. For on the one hand the few attempts to interpret concrete moral rules are rather unsatisfactory, as was evident in the case of murder. On the other hand he prefers a staunch belief in the unchangeability of morals, which can hardly be made to coincide with facts.

This leads again to the question of change or subsistence of the residues, to which Pareto has devoted much consideration. "In those historical societies, we observe phenomena varying little in substance but much in form. The various religions for instance succeeding one another may have different forms *ad libitum*, but finally they are manifestations of religious sentiments varying little."¹ Again, a definition of religious sentiments is lacking and we are at a loss to

¹ 1695.

RESIDUES

explain which sentiments according to Pareto vary little. It is undeniable that common features of human attitude exist, and that among them is a tendency to keep beliefs called vaguely "religious." It may be justifiable to say that those beliefs are characterized by a strict command not to doubt them. Then, the spreading of religion throughout humanity would mean that man generally has some sentiment of awe in face of certain beliefs as much as in face of certain infractions, and the sentiment underlying religion proves to be much the same as the sentiment underlying taboos. Certainly such a tendency exists and may justly be believed to express some common feature of human nature. But we contend that such an assumption is not the end but only the beginning of a sociological study. Man may need some absolute and this need may make itself felt in all different religions and practical morals. But are the forms only of secondary importance then? In the Middle Ages it was forbidden to believe in the autonomy of matter, in the progressivist creed it is forbidden to believe in the guidance of the world by the councils of God. The one has opposed some sorts of scientific research, the other one has emphasized them. The Catholic creed in the Middle Ages was opposed to the political tendencies of the lower classes, but Calvinism favoured Parliamentary government and some of its offshoots even believed in democracy. Hinduism binds up the fate of the individual with the fulfilling of his caste Dharma, whereas original Christianity started with the pronouncement that all men are equal before God, and thus broke the spirit of slavery. Mohammedanism allows and sometimes favours polygamy, whereas

Christianity is strictly monogamous; and so on and so forth. Are all these changes without importance? It may be said, that real life does not correspond to these religious derivations, which no doubt is true to some extent, but certainly is not the complete truth either. Does the Western world really keep to Christianity exclusively by tradition and could Mohammedanism in its present form be fitted into Western life? Certainly not. Of course, some elements of the Mohammedan faith could be adapted without trouble to its social organization, but the creed as a whole would have to be entirely transformed in order to be adapted. Or do the Bolsheviks persecute Christianity only because they have a fancy to do so? We believe they know very well why they do it.

In another example Pareto's mistake becomes still more evident. It is the same residue, he says, which creates magic and scientific research.¹ Let us take this doubtful axiom for granted. Is therefore magic essentially the same thing as science? Pareto himself would be the first to deny it.

Before leaving the theory of residues we must still touch on the application given to it in the later portions of Pareto's work. As a matter of fact, the details of this theory are of no account in its further applications. The six groups of residues disappear. The residues of action and sex are conspicuously absent in those later parts while sociability and integrity are largely included in residue II, persistence of aggregates. Finally, history proves to be one great conflict between residues I and II. Furthermore the meaning of these two residues is simplified. No account is taken of the attraction of

¹ 1699.

RESIDUES

similarity in residue I, whilst asceticism and other items in residue II are dropped. Finally, residue I is simply identified with the spirit of change, while residue II is meant to represent the spirit of continuity and authority, morals and religion. The whole story of mankind becomes a struggle between conservatism and change.

We have now considered every one of Pareto's residues in detail and his concept of non-logical actions has thus been put forward under different aspects and from different view-points. Far from being a simple notion, derived from a comprehensive division of all actions into logical and non-logical, it proved to be a compound of different, not always well-distinguished, notions, which certainly cannot be derived from the primary characteristic of lack of logic. Among them we found unchangeability, isolation of the different residues from one another, meaninglessness, unintelligibility. Having achieved our detailed presentation of Pareto's theory, we are in a position to reap the fruits of our rather trying labour, to determine the real methodological and metaphysical character—for in spite of Pareto's denials the notion of residues is a metaphysical one—of his idea of non-logical action. Let us cast a comprehensive glance over his deductions.

Society very often enforces uniformity of its members on important points. What is the cause? Evidently men have a sense of uniformity! Things once belonging together are very often kept together, in a sort of sense of preservation, usually called conservatism or traditionalism. What is the cause? Evidently a liking for the persistence of aggregates! Very often things not originally belonging together are combined,

sometimes in unexpected ways. What is the cause of it? Evidently an instinct of combinations! Things and actions are tabooed and we have difficulty in finding out why. But why bother? Is it not evident that we have here just an instinctive aversion to these things and actions, and need not trouble any more, this being a sufficient explanation? A century ago, Hegel turned his bitter irony against Kant, who explained every mental activity by assuming a specific capacity for it. Pareto, in his turn, explains every psychological and sociological fact by assuming a specific instinct or sense for it in human nature. Now an explanation is the correlation of unknown phenomena with other phenomena better known to us. Is the "instinct of combinations" better known to us than the combinations themselves, the natural aversions better than the taboos they are supposed to explain, the sense of uniformity better than the actions enforcing uniformity? Certainly not! Those instincts, as Pareto assumes them, are simple doubles of the facts they are supposed to explain, queer psycho-sociological "Dinge an sich" which resemble on all points the phenomena they are intended to make intelligible, except the one point that they are unobservable and thus metaphysical entities, whereas the social phenomena they are meant to explain are observable.

But what then about the strict transference of the methods used in natural sciences to sociology? Some centuries ago, before Galileo, Pascal, Newton and others had developed modern scientific methods, and even much later, people were satisfied with explaining every quality perceivable to the senses by an underlying unobservable entity: burning through the phlo-

RESIDUES

giston, light through the lightstuff, heat through heat-molecules and so on. These "quality-matters" were simple metaphysical doubles of the qualities observed, exactly as the "residues" are doubles of social and psychological phenomena. It is the methods of medieval and renaissance science, not the ones used in our times, which Pareto has transferred to sociology.

In the conception of prescientific naturalists, those "quality-matters" were essentially independent of one another, but underwent a mutual, but purely external influence. Modern science prefers to assume that these qualities are only different aspects of identical processes with an identical material substratum. Function, the dominating concept of modern natural science, is based on this conception. For the main characteristic of function is its permutability. You cannot express the heat-molecules in terms of smell-molecules, but you can express calories in terms of chemical energy and vice versa. The concept of energy and of the permutability of its different forms is the prototype of modern physical method. The underlying assumption is that in reality there is only one matter and only one energy. How could such a conception be transferred to sociology? Evidently by the assumption that social life is essentially one, that the various phenomena we observe in it are only different aspects of a unique process and that it is the task of science not to make metaphysical guesses about the underlying material substratum but to make the phenomena we observe intelligible the one in terms of the other. It would not admit that these phenomena simply influence one another. It would, for instance, emphatically reject the old puzzling question whether law determines

economic life or economic life law. It would insist that law, as far as it is concerned with economic activities, is an inseparable aspect of economic life, a rule neither dependent on nor determining the economic life, but an element without which no economic life can be thought of and understood. Such a method, as practised to-day in one school of social anthropology, would deserve the name of "functional" and could claim to transfer the concepts and methods of modern physics to sociology.

But such a method is essentially incompatible with the primary axioms of Pareto's social philosophy. For his residues are *ex definitione* separate unchangeable entities. They can influence one another by a kind of external pressure, conflicting in one individual or causing conflicts between different individuals. But they remain, nevertheless, standing aloof. In Pareto's sociology causality can and does exist, as an irreversible influence of one "residue" upon other social facts. Cross-influences still exist, some one phenomenon influenced by a residue influencing other phenomena and being in its turn influenced by them. But function, in the sense of a strictly irreversible relation between facts, the treating of social life as a coherent whole, does not and cannot exist in such a philosophy. For incoherence is the main feature of non-logical actions, as Pareto describes them.

Here the ways of sociological schools diverge. Some may hold Pareto's concept, but others will, and rightly, we believe, contend that real non-logical actions would be a symptom of madness, and even in madness there is certainly more sense than former times used to assume. Magic, taboos, traditions, all these elements

so non-logical for the rationalist—and Pareto is essentially a rationalist, in spite of his violent attacks on rationalism, which, in him is broken by a pessimistic philosophy!—are in reality full of meaning, and generally the societies where they are found could not live without them. It is the main task of the sociologist to find out this meaning, to understand social phenomena as the results of a process of adaptation of needs and desires to necessities.

Perhaps the strangest aspect of Pareto's sociology is the treatment he gives to those synthetic activities tending towards separatism. We are far from denying the existence of instincts; still, we refuse to suppose simply an instinct, wherever we are confronted with a reiterated activity. Again, we deny that instincts in themselves are meaningless; from the outset they are generally more or less clearly related to biological or social needs. And finally, we assume that almost the whole of social activities is directed towards the fitting of these instincts into the whole of social life. This synthetic tendency, which is the essence of social life itself, is felt by Pareto—and treated as a residue, as a separated instinct itself! It is the residue of the preservation of the equilibrium, the instinct of the keeping up of the unity of the personality, and as such a special case of the frequent tendency to keep things once united going together. Social life is made uniform by an instinct of uniformity, but individual life is held together in the unity of the personality by an instinct for holding it together. The last explanation of social life lies thus in the assumption of some unobservable metaphysical entities, called instincts. They will explain everything.

CHAPTER IV

DERIVATIONS

WE will repeat in a few words the essential ideas of Pareto as far as they have been analysed. Actions are either logical or non-logical. Logical actions are governed by interests. To them belong economic activities, science, and probably some other smaller groups, never enumerated; but at least struggle for power seems to count among them. The other actions are non-logical and governed by certain recurrent sentiments, which are common to mankind: residues. But even non-logical actions are not devoid of all interference of thought. They are accompanied by simili-logical explanations: derivations. With them we have to deal next.

Derivations arise, because man wants to explain his actions and at the same time wants to hide his feelings. So he gives for many of his actions some apparently logical explanations, while in reality they are directed by sentiments.¹ We are again presented with the strange cleavage between acting by sentiment and acting by logic, which is so essential in Pareto's sociology. As we have discussed it at length, we shall not come back to this point.

There is, says Pareto, a widespread tendency to study derivations instead of residues. Not only is this a mistake, but even the sociologist must not be contented

¹ 1397.

DERIVATIONS

with spotting the sophisms included in every derivation. He must try to find out how it works and how far it succeeds.¹ Then he gives the following list of derivations:²

✓ I. Affirmations:

- (a) Experimental or imaginary facts,
- (b) Sentiments,
- (c) Mixture of facts and sentiments.

✓ II. Authority:

- (a) Of a person or several persons,
- (b) Of tradition, habits and customs,
- (c) Of a deity or a personification.

✓ III. Accord with sentiments or principles:

- (a) Sentiments,
- (b) Individual interests,
- (c) Collective interests,
- (d) Juridical entities,
- (e) Metaphysical entities,
- (f) Supernatural entities.

✓ IV. Verbal proofs:

- (a) Indefinite terms used to indicate a real thing, and indefinite things brought under one term.
- (b) Terms indicating a thing arousing accessory sentiments, and accessory sentiments determining the choice of terms.
- (c) Terms with various meanings and different things under one term.

¹ 1411.

² 1419.

- (d) Metaphors, allegories, analogies.
- (e) Vague, indefinite terms with no concrete object.

From this very list the main characteristics of the concept of derivations can be deduced. Derivations, in Pareto's system, comprehend the whole of arguments used to justify sentiments, everything, which, in other systems is called "ideologies." It comprehends jurisprudence, morals, religious beliefs; not, of course, the religious and moral sentiment in itself, which, being the same throughout all times and peoples, belongs to the residues; but all its concrete variations and alterations. They are mere derivations, similitudinal variations in argument to justify an ever remaining unchanging substratum.

This is one side of the concept of derivations. The other side, closely correlated to the first, is this: derivations, in the list above, are grouped along the type of arguments used. Thus, in the list, items as "sentiments," "interests," and so forth, are not to be understood as the real causes of the derivations in question. They are the reasons invoked to justify an action. Let us take an example. Protective tariffs may correspond with certain interests. But that is not, in Pareto's sense, the derivation of "interests." On the contrary it would be a logical action. But in advocating tariffs, "collective interests," interests of the nation, for instance, might be invoked, which are really non-existent.¹ Then we have a case of the derivation of interests. The same applies to sentiments; the derivation of sentiments con-

¹ 1499.

DERIVATIONS

sists in the rousing of sentiments for purposes not really implied in them. The juridical derivations are not the true applications of law, but the using of pseudo-legal arguments where they are inappropriate, and so on and so forth. We know already that according to Pareto men are generally satisfied by similitude as well as by true logics. Thus we may assume that in Pareto's mind most arguments must belong to the type of derivations. Consequently, derivations are grouped according to the type of argument used in them.

One remark here obtrudes itself. First, we are again confronted by the negative rationalism of Pareto. The lack of rationality is the thing which strikes him in derivations, which, accordingly, are studied as paralogisms. What in them is not logical, is a phenomenon belonging to residues and not treated again. Thus, the study of derivations is essentially a study of paralogisms. And again, the study in detail of the variations of law, morals, and religion, is set aside, the essential task of any sociological study is discarded. We will now consider a few of the examples given by Pareto, in order to give a better idea of his concept of derivations.

Group I, simple affirmations, does not afford much matter for comment. Nor does group II, the derivation of authority.¹ It becomes clear at once that derivations in reality are indistinguishable from residues. Does he not contend that the sentiment of authority is the same throughout all times. But then the derivation of authority is simply based on the residue of hierarchy, the derivation being the double of the residue. Residues cannot be destroyed by logical argu-

¹ 1434.

ments. Nor can derivations. The idea of destroying Christianity by proving scientifically the non-existence of Jesus is wholly illusory. Such demonstrations do not even reach the masses which they are intended to convert.¹ A few examples are given to show how authority is accepted on matters where it has not the slightest claim. Theodore Roosevelt may have been an able politician, but that hardly entitled him to the admiration with which scientific bodies accepted his incompetent utterances on difficult questions. But any one who has attained authority on one point is in a position to claim it on entirely different ones.² No doubt, the statement is fully born out by facts.

Group III, invocation of sentiments, interests, principles, is still more interesting. Invocation of interests is exemplified by the philosophy of Bentham.³ This thinker starts from individual interests in order to arrive at collective regulations. But as individual interests in reality often clash with collective rules, he is obliged to smuggle in the interests of the majority instead of the interests of the individual, to make interests and rules fit into one another. Again, Pareto's criticism is certainly pertinent.

One famous case, the theory of the social contract and of natural right, illustrates at the same time the invocation of sentiments and the juridical derivation.⁴ Here notions of law, which are entirely consistent in their own sphere, have been pressed into a context where they are fictitious in every sense. But the *consensus omnium* and the juridical forms wield authority, even in spheres where they cannot be applied at all. Again, there is no doubt about the rightness of Pareto's

¹ 1455 f.

² 1436.

³ 1486 ff.

⁴ 1501.

DERIVATIONS

appreciation. Nevertheless, here another aspect of Pareto's theory ought not to be forgotten. He is not so strictly opposed to the ideology of natural law as his theory of derivations makes us believe.

Natural law has generally been advocated on the basis of the *consensus omnium*, and, if such a *consensus* existed, would exist in fact. Moral, legal, religious, æsthetic rules common to all mankind would really form a natural morality, law, religion and sense of beauty. One still might discuss whether they render some absolute truth, or a truth valid only for man, but this would not take away their value for man. In fact, I do not see that there is any argument against the theory of natural law save one, and this one is decisive: the fact is, there is not one single moral, legal, religious rule on which the whole of mankind really agrees. But unfortunately, Pareto shares with his rationalist adversaries the belief in the essential identity of morals, religion, and so forth, throughout mankind. He certainly takes it in a negative sense, accepting the general existence of these attitudes as a proof of the general existence of non-logical residues. But whether logical or non-logical, if these beliefs are really essentially the same, then they constitute, in the fullest meaning of the word, a "natural" religion, and morality, of mankind. It is impossible at the same time to throw ridicule upon the rationalists and to believe in the identity of mankind.

Metaphysical and religious derivations give one more opportunity for Pareto to stress the non-logical character of certain modern convictions. "It would be absurd to believe that some of our contemporaries imagine solidarity to be a beautiful woman, as the

Athenians imagined the goddess Athene; but for our common people, solidarity, progress, humanity, democracy, do not belong to the same class as simple abstractions, as for instance a geometrical plane, chemical affinity, the luminous ether; for them, those other notions belong to a much more elevated sphere, they are powerful entities, procuring happiness to mankind."¹ Again, the observation is fully borne out by the facts: but, we learn no more through it than we learn through the concept of residues. We understand no better than before why the Athenians worshipped Athene and the modern masses democracy. We simply learn that in both cases powerful sentiments are at work behind the arguments.

But the most important group of derivations, in Pareto's mind, is group IV, "verbal proofs," to which one whole chapter is devoted. The logical aspect of ideologies is the thing most interesting in them for Pareto. He starts his treatment of this point with the remark that the terms of derivation and of verbal proof are almost identical.² There follow considerations about paralogsms, which, as they belong entirely to the realm of formal logic, we do not deal with. But then come scores of examples for paralogsms in demagogic arguments. The interdict on murder is justified by solidarity. But some murders are allowed and even meritorious. Thus the command runs: Thou shalt not kill (except when thou shalt kill).³ Liberty, by some, is believed to be an absolute good. But nobody can advocate complete unrestricted liberty. In order to make "absolute" principles square with facts, some vague qualification is introduced into

¹ 1511.

² 1543.

³ 1558.

DERIVATIONS

the principle. Instead of simply speaking of liberty, a man will then speak of the "true" liberty. In the term "true" every limitation of the general principle, according to one's liking, can be included. There are innumerable examples of this type, criticizing many important philosophical systems, from Aristotle to Rousseau. But they are hardly important for sociology.

We come back to sociological terra firma again by considering who it is that accepts these derivations. Pareto takes the example of Rousseau's *volonté générale*. This is believed in by people who hope to belong to the majority, cheats who want to use democracy for gaining power and wealth, enemies of the ruling class, persons wanting a religious creed and accepting the one *à la mode*, persons simply following the dominating opinion, and persons who are merely pleased by the theory as they would be by music. Unfortunately, convincing as are the arguments concerning the usual types of popular paralogisms, this purely sociological statement is equally unconvincing. The theory of the *volonté générale* is not a thing in itself, outside space and time. It corresponds to a definite historical situation. In Pareto's list, groups are included who cannot possibly hold this belief at the same time. If democracy is the actual form of government (and then alone it can be a good business for swindlers) belief in it cannot be held by the enemies of the government. Even ignoring these contradictions, the argument is more or less void of concrete elements. A sociologist wanting to classify the partisans of Rousseau before the French revolution (the grouping *after* this revolution would be entirely different) might give the

following list: a substantial part, though not the majority, of the Versailles aristocracy, mostly on æsthetic grounds; a minority of the landed aristocracy, interested in the modernization of agriculture; the majority of the lower class intellectuals, a few of the most educated artisans; vaguely, as far as they had heard of it, some of the peasants, but certainly a very small minority. Asking for the causes of their adherence to this theory, we certainly should not find any such thing as the demand of the members of the majority for the domination by the majority, but exclusively, or almost exclusively, the interest of a minority in the transformation of state and society. Then a close study ought to show what determined the attitude of the single groups mentioned in detail. Compared with those concrete problems Pareto's list appears as what it really is:—mere invective against political adversaries, or, in his own terms, verbal derivations.

We shall not proceed with examples, as the few given are sufficient to furnish a fair idea of what is meant by derivations in Pareto's theory. The bulk of his considerations in this case are not sociological nor purely psychological, but mostly logical, with a certain amount of psychology of paralogisms, mostly leading back to the theory of residues. Thus we had best proceed at once to a general appreciation.

We have already remarked that what Pareto calls derivations are generally called ideologies. This notion contains some very valuable elements. One is the stressing of the difference between real life and the official presentation of it. Religion,¹ Pareto empha-

¹ 167.

DERIVATIONS

sizes, is not identical with theology, applied law is different from codified law,¹ real rules of conduct are different from official moral standards. Then, there is the general fact that the study of ideas cannot replace the study of the other aspects of real life. Finally, it is undeniable that very often ideas not only deform the reality they are intended to express, but even transform it into its opposite.

In this, Pareto comes very near to the Marxist theory of "historical materialism," whose merits he in different places strongly emphasizes, excluding, however, Marxist economics from this favourable appreciation. In one place, in strict contradiction with his views on the unchangeability of residues, he even goes so far as to accept a strong influence of historical facts on residues.² In another place, already mentioned, he comments favourably on the idea of the economic system being the cause of other aspects of civilization, as one working hypothesis amongst others. Finally, his stressing of interests as opposed to ideologies has certainly a strong Marxist flavour. There is in his mind no such feeling towards Marxism as his hatred of the "bourgeois" progressivists. Even in a late article on Bolshevism,³ he admits that the latter is on some points more realistic than its humanitarian adversaries. He opposes socialism mainly on the economic plane, in practice as well as in theory. But whereas his other friendly comments on Marxism are hardly more than incidental remarks without deeper influence on his thought, in the case of derivations the position is dif-

¹ 256.

² 1770.

³ Reprinted in the collection of his articles entitled "Fatti e teorie," Milano, 1920.

ferent. It is the struggle against ideologies, especially against humanitarianism, which attracts Pareto in the writings of Marx. Are his humanitarian adversaries not of the same stock as the German republican idealists, against whom Marxism was originally directed? Did not Mazzini hate Marx with all his strength and soul? So Pareto, here as in other questions mainly a critic, accepts the critical, anti-ideological side of Marxism, without taking much account of its positive ideas on society.

Still, if there is no doubt about the transfiguration of reality by the ideologies, the sociologist has to account for this fact and for the content of the ideologies in detail. And it is here that, in concrete application, Pareto's concept of derivations shows its shortcomings. For at the basis of these transformations are sentiments, and sentiments, in Pareto's theory, fall under the heading of residues and are treated with all the deficiencies inherent in this theory. Residues are always the same; thus they cannot account for changes in ideologies. Residues are meaningless; thus they cannot account for the logical aspect, for the meaning, of derivations. Residues are disconnected; thus they cannot account for the fitting of derivations into the whole of social life. Finally, residues are the one real force in non-logical actions; thus, derivations are superficial unimportant phenomena.

Consequently, the fact of the existence of ideologies is well marked in the theory of derivations and they are much criticized from a logical point of view. But their function in social life only remains unintelligible, it is almost denied. Thus, Pareto treats as irrelevant the differences between the different Christian religions,

DERIVATIONS

their morals being essentially the same! The historian cannot but be puzzled by such a statement and will be rather inclined to agree with the theologian on the paramount importance of some denominational differences as to morals. After the studies of Max Weber, which appeared more than a decade before Pareto's work, there can be hardly any doubt as to the profound difference between Catholic and Protestant morals at the time of the Reformation. Still, it is useless to ask whether a changed morality has engendered a changed theology or vice versa. Both changes form part of one and the same process. In the context of this process of transformation of society from the medieval to the modern type of social life, religious belief, in all its details, plays one of the most important rôles. And it is this side of things which is consistently overlooked in Pareto's theory of derivations. First, to him there is no difference between different religions, a point hardly to be discussed in earnest. And then secondly, religious struggle has no importance whatever, one derivation being as good as any other one. He completely lacks the feeling that ideas are powerful driving forces of the historical process. For him, ideas are either logical, which, in this context, means scientific in the sense given to this word by modern physics, or they are empty talk without any real importance. Has he really a right to make fun of the admirers of the "goddess science," among whom he himself most certainly belongs no less than the most fanatic rationalist? Has he really a right to abuse the belief in "truth," since he himself divides all ideas into those that are true and those that are nonsense?

PARETO

Our presentation of the theory of derivations was short, as it is a subject the sociological importance of which, according to Pareto, is small, and to whose sociological aspect (in contrast with its purely logical aspect) he has given very little consideration. His view can be summed up in one sentence. Ideas, except scientific discoveries, are of very little importance in social life.

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS AS A WHOLE

IT is time to give a general appreciation and criticism of the theory of residues and derivations. The detailed study of them has put us in a position to understand the motives and the special tendencies of Pareto's theory of non-logical actions. We have now to emphasize them by noting a few of the more general features of this theory.

Every criticism of it should start with a quotation from Pareto's own work, concerning the elements of every human action. The sentence which follows appears in one of his frequent polemics against the rationalists. "With the kind permission of the humanitarians and the positivists," he says, "we contend that a society exclusively determined by reason does not exist and cannot exist, not because 'prejudices' turn men aside from the dictates of reason but because the data of the problem to be resolved by logico-experimental reasoning are lacking. Here again the vagueness of the concept of utility becomes apparent. . . . The ideas of different individuals as to their own interests and those of their neighbours are essentially heterogeneous and there is no way of bringing them into unison."¹ In other words, every human action is determined by at least two groups of elements, tastes, desires, aims, motives, on the one hand,

¹ 2143.

and ways and means to obtain these desires on the other. Nothing is more true. Moreover, it is the axiom underlying Pareto's own economic theory, which falls outside the range of our consideration but which certainly is his most important achievement and is specially strong in logical accuracy. There, however, he leaves the study of tastes as a subject foreign to economics, which ought to study exclusively the conditions of equilibrium where tastes and external conditions are given as "data." In pure economics this may be justified. But as tastes and desires certainly are among the most important factors of human life—it is not overstating the facts to say that the whole of it is determined by desires on the one hand and the external obstacles to their satisfaction on the other—they must be studied somewhere in social science. This Pareto knows very well *in abstracto*, as the above quotation shows, but he does not make the slightest attempt to apply it in practice. This, of course, is not a simple omission of some more or less important detail, but it vitiates completely the whole theory of actions, as one of the two essential factors composing every single human action is left unconsidered. This, at least, is the attitude embodied in the concept of logical and non-logical actions. Actions in themselves, as we have already had occasion to remark, are neither logical nor non-logical. Only the adaptation of means to given ends can be in accordance or in disagreement with logic and experience. In the general scheme given at the end of our chapter dealing with non-logical actions, this is the one question considered.

But naturally not one sentence of the theory of actions could be written without considering tastes and

THE THEORY OF NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

desires at all. In one aspect of Pareto's theory of non-logical actions, the one embodied in his definitions, they are completely lacking. In the other aspect, the one embodied in the theory of residues, they appear; for every residue is really a taste or desire or an aim for given actions. But strangely enough here, in flagrant contradiction as well with his definitions as with his insight into the impossibility of determining actions by reason alone, Pareto seems to assume that tastes, desires, aims can be logical or non-logical in themselves. From the view-point of logic itself, as from the view-point of Pareto's own definitions, this is entirely meaningless. The result of such an approach to tastes cannot produce anything but a theoretical chaos. Moreover, it is precisely the basic mistake of Pareto's most bitter adversaries, the rationalists, to believe that there exists some objective measure for actions, which invests some of them with the honour of belonging to "reason" and throws others into the abyss where "passion" and "prejudices" meet. Nevertheless, this is exactly Pareto's concept. Certainly, he has never clearly thought it out; on the contrary, in his theoretical pronouncements, he rejects it emphatically. It is all the worse then, that he makes use of it consistently in his detailed research. All the elements of his theory of residues belong to eighteenth-century rationalism, whose essential mistakes he himself has so clearly marked; all the elements, plus one entirely new one: rationalism had believed in the decline of passions and prejudices, whereas Pareto believes in their unchangeability.

From this basic contradiction are derived a series of secondary ones, of which we will here consider only

two, appropriate for elucidating the motives of this strange inconsistency of Pareto's system. He knows very well, *in abstracto*, that every voluntary action is primarily determined by desires, or in other words sentiments. Then, everything favouring the fulfilment of the desires of an individual is his "interest." The desire for money, as a general means of satisfying needs, is certainly a sentiment. But everything capable of procuring money to a given person is in the interest of this person. Desire for honour is a sentiment shared by most human beings. Everything capable of procuring honour for a given person is then in the interest of this person. If a person has taken a fancy to drugs, it is exactly in the same sense in the interest of this person to have drugs, as it is in the interest of other persons to have bread. Pareto himself has pointed this out in his economic theory. But he does not hold to it in sociology. He says expressly that actions are governed either by sentiments *or* by interests.¹ As the study of "real" interests is completely excluded from the theory of residues, where, as we saw, only "imaginary" interests are treated, we may surmise that the distinction of actions by interests and actions by sentiments corresponds roughly with that between logical and non-logical actions. Again, some motives seem to have the dignity of being "logical," which is denied to others. A clear exposition of the question is lacking.

We have already had occasion to remark that according to Pareto theoretical economy studies logical actions, with a few exceptions. To these exceptions we now return. Does that mean that economic activi-

¹ 2079.

ties are not determined by sentiments but by interests? Pareto does not answer the question. The one thing certain is that all the desires and instincts studied under the heading of residues in Pareto's system are supposed not to determine directly economic actions. There seems to be some special type of motives in economics, distinct from other motives in human life. But how does this fit in with Pareto's own definition of economics as a general study of means for given ends, a definition identical with the basic assumption of all modern economic theory? Again, we cannot tell.

The one exception to the logical character of economics mentioned by Pareto is the case of saving.¹ Again, he does not explain why. But a close consideration of the facts implied in saving will give a clue to Pareto's meaning. At the outset, there seems to be no difference between saving and other economic activities. Saving implies a choice between different possible satisfactions of different desires, as well as other economic activities. There seems to be no essential difference in my choice between a new pair of shoes and an opera performance, and my choice between an improvement of my flat at present and a somewhat more costly improvement later on. The first case is the ordinary type of economic choice, the second is the case of saving. But as to logic and sentiment, both are exactly alike. For in both cases I have to choose between the different desires or sentiments to be satisfied and shall follow the stronger impulse, a choice, which, as any choice, may be "reasonable" or not from a certain point of view, but which is neither logical nor non-logical. Nevertheless, there are other

¹ Ibid.

differences, namely, in the relation of saving and other economic activities to moneyed property. Let us consider them.

There exist two very frequent ideal types of economic decisions. The one is the decision of the producer, who has no personal interest in the commodities he produces, but simply wants to gain money. Without hesitation he will choose the occupation in which he gains most. The other one is the decision of the consumer who owns a given sum of money, concerning its spending. Without hesitation he will spend it on his most urgent needs, according to their relative urgency. Any deviation both of the producer and of the consumer from these scales of values will be regarded as uneconomic, or, loosely expressed, as unreasonable. The scale of values of the producer is objectively given by the amount of money gained. The scale of values of the consumer is subjectively determined by his needs. Both scales are strictly distinguished, and are even opposed to one another. The first is determined by the desire to make money, the second by the need to spend it. But in the case of saving these two scales of values are in conflict, which never happens in any other economic activity. This is not the case in all types of saving. If saving is only intended to secure income for an uncertain future, the two scales of values do not conflict. They do conflict if saving is intended to procure money for lucrative productive processes which otherwise would be spent in direct consumption. Why, then, is saving non-logical? Apparently because here the view-point of the consumer, his needs and his desire for their satisfaction, intrude upon the sphere, the scale of

values, of the producer. The latter has "objective" values in the form of money. There is no doubt that for everybody more money has more value than less money. The values of the consumer are only subjective, varying from individual to individual. And, surprising as it is, there is no doubt that the objective scale of exchange values represented by money has for Pareto a special dignity. Acting according to this scale of values is "logical." Where, as in the case of saving, other values interfere, we seem to be confronted with non-logical actions.

Probably the one thing "non-logical" in the context of this problem is Pareto's presentation of it. But to understand it in its full meaning, some further considerations must be added. Why is the action of saving partly non-logical and acts of consuming commodities not? In saving the money incentive has at least some part, in consumption it is only indirectly implied. The answer can not be found in Pareto's utterances. He even does not explain why saving is partly non-logical; he seems to think that everybody must know. So we are forced to guess. Certainly, Pareto's dictum concerning saving is transferred from his economic theory to sociology. Economics, or at least Pareto's economics, does not deal with consumption. Thus the aspect of economic life where the money incentive is absent, is not studied there. In a theory dealing exclusively with production and distribution (and Pareto's like most other economic systems limits itself to these two aspects) saving is really the one case where a force different from the money incentive inevitably intervenes. In all other phenomena studied by economic theory deviations from the money incentive appear as

individual exceptions and are eliminated. Thus, the final conclusion of Pareto's theory of saving so far as it concerns his theory of non-logical actions is this: actions determined by the money incentive are logical, actions opposed to it are non-logical. Certainly, Pareto never pronounced such an axiom; he would probably have rejected it if he had heard it. Nevertheless it is the axiom which really guides his research.

Only through this axiom can we bring into accord the different puzzling utterances concerning the types of actions. His contrasting of actions by interests and by sentiments is meaningless in itself, but it becomes full of meaning if we substitute for "interests" desire to acquire the obtainable maximum of money. Then motives can be divided into the money incentive on the one hand and all motives opposed to it on the other. His contrasting of specifically economic motives and non-economic ones is senseless. Even from his table of residues it is easy to show that economic tastes are determined by what he calls non-logical actions, by liking of change and conservatism, by the desire for uniformity and the ostentation of the upper classes or by sex desires. But the distinction becomes full of meaning if economic motives are identified with the money incentive. Still, this and only this interpretation fits into his biography. For decades he has attempted to show scientifically, mathematically, that the liberal system of economics, guided by the profit incentive, is absolutely superior to any other system. Never, right up to his death, has he doubted the validity of these deductions. Liberal economics, then, is certainly completely logical, or scientific, or logico-experimental for him, and everything

opposed to it is non-logical, meaningless, guided by sentiments. Only, in the course of time, he has lost his belief in the victory of liberalism. In the mood of despair which characterizes the second part of his life, he considers the unreasonable attitudes opposed to liberalism too strong to be overcome. Hence the theory of non-logical actions, and their unchangeability. Again, the theory of residues has its chief application in the theory of the circulation of elites, to which we shall soon refer. This latter theory again deals almost exclusively with the chances and obstacles of liberalism. The problem which guided his political activities has guided almost exclusively—and profoundly vitiated—his whole theoretical outlook.

For the question whether liberalism is a better economic system than any other is not one of primary concern for the sociologist. But a sociological system viewing the whole of history under this one aspect must be extremely onesided and deformed. We will shortly show the essential results of this vitiation, which is embodied in the main principle of the theory of residues itself.

There are certainly other motives besides the money incentive and there is not the slightest reason why they should be regarded as non-logical. There is, for instance, the sense of honour. In some societies, it absolutely overrules the money or even the property incentive. We need only mention the famous habit of potlatch among some Canadian Indian tribes. This habit consists in economic competition between different clans but not a competition of the type common in our own society. Whereas in our society probably antagonistic social groups would compete for the highest gain or the highest amount of property, those

tribal clans compete for the highest amount of spending in feasts, and this habit results in a general impoverishment. The common sense of an economic railway director may find this habit very unreasonable, non-logical. Pareto certainly would. But the potlatch tribes certainly cannot understand how a man can spend his whole life in earning money which, on account of the innumerable hardships linked up with this earning, he can never in any way really enjoy. Both are equally right or wrong. The contrast between a potlatch Indian and a modern entrepreneur who refuses himself all the pleasures of life is not one between logic and sentiment but one between different types of civilization. The question which of them has the higher value is entirely metaphysical. Again, Pareto himself, in spite of his sneers at the metaphysical scales of values of the rationalists, applies scales of values entirely similar to theirs. The only difference is that the eighteenth-century progressivists had, besides liberal economic principles, other creeds, and among them the belief in humanity, which Pareto emphatically rejects. He is a liberal, but not a progressivist: his *values* partly differ from theirs, but their *methods* and his are identical.

Still, Voltaire and his followers proclaim more or less openly their metaphysical axioms, whereas in Pareto's system they are hidden behind other considerations, which claim to be empirical. Having stated their "rational" philosophy of state, economy and individual life, the rationalists had no need to prove empirically why absolutism, feudalism, hereditary occupations, inequality of rights were unreasonable. Pareto has to attempt this kind of empirical proof

for his distinction between logical and non-logical actions or motives. He must try to show that there are intrinsic differences between actions in agreement with his liberal creed and others opposed to it. In order to denounce the latter as entirely opposed to reason, he must show that they are altogether meaningless. Hence his concept of residues, of actions being inexplicable and unconnected with the other facts of social life. We have tried to show the shortcomings of this idea by discussing in detail one of his residues after another. Let us now test it in the case of the liberal and the potlatch competition. Liberal competition certainly fits well into a social whole. The individual aims at more property, and, if suited for the special demands of his society, often obtains it. The society itself develops in the direction of economic progress, increased wealth, to the satisfaction of its most powerful part. In the potlatch society, each individual acts as a member of his clan. This is as much a fact as the individualism of modern times, and neither more nor less logical than it. Does potlatch fit well into the clan society? Excellently! It is a society not of business men but of warriors. Honour is the highest value in it. The potlatch competition transfers the idea of honour into the economic sphere and thus reinforces the spirit of honour in the sphere most dangerous to it. It does so to the great satisfaction not only of the leading group, but of the whole of its society; in this last respect, it is definitely superior to the liberal society, which, as history proves, could not gain in the end the support of the majority of its members. Logic has nothing at all to do with the contrast between the two societies.

Exactly the same applies to magic, religion, meta-

physics. Pareto believes them to be in opposition to science. In some cases, as in the case of magic, he is in agreement with most educated people, in other cases, as in the case of religion, he perhaps is not. He himself insists that it does not matter whether they are wrong, but only that they transcend experience. Do they really? The believer has a very definite type of religious experience. Pareto ridicules this "inner experience," and rightly, in so far as it is invoked as a proof of the objective reality of gods. But the inner experience of religion is nevertheless absolutely real, "objectively real," as far as the social and moral implications of religion are concerned. The believer is absolutely right in saying that his special type of moral and social adjustment cannot exist without his belief. Religion is no "residue" at all in the sense given to this concept by Pareto in practice, it is not unchangeable, not meaningless, not inexplicable. If "logico-experimental" actions are such as fit well into the whole of the life of the individual, then religion certainly in some cases is extremely logical and so is magic. Again, in contrast with his treatment of religion under the heading of the residue of persistence of aggregates, Pareto repeatedly stresses its social utility. But if it is socially useful, why then is it non-logical? Why should it not change in an intelligible manner with the change of society? Why, if it is useful, is this usefulness and necessity of religion entirely discarded as a means of explaining it? The treatment of religion, magic, metaphysics, under the heading of non-logical actions brings about only a chaos of contradictory viewpoints, which do not help in any way to the understanding of them.

THE THEORY OF NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

Why is that? Because these phenomena are measured by a scale of values entirely foreign to them. As liberalism is the measure applied by Pareto to all everyday activities, so a special version of modern natural science is the measure applied to the higher forms of intellectual life. But what can be learnt about the origin, function, interpretation of Zoroastrianism or ancient Christianity by stating that its ideas do not coincide with the methods of Mach and Poincaré? Nothing at all! By way of this comparison, one may be able to refute these ancient ideas, but it contributes nothing to the understanding of them. If the study is limited to this comparison, nothing at all is learnt as to their social function. And if then the critic says that they are inexplicable it simply means that he has rejected them without trying to explain them. But here again, Pareto works on the same line as his adversaries. Was it not the rationalists who loathed every study of the "dark ages," who believed that things rejected as contrary to "reason" need not and could not be explained any further? Did not they believe in the "Goddess science"? Pareto's science differs somewhat from theirs, it is no more the science of Newton and Kant but the science of modern relativism. But it has not ceased to be in his system the absolute value, the absolute measure, and everything contrasting with it is simply rejected as non-logical and consequently as unintelligible and inexplicable.

The result is astonishing. In his system, two types of actions are essentially "logical," economic actions in accord with liberalism, and intellectual actions in accord with modern relativistic science. Other actions may be logical too, but they are not mentioned as such.

And the whole study of "logical actions" is left out in his sociology, one does not know for what reason. All the rest are "non-logical actions." That is to say, all actions contrasting with some standards of some leading groups of the eighteenth and nineteenth century are treated as non-logical. As such they are marked and classified—classified in a formalistic way, which contributes nothing to their understanding, and then they are left as inexplicable. And there the whole problem of actions is left. Thus a great part of the actions of our own society are not studied because, as logical, they seem to need no further explanation, and the actions of other societies are not studied but only enumerated, because as "non-logical" they are closed to any further explanation.

It is not the task of this book to oppose our own concept of social life to Pareto's. We shall only point out that, to our mind, his concept of residues makes him fail in the essential task of sociology. If he did not make "science" and liberalism the standard measures of human behaviour, he would not be led to the axiom of the unchangeability of mankind. He then could see that sociology, like every other science, has the task of finding the rules of variation of the phenomena it studies. These variations he mostly denies. Had he accepted them, he would have realized that they are correlated, that variations in one sphere of social life carry with them variations in others and that it is the task of sociology to find the rules of these correlations. As it is, he considers neither the changes of tastes, nor the changes of beliefs, nor the social roots of sentiments, nor the correlations of different aspects of civilization. He limits himself to the statement that

THE THEORY OF NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

actions and ideas opposed to liberalism and modern science play an enormous rôle throughout all ages, he enumerates these actions and tries to prove that they have not diminished in strength. It is the bitter invective of a disillusioned believer in science and liberalism, and hardly any contribution to sociology at all.

The value of our study of this first part of Pareto's sociology—if there is any such value in it—is essentially critical. Had Pareto not given anything better than his theory of residues, it would hardly be worth while continuing our study. But the second part of his sociology, his theory of elites, only loosely connected with the theory of non-logical actions, though still profoundly biassed by his axiomatic beliefs, is much nearer to the true problems of sociology.

CHAPTER VI

ELITES

ONLY in one secondary respect is the theory of residues and derivations connected with the theory of elites. The latter stands out as an independent body of concepts, to be discussed separately. And certainly the group of ideas here concerned is the most interesting in Pareto's sociology, and probably the one containing the greatest amount of objective truth. As is the case with all his theories, Pareto's idea of elites can be explained in a very few sentences or presented as a series of simple axioms.

The first of these axioms is the necessary existence of differentiation among men. This differentiation, Pareto very justly contends, takes place in every respect. As men are of different physical strength and different mathematical or poetical talent, so they differ in respect of economic ability, general intelligence and fitness to rule.¹ This, we believe, is an undeniable fact. Certainly differentiation of surroundings is not sufficient to account for all differences between man and man. It is true, that aptitude develops in a favourable and is retarded in an adverse "milieu." But it is equally certain that differences of talent in different respects are found among people living in very similar conditions. This argument is decisive in confuting some naive egalitarians, who seriously believe in the

¹ 2025.

abolition of all natural differences between men as a consequence of a possible abolition of all institutional differentiation. In addition, there seems to be evidence that no society, however it was organized, could give really the same share in government to all its citizens, though formal rights may be entirely equal. A government carried on by all alike would be a government administered equally by the unable as well as by the able. The bare hint at the natural differentiation of mankind suffices to put an end to all arguing in favour of direct self-government by all citizens, as propagated in the Soviet theory, but of course not realized in practice by the U.S.S.R.

Following on this, Pareto takes a second step. He assumes that the economic, political, and social gradation of society corresponds to the natural differentiation in abilities. Partly, this argument is tautological. For he insists that abilities, in his conception, are not the same as objective ability in any sense, but simply ability to do what is done in social life. Economic ability, for instance, is not meant to be utility for the procuring of the highest standard of wealth for the society, but the ability to secure individual economic success in a given society. If this society has unreliable business habits, then economic success will mainly depend on the ability to cheat, and the economic elite in such a society may consist of the best cheats. Undeniably, there is a great deal of truth in the argument. Every society encourages certain attitudes and penalizes others, and certainly, the men at the top of the ladder will be the ones most skilled in the prevailing kind of behaviour.

An even stronger argument could be made in favour

of Pareto's view. There is no doubt that a leading group, be it in economic life, politics or some other important social activity, need not only be highly gifted in some special direction, but must consist on the average of what is usually called strong personalities, possessing to a high degree some general aptitude. Intelligence tests in American schools have shown beyond question that the average intelligence of bourgeois children is higher than that of the children of the poor. It may be contended that the tests ascertain a specially "bourgeois" kind of intelligence, but this argument does not carry much weight. There is, however, the more important fact that these tests are carried on among children of eight to ten years of age, who have been under the continuous influence of their specific environments, which have certainly profoundly influenced their intellectual behaviour. How far this influence of the milieu goes and how far natural differences are implied, it is impossible to ascertain. One may assume that the very best of the lower class climb into the upper class, so that the remainder of the former may be somewhat inferior to the average of the latter. But on the other hand the children of the higher classes must be supposed to grow up in a sheltered position, protecting them from falling quickly even if they lack talent, and this fact presumably alters the balance in favour of the poor. If the final outcome is definitely in favour of the upper class, some natural difference in talent is likely to have its part in it. This part must be diminishing where the "circulation of elites," the climbing of the poor into the ranks of the rich, is seriously hampered. This result would completely agree with Pareto's assumption.

ELITES

If we transfer our argument from the plane of test statistics on to the plane of notorious political facts, its value becomes still more evident. Nobody observing the class struggle after the war throughout Europe can doubt that on an average the bourgeoisie has been far more intelligent than the proletariat in every respect. Again, it is certain that the narrowing of the channels leading upwards in our society since the war has helped to amass dynamite in the existing society.

We will not forget, however, that the argument contributed by us in favour of Pareto's theory of elites is not his own main argument. He does not stress general aptitudes, but special abilities coincident with the special demands of a given society. He emphasizes that the demand for warriors can be extremely low and more than met in a commercial society, but this supply may prove to be entirely insufficient in the case of a war occurring.¹ We shall later return to this argument.

There are, however, two other axioms hidden in Pareto's theory of elites, arguments conducive to further steps in this theory. The first takes domination as an immediate consequence of the differentiation of abilities, and the second assumes a direct quantitative correspondence between the distribution of abilities and the distribution of elites. The second argument, to be sure, is only contained in the "Manuel" and has been dropped in the "Sociology" which even defends a view incompatible with it; but we shall see that this change of argument is only superficial, its essential consequences remaining.

As to the first argument, like so many other essential points of his doctrine, Pareto never explains it *expressis*

¹ 2044.

verbis. He distinguishes between parts of the elite, which do not rule (such as the scientific, or artistic elite), and the ruling part of the elite.¹ He seems to assume that the mere fact of a group of men being able and willing to rule is sufficient to explain the existence of domination. Abhorring any research into the "origins" of institutions, it never occurs to him that possibly the existence of a group of men with qualities of domination may not be the actual reason but only one among different conditions for the coming about of domination.

It is certain that all ideas about human societies without some sort of dominant class have proved to be fallacious, concerning the past as well as the future. So far, Pareto's theory of elites provides a valuable generalization from the facts. As to the past, it has been proved that no tribe is without some sort of dominant power—chief or elders or medicine men, and this quite irrespective of their economic organization. This is a strong argument against the views of Marx, who supposed domination to be a simple consequence of economic differentiation. On the other hand, it is certainly impossible to contend that a state with entire absence of domination will never be reached. But as a matter of fact the Russian experiment, intended to lead to the "abolition of the state," has not only not attained and not even approached this goal, but on the contrary has led to an oppressive dictatorship. We do not know of any society without domination. This seems to be a strong argument in favour of Pareto. But it is at the same time a warning to be careful. Marx believed domina-

¹ 2032.

tion to be a simple "superstructure," or "reflex," or consequence of economic differentiation, but closer research has shown that political rule has an existence of its own, independent of economics. Pareto on his side takes domination as a simple "superstructure," or "reflex," or consequence of natural differentiation between men, and his view is exposed to the same doubt and criticism as Marxism in this respect.

Does he not, in reality, contradict himself? Communities, during a long war, need a leading group of warriors, he contends most justly. We may assume that the community will either prove able to produce such a group and to put it into political power, or will break down. But have the warriors (for instance the Roman "military emperors" in the third century B.C.) then really come into power as a simple result of their military qualities? Far from it. These qualities were prerequisites of their success in a given situation, the situation of prolonged war, excluding from power other groups with different qualities, which might have held domination under different conditions. War was the condition of their coming into power and this war was not the result of their own rule (since it broke out when others ruled). This Pareto acknowledges in another connection, insisting strongly in his criticism of democracies upon their liability to drift into war in spite of their peaceful temper.¹ In another statement already mentioned, Pareto insists on the composition of elites of individuals best suited to meet a given situation. Does this not imply that situations form elites at least as much as elites form situations?

But there is one still more general question underlying the whole problem. To make it quite clear, we take an example far removed from politics—art. There is no doubt at all that such a thing as an artistic elite exists, and there seems to be no doubt that this elite also creates art. But is this really quite so? Is art created, simply because there are people talented for art? We believe not. There is not the least reason to assume that the fluctuations in the development of art are due to an increase or decrease in creative capacity. This may possibly apply to periods of general “decline,” but certainly there are periods of the highest development of culture without any remarkable blossoming of art. It seems still more evident that the changing of styles is not due exclusively to any change in the personnel of art. Some changes in art are adequately accounted for by the fact of new groups taking up artistic activities. But sometimes profound changes of style have obtained without any change in personnel, and it is then evident that the changes have been brought about not through the change of artistic personnel but through the change of the general aims and problems of society as expressed in art. Art itself seems not to be a simple result of artistic talent (which may not be distributed with too great quantitative differences throughout the ages). It supposes not only the existence of artists, but further, the existence of a public able to appreciate art, and artistic success is essentially evaluated in terms of approval of this public—not to be sure, of the public contemporaneous with the artist, but of the public of later ages. The great artist is essentially a man endowed with a superior capacity of expressing the aims, the longings and the

sufferings of others. Certainly the artist's activities are not simply determined by the needs of the public which, on the contrary, are in some cases profoundly transformed by the artist's creations. But the fact remains that the artist, though often imposing his own solutions of problems, takes his task and problems from the community in which he lives. Perhaps the best approach to the history and sociology of art may be to take the artist as the trustee of a community, which has invested him, though sometimes rather grudgingly and reluctantly, with the tackling of its problems. The community sets the problems, the artist gives the solutions. It would be a great perversion of the creative process of art to consider only the artist himself, as a member of the artistic elite, and to overlook the community and its problems, which are the subject matter of his activities. In the case of the artistic elite we are, surprisingly enough, confronted by a problem similar to the one underlying our final criticism of the concept of non-logical actions. In this latter case, we insisted upon avoiding a treatment of these actions in themselves, without taking any account of the function of adjustment which they exercise in social life. We contended that society was not composed of a number of acts influencing one another externally, but was a whole, continually busy with the task of adaptation to changing conditions. Artistic activity is one of the innumerable means by which such adaptations are put into effect. And we may suspect that the theory of elites, like the theory of non-logical actions, presents a similar case of the artificial isolation of facts which are essentially connected.

PARETO

For what has been said about the artistic elite applies in much the same sense to the political elite. Pareto is perfectly right when he discards the wholesale acceptance of the belief in society as a homogeneous body, accomplishing homogeneous developments. It is not true that "society," in a given age, has certain ideas. These ideas have been created, and they have been created by some leading group or elite. This applies to political changes no less than to the introduction of a new artistic style. Nevertheless, a political change is not simply the result of a creative effort of the leading minority, or the result of a change in its personnel, but is the consequence of changing conditions, of new problems arising and demanding new solutions, which the leading group of society may or may not supply. The relation between elite and masses is the same as in the case of the artist. It is the social body as a whole which is confronted by political problems and develops political needs, and it is the elite which devises solutions. And as no solution can be understood without a previous understanding of the problem to be solved, so no political act of the ruling group can be understood without an understanding of the political problems confronting not only the elite but the community as a whole.

As in the case of art, this applies not only to single facts, but to the political sphere as a whole. As art cannot be explained by the fact that there is a large differentiation in artistic talent between the members of a community, so political domination cannot be explained by the fact that different individuals are suited in varying degrees for exercising domination. Domination must be explained as a social need and not

ELITES

as a desire or intention of the elite. If the necessity for domination is understood, then and then only the function of the dominating group can be made intelligible. Occasion will arise in the course of this study to prove this point in a concrete case of great practical importance, that of the "degeneration" of the Soviet system into a personal dictatorship.

As we saw, Pareto treats domination as a natural, quasi-biological, fact arising out of the existence of a group specifically talented for domination. Two important consequences are implied in this assumption. One is that the elite must have some natural features characteristic of rulers in common, which are lacking in the mass of mankind. If domination is mainly a result of natural, biological differentiation, then the rulers must represent some sort of higher race. Any theory deducing domination from the biological differences between men is essentially a theory of race. "Race" in this context need not be "race" in the sense given to the word by anthropologists. There is, even in the context of the biological theory of domination, no reason to assume that the dominating race must be characterized by some physical peculiarity lacking in the rest of the population. In making this interpretation of race in social science the official creed of the regime, German Nazism has created for itself needless difficulties. Italian Fascism was wise in not insisting upon the physical characteristics of the elite, simply assuming that it revealed its biological capacity for domination by the act of taking on political power itself. The main point is that the dominating class is supposed to dominate on account of inherited aptitudes, and that this is believed to be a sufficient explana-

tion of domination. "To-day the ideas of Lapouge, Ammon and others, though partly erroneous and imperfect, have the great merit of having emphasised this important fact, the ignoring of which profoundly vitiates all democratic theories."¹ The "partial errors," hinted at in this passage, are Lapouge's insistence upon physical differences, whereas the "essential truth" is the emphasis upon the biological, inherited difference between elite and masses.

But there arises an insoluble problem. If elites by definition are the very best, why then in the course of history do ruling groups so conspicuously degenerate? Why do they decline in number? This is the puzzling question which Pareto puts to himself. It is the consequence of his biological outlook on the question of leadership. If elites are the very best and strongest, why then do they degenerate? Why do they decline in numbers? As a matter of fact, high-bred pedigree animals do not. But "the aristocracies do not last. For one reason or another, after a certain time they disappear."² In the last centuries, mankind has enormously increased in numbers. Certainly the aristocracies have not kept up with the pace. Still more puzzling is the fact that some last for a few years and others for centuries. A host of secondary theories, to be discussed later, is evoked by Pareto in order to account for this fact so obtrusively contradicting his basic concept. And it never occurs to him that it may perhaps simply prove his theory to be erroneous. To us it seems to demonstrate that biological facts, though probably involved in the phenomenon of political differentiation, are not sufficient to account for it as a

¹ 2206.

² 2053.

whole, and probably are not even the paramount features of political differentiation.

To put it in few words, in anticipation of much to be said in the discussion of details: to us it seems evident that the continuance and disappearance of aristocracies are both due to a change in social milieu. In rising, elites change completely the atmosphere of life. When their status is low, they have been stimulated by their sufferings and by the possibility of success. At the top of society, they usually soon become more anxious to keep what they have than to conquer what they lack. Instead of stimulating conditions enervating conditions supervene. And it is more or less clear that elites only decline where the necessary stimulus fails them. Military aristocracies, as long as they have been in conditions of continual warfare, generally do not show any sign of decay in numbers or in their characteristic qualities, as can be shown throughout the last centuries by the Prussian aristocracy. Aristocracies living in a milieu of activity and enterprise do not decline either, as can be seen from the long-lasting strength of the aristocracy of Venice. But aristocracies which are spared hard struggle, decline. Not the biological but the social factor seems to be paramount. It is A. J. Toynbee who has most clearly put this point, the essential importance of a continual stimulus for any social group. In his theory, elites are recognized, their importance for social life is clearly outlined, but they are not treated as biological entities, but as social factors. But we will go back to Pareto's own theory.

Out of Pareto's biological theory of domination a second consequence arises. If elites are biologically

determined, then the social differentiation between men must more or less correspond to the biological one. We are confronted by a quantitative problem. In politics, this problem is insoluble, as statistics concerning the political differentiation of the population are not available. So we have to turn to economics, where the statistics of taxation give a rough idea of economic success. The idea of demonstrating the theory of elites by tax statistics is developed in the "Manuel,"¹ but dropped, for a reason soon to be explained, in the "Sociology." Pareto starts by presenting the English income tax figures. They show a relatively large group of very low income, then a still larger group of an income a little higher but still very small. Then the number of individuals belonging to the higher groups rapidly diminishes, so that the curve of income, in its upper section, becomes concave. The facts are well known but the consequences drawn from them are surprising and far-reaching. First, Pareto praises the facts evidenced by the figures as the best possible mechanism of natural selection. (The figures are taken from a period when English economy was still mainly based on free trade.) It is true that in the lowest section of the curve, misery is such as to crush even the most talented individuals. But this must be accepted as a minor evil, since this lowest stratum of society provides a sort of machinery for the destruction of the unfit defeated in the struggle of life, and for the destruction of their children who, on an average, are supposed to be equally unfit by inheritance. Secondly, the bulk of the population is concentrated in the lower section of the curve, but with an income which just allows the

¹ *Manuel d'économie politique*, 2me edition, Paris, 1927, p. 384.

most fitted to rise. Finally, we may assume that the unfitted among the progeny of the rich sink down, according to the American proverb, so that the grandchildren of the poor, who have become rich, are poor again. Not being concerned here with economics, we leave out the economic side of the question, but wish to scrutinize the sociological consequences.

The liberal economy is assumed to give free course to natural selection and to reproduce a stratification of society exactly corresponding to the biological qualities of its members. As a consequence, Pareto assumes (as statistical evidence is lacking) that the curve of stratification of society in other non-economic respects is identical with the curve of distribution of income. This assumption is unprovable. But there are other demonstrable facts, directly contradicting Pareto's conclusions. First, the curve of distribution of income varies, even under a free trade regime. Pareto asserts that it has remained unchanged throughout the ages. But a few pages later¹ he himself has to admit that the upper part of the curve has been increased in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It would be senseless to assume a change of biological qualities in a few decades. The increased protection of labour could affect the lower section of the curve, but by no means the higher one. The process of increase of the higher section was entirely "natural," mainly uninfluenced by legislation. This fact alone is sufficient to refute the idea of a correspondence between biological and social facts. If the average wealth of a society increases, the surplus is not divided among its members by a permanent code of distribution, but

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 385 ff.

differently according to varying social regimes. In the regime prevailing in England at the end of the nineteenth century, the lion's share went to the rich. To-day, the position may be slightly different. It would be futile to insist that the distribution of income is entirely different in societies radically different from the liberal society of the nineteenth century without producing anything like a catastrophe in these societies. But how could a catastrophe be avoided, if distribution of wealth were governed by a sort of biological law?

But to make matters worse, Pareto's assumption contradicts ascertainable biological facts. If there were any truth in his hypothesis, the curve of income-distribution must show some similarity to the curve of intelligence tests. Now these two curves differ radically. The bulk of the school-children tested is concentrated in the middle of the curve, a result borne out by everyday experience as well. The ordinary man is of average intelligence however much this average may differ in space and time. Here we are really confronted with a sort of everlasting biological fact. But the bulk of the population as grouped according to its income is concentrated low down in the curve. The two curves are radically discordant. Biological aptitude is not the essential fact in the distribution of wealth. This does not of course mean that aptitude does not influence the distribution of income. The comparative intelligence tests of rich and poor children show that the average of intelligence is higher among the rich. Biological aptitude is neither more nor less than one among several facts determining social differentiation. It is not difficult to find at least one other

essential factor—social organization. This Pareto would admit for all societies except the liberal one. For liberalism is characterized by free circulation of the elites. Where the fit are artificially hindered from climbing, there the biological and the social differentiation cannot coincide. But where there is no obstacle to the "circulation of elites," both groups of facts though not necessarily identical at any given moment, must tend to become identical.

But figures show that this is not the case, even in a liberal society. It is not only that the children of the rich have a transitory advantage, which is counter-balanced in one or two generations. Apart from these individual exceptions there is the fact of the distribution of wealth between different strata of society, previous to competition and reproducing itself continually. Evidently it is this fact which depresses the bulk of the population in their economic standard as compared with their biological abilities. This may be said once more in different terms. It is true that biological aptitudes are important in competition. It is true that in an absolutely free competition the curve of social differentiation must exactly correspond to the curve of biological differentiation. But in the liberal society this competition in reality is *not* entirely free, but hampered by the institution of private property in productive commodities.

If one accepts Pareto's point of view, this gives an extremely strong case for socialism. If a society with unhampered circulation of elites is ideal, then the liberal society certainly does not achieve this task. But one may doubt whether biological differentiation and biological selection are as important in social develop-

ments as Pareto assumes them to be. And in addition we may doubt whether perfectly free competition is possible. These are arguments outside the scope of Pareto's consideration and we must leave them, however reluctantly.

For us the comparison between the figures of intelligence tests and those concerning distribution of income are interesting because they give a good insight into the co-operation of biological and social factors. Competition under a free trade regime is not a biological fact in itself. No more is private ownership by a minority in productive commodities. No biological explanation is available for the creation of both sets of facts. These are the ones, however, which determine the rules of the game of free trade competition. The rules having been defined, the individuals participate in the game itself with the full force of their biological aptitudes, but they start, in addition, with very different handicaps and advantages, according to the place assigned to them in the social organization.

In the "Sociology," Pareto has, on other grounds, slightly changed his theory. The curve of income-distribution in nineteenth-century England appears no longer as a law of nature, repeating itself throughout time and space. Instead, we find elaborate arguments why social organizations different from liberalism, and protective tariffs in particular, sometimes produce a greater amount of wealth than the orthodox policy which he had formerly advocated. We will study these theories in connection with the circulation of elites. Here we lay stress upon the fact that it is again the defeat of liberalism in Italy and the following prosperity of this country which introduced

ELITES

important changes in Pareto's theoretical attitude. He has been led to lay more weight upon the changing of elites, and the changing of social systems with them, and it is in this connection that he introduces the working of residues I and II upon the composition of elites. In other words, the defeat of liberalism accounts for his introducing non-logical actions into the theory of the elites. But the main liberal concept, the idea of the survival of the biologically fittest in an order of free competition, though partly abandoned, has left its imprint upon his later theories. For again, he defines ruling groups as groups of biologically superior individuals.

But why has Pareto retained this theory after abandoning the liberal argument which was originally closely bound up with it? In order to understand this surprising attitude, we must bear in mind that the Bolshevik experiment, which has inflicted such a final defeat on the Marxist theory of the state, at the time of the accomplishment of the "Sociology" was only in its first beginnings. Since this experiment, it has become evident that a thorough abolition of classes and wholesale abolition of private property in productive commodities can quite well coexist not only with a state organization but even with a ruthless dictatorship. In Pareto's days, however, the choice seemed to lie only between two contradictory concepts: either economic and political domination are bound up with one another, both being consequences of a transitory form of social organization and obliged to disappear with it, or economic and political domination are both eternal facts springing from human nature itself and inaccessible to any artificial measures intended to change them.

The second interpretation tends to become biological in the sense given to this word throughout this whole chapter. Classical liberalism and idealist early democracy proposed a contradictory compromise. They accepted and advocated the existence of a state (with different degrees of emphasis, according to the more "liberal" or more "democratic" outlook of different theoreticians) and they acknowledged the existence of private property in productive commodities with the differentiation of social standards consequent upon it (with much the same emphasis in the liberal as the democratic camps). But the economic differentiation was not reputed to be a differentiation of class, but one simply of more or less able individuals, as in a "free" economy everybody was offered a chance to climb the social ladder. And the state, though ruling, and enforcing obedience, was not supposed to be an instrument of domination in the hands of a certain group (whether in the interest of the community or not) as it was only a form of self-government, the citizens enforcing social discipline upon themselves.

Pareto's theory of elites is directed against the socialist attack on class society as well as against the liberal-democratic defence of it. The criticism of liberal apologetics is splendidly given in the few remarks about the liberal Utopia in the "*systèmes socialistes*." First, this criticism strikes at humanitarianism, for which alone it is intended. But after the defeat of liberalism in Italy an element of criticism even against liberalism creeps in. Compared with the times of the ascendancy of liberalism, the position is now entirely changed. The early liberals justified the existing system of state and property by assuming its tendency to

abolish all class differentiation and all oppression. The latter day partisans of the state and of class differentiation defend these institutions by developing a theory of the inevitability of oppression and of class differentiation. The heyday of the modern industrial world has gone, politically and economically, and with it liberal and democratic Utopias have vanished. But it would be rash to conclude that the institutions of class differentiation and oppression are on the verge of downfall. The political experience of our own time affords ample evidence that the contrary is the case.

But one common feature between early liberalism and Pareto's theory of the elites remains—the biological determination of social facts. Pareto and liberalism contend that any intrusion of legislation in the formation of the leading group is open to objection. Pareto in common with early liberalism believes in the free circulation of elites as a model form of social organization, and believes this system to be realized in a free trade economy. Again Pareto in common with early liberalism believes that the necessity for differentiation and domination is essentially biological. In the syllogisms, everything is changed. Instead of apologetics and Utopias we are confronted with a ruthless assertion of bitter facts. But in essence nothing is changed. Only the Utopia has broken down. Again, Pareto is a liberal, but an anti-Utopian liberal. His concept of the best social order corresponds to the liberal concept, but the belief that it will be attained has vanished.

The biological element in the theory of the elites was prevalent in orthodox liberalism as well. Only, in

PARETO

the liberal Utopia it is used contradictorily in order to prove the gradual accession to a classless and "free" state of society, whereas in the theory of the elites it is intended to prove the everlasting necessity of class and domination. There are, of course, in Pareto's concept other elements more directly connected with Italian politics of his day and it is only by including them in our consideration that a full understanding of the theory of elites can be reached. But they are connected with the more concrete facts treated by Pareto under the heading of the circulation of elites, which is our next topic.

CHAPTER VII

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

AS for some reason or other elites cannot last, they must change. How is this change effected? The answer is simple in cases where this change is not artificially opposed. In a society with entirely free competition the able will rise and the incapable sink. The social system and the character of the elite need not change: but there is continual change between the individuals composing the elite. This, Pareto seems to believe, would be the ideal case, guaranteeing the highest possible degree of well-being to all members of any society. But this goal can never be reached. In the case of liberalism, which Pareto confounds with this ideal, free circulation of the elites is in reality handicapped by private property of productive commodities. And if this economic order is overthrown or reformed, politics enter inevitably into economic life; in politics, however, an entirely free circulation of elites is impossible *ex definitione*. For political activity is mainly struggle for power, and political power means the possession of machinery intended to preserve the domination of a given group or plurality of groups. Never has a ruling group readily accepted entirely free competition for government. The utmost obtained has been an intelligent admission of the best elements of the lower classes into the leading group. Pareto spends a good deal of his argument in proving that

there is no difference between democracy and other political regimes in this respect and he is, we believe, entirely right in that.

So elites never circulate freely but instead become decadent. This is a direct conclusion from Pareto's axioms and there is nothing mysterious in the process, if the theory is taken for granted. If admission to the leading group is barred, there can be no influx of fresh blood. It is, however, certain that some of the sons of the elite will be less able than their fathers. Even when others prove to be more able than their forebears it is probable that in the long run the ruling group will contain an increasing percentage of unfit members. The supposition is to a certain extent borne out by historical facts showing that "closed" elites often decline rapidly. The lack of the stimulus of competition certainly counts for something in this process and we may assume that both factors in co-operating increase one another and accelerate the final disastrous result.

The theory seems to be simple and consistent as well as in accordance with facts. In addition it provides an excellent argument for liberalism. There seems no reason not to be satisfied with it and to introduce additional and opposing considerations. But unfortunately in the form given above the argument supports not only liberalism but democracy as well. It is perfectly true that democracy is not free competition in politics, but it is equally true that the circulation of the leading personnel in democracy is relatively swift, certainly much more so than in bureaucratic and autocratic regimes. But democracy is Pareto's bogey from the outset, and in addition it sometimes works, and in

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

his time in Italy did actually work, against a free trade economy. In the light of these facts, quick circulation of elites seems no longer entirely desirable. The liberal appreciation of the facts clashes with the anti-democratic one and their contrast produces an enormous number of subsidiary hypotheses.

On the one hand it must be proved that the closing of the elite is pernicious, and this seems easy with the help of the original concept of circulation. The question is not further treated and we learn very little about the reasons for the breakdown of closed elites. On the other hand arguments against an excessive circulation are brought forward and it is these which form the main body of the theory of circulation. The argument against circulation is provided by the theory of non-logical actions, which in part finds here a new and important application.

Two types of elites are distinguished and identified by exhibiting quick and slow circulation, the one dominated by residue I, the other by residue II.¹ And these two types of elites are again identified with two economic types, one being the speculator, following the lure of new combinations, the other being the "rentier," who keeps anxiously to a fixed income.² Out of these two types of elites arise two types of social order. The one is conservative, military, religious, using force as the main method of government. The circulation of elites is slow, economic stimulus weak. In the opposite case economic interests supersede military ones, the costs of government are high, but so is economic stimulus, the conservative virtues decline, and finally the leading class, degenerat-

¹ 2178.

² 2233.

ing into humanitarianism, proves unable to keep the political power. Revolution or defeat in war ensues and puts an end to this part of the cycle. For Pareto assumes that there is a continuous change between these two forms of government. But before we enter into the detail of his theory of circulation, one further point must be mentioned.

At the beginning of the chapter dealing mainly with the circulation of elites, a fine study of social utility is given, a little out of the context, but a masterpiece in itself and important in so far as it demonstrates the impossibility of giving any objective rule as to which state of society is preferable. As we shall soon see, Pareto himself has not kept to this sceptical detachment. But in considering social utility, a concept familiar to him from economic theory, the master of abstract economic thought shows himself at his best. He distinguishes first between subjective and objective utility.¹ The latter supposes the existence of some objective rule and as a consequence can never be applied to individuals who do not accept the rule concerned. There is no objective measure of individual utility. Society itself must certainly take some idea of utility as its guide. But there are two possible solutions of the problem of social utility, radically different one from the other. One is the "*utility of a community*," the other the "*utility for a community*." These terms may not be the best available, but the problem is essential indeed. The *utility of* a community is its power and strength as displayed in a larger group of communities.² The *utility for* a community is the utility of a given fact for its members. The former may

¹ 2115.

² 2134.

be pretty clear in most cases. The second one very often is not clear at all, as most measures affect some members of the community favourably and others to their detriment. In the economic field the utility of measures for the community is not open to any doubt as long as they increase the wealth of all its members (provided all its members desire increase of wealth) but as soon as the wealth of some is increased and that of others diminished there is no more objective rule as to how to decide. "We suppose a community in the situation of having to choose either to be very rich but with great inequality in income, or poor with great equality. The utility *of* the community may require the first solution, the maximum of utility *for* the community may require the second. . . . The admirer of "superman" will attribute almost no value to the utility of the lower classes and will obtain by his considerations a maximum of utility very near the first solution. The lover of equality will attribute much importance to the utility of the lower classes; and his maximum of utility will be very near the second solution. There is no criterion but sentiment for making a choice between the two possibilities."¹ Since Pareto wrote these lines, Fascism has tried to apply the first solution and Bolshevism the latter, but both have pretended to apply a system guaranteeing the wealth of the society and of all its members together. Or another example: "Let us consider for instance the increase of population. Taking into account the utility *of* the community, principally for its military and political power, you will advise increasing the population to the very limit, where further increase

would lead to general impoverishment and decadence of the race. But if you consider the maximum *for* the collectivity, the limit of increase will lie at a considerably lower point. Then you have to find out in what proportion the different social classes participate in the advantages procured by this increase of military and political power, and in what proportion they participate in the common sacrifices.”¹ Here again, Pareto touches one of the most pressing problems of our time, showing the impossibility of an “objective” solution and giving a clue to the understanding of the motives for the decisions of different social groups in this matter.

Now we turn to the theory of the circulation of elites itself.

At the very beginning of the discussion of this theory Pareto considers two cases concerning Italy, which seem to have been essential in the formation of this whole concept. One is the operation of protective tariffs in Italy and their favourable effects on economic development,² which were at variance with the whole system of a staunch free trader like Pareto. In the case of protective tariffs, he says, the composition of the elite is changed. The best chances are no more with the technically fit but with the men of financial imagination and capacity to influence politicians, who divide the shares of the profits arising from protection. A similar process obtains among politicians; now only those skilful in the commerce of protection are successful. The newly created ruling class draws the whole nation into industrial production and the final increase of wealth may be greater than the losses

¹ 2134.

² 2134.

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

incurred by protective tariffs themselves. The final result, the increase of wealth, is as a matter of fact undeniable. The explanation offered by Pareto is less convincing as it brings a host of subsidiary theories to bear on a very simple process. Protective tariffs carry with them an increase of costs. But the final increase of wealth seems sometimes to be greater than these losses, namely, if without protection no industry at all could have been built up. This is the case of Italy as well as of other countries backward in economic development, and forced to compete with highly developed foreign competitors. In these cases protection simply affords time to effect the necessary accumulation of capital in order to enable national industry to compete on the highest attainable technical standard. There is certainly a snag in the system. Protection may induce the application of higher technical methods, but it may also give to weak existing industries a comfortable refuge preserving them from any necessity of improving their methods. Some progress was undeniable in Italy but largely the latter result followed the introduction of protective tariffs. In this case, the theory of the circulation of elites seems rather to be misused for the explanation of a simple fact, the evident reason for which Pareto does not like to acknowledge, as it contradicts his economic opinions.

The second application of this theory to Italy is much more important, because more comprehensive. It is a masterly description of the Italian political regime during the author's lifetime.¹ The political regime of Italy has provided the elements for the picture

¹ 2255-2256.

of his elite dominated by residue I. He starts with the Depretis cabinet, the ministry of the "left" which had been in office for a long time, beginning in the late 'seventies. How, he asks, could this government have lasted so long? Depretis was neither a victorious general nor a great orator; he had not achieved anything important, he was not a favourite of the king. But he was the head of the syndicate of speculators which in reality ruled the country, and in its service knew to perfection how to make use of all sentiments and all interests. He spent money in protective tariffs, railway concessions, government orders, dubious bank business. There is at the moment no very rich family in Italy which has not made its fortune by this peculiar method of getting favour from politicians. (The fact is really beyond any doubt, as everybody acquainted with Italian history knows.) Then came Crispi, damaging the interests of the speculators and the residues of the masses. Instead of utilizing the socialists, he attacks them and makes their most intelligent leaders his personal foes. In addition, the misfortunes of the economic cycle were against him. Giolitti, his successor, continued the policy of Depretis, and in addition favoured large trusts. He was a past master in the utilizing of sentiments. He did not attack the socialists, but induced some of their most important leaders to moderate their views by subsidizing the socialist co-operatives. He won the Lybian war and left the cost to others. He knew how to make use of even the clergy in elections, at the same time breaking its strength by favouring the new movement of the nationalists. He enlarged the franchise, in order both to intimidate the bour-

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

geoisie and at the same time to be its protector. Like all men dominated by Residue I he knew nothing about the impetus and the value of the sentiments of the masses he so well understood how to master. He did not care for the more remote consequences of his actions. His policy drove the country to war, but he did not prepare for it, in order to avoid unpopular taxes. Finally, he was overthrown by fifty socialist deputies, who acted not of their own free will but under mass pressure. The socialist masses, being strongly influenced by Residue II, had little understanding for the opportunism of their leaders and had brought a new group to the top of the party. (Among these new leaders was Mussolini.) Under the premier Luzatti, Giolitti remained real master of affairs and took up government himself again as soon as he thought fit. Even Sonnino could not effectually oppose him in spite of his higher culture and political farsightedness, because he would not or could not govern in the interest of the syndicate of speculators. The situation in France, he concludes, is similar to the one in Italy, and in England and Germany the same forces are at work, though not yet paramount.

So democracy is essentially the government of the speculators and its main methods of government are "combinations." It increases wealth but is bound to break down finally in a general dissolution of public spirit. This is the essence of Pareto's theory of the elites and their circulation; a theory pretending to be entirely objective, scientific and as free from political bias as any social science can be. In reality, Pareto has simply projected his individual political experience in Italy on to universal history. And his sociology seems

to say that the problem with which Italy in his time was coping, is the essential problem of social life throughout time and space. One ought not to grieve too much with Pareto about this attitude. It is, as a matter of fact, much more common than is generally admitted. No social theory can really be understood without taking account of the specific problems of the society in which the author lived. The difference lies only in the different degree of critical sense from the generalizations of local and individual experiences. In the best cases, the problems are determined by subjective experience, but the solutions proposed insist upon the essential difference between one's own problems and the problems of other times and places. Authors who lack this self-critical sense, however, are inclined simply to generalize the facts which are most important for their own surroundings. Pareto is much more liable to this mistake than is the average social theoretician. Simple assertions of objectivity repeatedly made in his work are not sufficient and if an author takes his own objectivity in sociology for granted, he may be sure to fall into the worst kinds of subjective sentiment instead of objective description. Pareto's sociology is first and foremost a violent manifesto against democracy; and assertions as to its scientific character change nothing in that respect.

On the other hand it ought not to be forgotten that his appreciation of Italian politics is deeply realistic. What he says about democracy, elites, circulation, is generally biassed and deformed in its general applications. But it almost consistently renders correctly the true state of things in Italy before the Fascist revolution.

Is democracy a specific government of speculators? He knows himself, first, that there are other types of democracy, such as Switzerland (he could have added Scandinavia) where the influence of "speculators" is relatively weak. He notes the exception.¹ But there are certainly types of autocracy which are not less governments of "speculators" than democracies. The monarchies of the eighteenth and even of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were even more dominated by finance than is democracy. Democratic France had Panama and Dreyfus, but the absolute monarchy had John Law, and even St. Joan was financed by Jaques Cœur, who in reality held the reins of the kingdom. On the other hand, it is definitely wrong to say that it is the spirit of the speculators which creates wealth. "Speculators" is not meant in its literal sense by Pareto. It means the type ever inclined to try new combinations. The choice of the term is one of the many cases where Pareto's violent passions appear behind his quiet formulæ. "Speculator" certainly indicates an undesirable type, as much as "elite" indicates something entirely desirable. And then again the word is used in its literal sense, where Pareto asserts that there is no rich family in Italy which does not owe its wealth to political affairs. The fact is true. But if the word is used in this literal sense, then certainly it is not true that this type has created the modern forms of wealth throughout Europe. In England wealth is, or at least was, mostly in non-conformist hands (apart of course from the aristocratic types of wealth). It was gained by a group completely debarred from political activities and on the worst terms with the administration.

¹ 2255.

"Speculation" in the sense this word alone can really have, was most abhorrent to it. It detested "combinations" denying itself on religious grounds even the most harmless forms of recreation. Steady, conservative work was its main method of becoming wealthy. Religious sense, instinct of duty, courage, all the virtues of residue II, were its characteristic features. In America the same type was predominant throughout the century which saw the amazing rise of that country. It is really surprising to see a man like Pareto believe that the most characteristic fact in America is Tammany Hall. In reality, if any general rule is to be applied at all, things are just the contrary of what Pareto believes them to be. "Speculators" are paramount in countries which have not succeeded in modern economic development. They are most important in some civilizations other than our own Western one, in countries where a small group of commercial people control the more or less primitive economic activities of the mass of the population. This was the case even in ancient Rome. They are equally important in such backward countries as Italy, Poland and others, where modern industry has not managed to permeate the whole society. They are secondary in great industrial countries like America, Britain and Germany. Their influence varied somewhat in the different periods of industrial development. Financial enterprise was more important in the last years before the war than in the eighteen-fifties, and it is this phenomenon which Pareto overrates so enormously. But probably it has since steadily declined, and certainly was never so important in any of the great industrial countries as in Italy and especially

in France, where it is supreme. It was in France and Italy that it had the disastrous effects correctly described by Pareto.

On the other hand, it is somewhat surprising to find the type opposed to the "speculators" called "rentiers." Under this heading we find the conservative industrialist, the bureaucrat, the peasant and farmer, the employee, the labourer, and finally the real "rentier" all jumbled up together. We are confronted with one of Pareto's attempts artificially to simplify complex facts in order to give one general far-reaching explanation confirming the dogma that social life does not essentially change. Only from the angle of French and Italian discussions is it intelligible why the "rentier" and no other group could have afforded the pattern for the "non-speculating" group. For if in Italy before Fascism all lower classes were disregarded and only the bourgeoisie and the parts of the aristocracy connected with it were taken into consideration, then only two groups remained on the field: "speculators" and "rentiers"; great financiers without any sense of responsibility, and respectable higher middle class people living partly on "rentes" and anxiously keeping to their fixed income. In countries like France and Italy there exists a terrific hatred between the respectable middle class and the less respectable but much more successful political financier, who is carrying on predatory activities at the cost of the "rentiers" themselves. In these countries all problems bound up with modern industrial life are secondary, as industry is weak. In some of these countries it exists mainly in the form of mining, as in France. Italy, however, has no mines. Labour too is only a secondary

problem, as industry is weak. Socialism sometimes becomes a problem, not on account of its own forces but as a consequence of the weakness of the government. The peasant remains silent and subdued. Only two forces remain on the field, the great and the small owner of shares and loans, the one speculating, directing the political powers, spreading moral and political dissolution, the other abhorring all that, but imbued with contempt and hatred for his successful competitor. It is this mentality which is reflected in the division of society into "rentiers" and "speculators." In addition, this theory offers an opportunity of ruling out the other antagonisms which exist in society, especially that between the factory owners and their hands.

One biographical note may add to the understanding of this attitude of Pareto's, as we know he was the son of an aristocrat, a marquess. In his original conception of sociology, as given in the "Manuel" his "elites" carry still the name of "aristocracies." Here the concept of aristocracies seems to be confused with what in his sociology he calls "elites with residue II." Only under the shock of the victory of the "speculators" under Depretis (the government he so violently opposed and the one which made life in Italy impossible for him) he admitted that even elites Residue I could really be leading groups. But not for a long time, he immediately adds. As an aristocrat, hatred of the speculators was natural to him. Perhaps in his violent attacks on the "speculators" and in his over estimation of the problem raised by their existence, aristocratic traditions, combined with the loathing of a revolutionary family for such activities, are still at work.

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

As to the objective value of the distinction between speculators and "rentiers," not much need be said. As in so many instances, Pareto has called attention to one phenomenon previously neglected and then enormously exaggerated its importance. His reiterated attacks on the pseudo-Marxist conception of some Italian socialists who divide the whole social body into capitalists and proletarians and then explain history throughout the ages by their struggle¹ is fully justified. Only he does exactly the same thing, dividing society into speculators and "rentiers" and explaining history throughout the ages by their struggle. In reality, the phenomenon has sometimes been of great importance, sometimes of none, never supreme. As a hypothesis, it is definitely objectionable, since it bars the way to concrete investigation of the varying social stratification of different societies.

There is, however, in our time one important factor, exceedingly active in political struggle, which is hidden in this division: the struggle for a secure and stable income *is* one of the essential facts of our time. Social legislation, collective bargaining for wages, protective tariffs and innumerable other measures form part of it. The fact has had great importance in some other periods, mostly at times when the existing economic system has been profoundly shaken. One outstanding example is the safeguarding provisions of the medieval guilds at the time of their decline. Speaking of the approach of a new Byzantine age² Pareto refers to the process tending towards the establishment of fixed incomes throughout society. From time to time he expresses his astonishment at the

¹ 830.

² 2612.

undeniable desire of the masses for this kind of security. As a matter of fact, the problem of economic security has dominated whole periods, sometimes as the leading feature of their actual working economy, sometimes as an unattainable ideal. But it is entirely misleading to identify this trend with the strife between "rentiers" and speculators, which is only one minor aspect of it. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, for instance, especially from 1830 onwards, the trend towards security had become increasingly weak. The bulk of the society in the most advanced countries was definitely in favour of change. In U.S.A. this state of mind continued until 1930. In other periods, practically the whole social body stood for security, as for instance in the fourteenth century A.D., and even more, in the last two centuries of the Western Roman empire. The differences and antagonisms of interests connected with change and security respectively are neither stable nor the causes of the changes arising in this respect. They are, as other "elite" behaviours, consequent on the social order which is their setting.

This consequence Pareto tries to avoid by proving that change of social and political systems is conditioned by a change in the composition of the elite. In the case of elite with residue II this change is slowly effected through the creeping of elements with residue I into the elite. For generally speaking the leading group has always more residue I than the masses, or in other words, the masses are always more conservative than the leading group. This is the well-known theory of Le Bon. In time, the elements having a strong residue I have a chance of changing their

condition and joining the elite, the composition of which is changed in the process. If residue I begins definitely to prevail in the elite decadence sets in, instead of force astuteness is used as the principal means of rule and armed struggle is more and more avoided, even at the cost of expensive concessions to the dominated. Whilst the elite is thus in a process of transformation, it excludes more and more the elements prepared to use force. These elements remain in the dominated classes and grow increasingly unsatisfied with a government unable to oppose their force but superior to them in the matter of cunning. Now the question is whether the ruling group manages to draw the most active elements of the opposition into its own camp. If it does, the victory of the oppressed group with residue II is extremely difficult. But if it does not, defeat is almost certain for the elite, especially if some ambitious members of it join the ranks of the opposers of the government and bring with them the art of cunning, which the adversaries of the government lacked until then. Then the regime of the weak, cowardly, humanitarian speculators is overthrown by the men of force, some of their rank are killed, a thing extremely useful for the society, as humanitarians are no better than noxious beasts.

In the opposite case, if the elite, though less conservative and aggressive than the oppressed, but sufficiently endowed with residue II, knows how to use force and is prepared to apply it, it will certainly keep the power in its hands. The exclusive use of force, however, will not do. This would be the government of a tyrant or a group of tyrants based on a corps of satellites. But satellites may quickly find it to their interest to forsake

the cause of their master, leaving him without any means of resisting revolt.¹ Generally government is based on force as well as on consent, and consent is the more readily granted if the inferior feels that the superior is prepared to use force if necessary. If Louis XVI² or Napoleon III, that weak humanitarian, had known how to use force, their regime would certainly have been lasting, to the benefit of their subjects. But if a ruling class falls into the sin of humanitarianism, then its downfall is its well-deserved penalty, and a new leading group arises, endowed with residue II in sufficient quantity for the exercise of the business of government. One may be entitled to question whether Pareto's belief in means of force is justified by historical experience. An equally strong case could probably be made for the contrary opinion. Great Britain lost her American colonies, because she insisted stubbornly on her formal rights, enforcing them by military means, instead of seeking the consent of the governed. British rule in New England was, however, not exclusively built on force. It presented precisely the combination of much force and some amount of consent regarded as ideal by Pareto. Loyalists were certainly not a negligible force in New England, but even their support proved to be insufficient. In the middle of the nineteenth century, in a kind of despair as to how to rule recalcitrant colonies, Britain then turned to the creation of Dominions, gradually abolishing the application of force in this part of her Empire almost to the extent of entirely abandoning it. And in the light of the experiences with New England and with her Dominions respectively

¹ 2179.² 2191.

Britain to-day has no doubt, that, as far as white settlers' colonies are concerned, complete renunciation of force is the one means of keeping the Empire together. There are other conspicuous cases, where force has met a crushing defeat. The government of the Tsar was not composed of weak humanitarians, but was extremely bloodthirsty and cruel. Nevertheless, it has met its end, in spite of a considerable amount of consent, which strengthened its military and police activities. Sometimes it becomes quite evident, that the application or renunciation of force has nothing to do with the psychological qualities of the rulers. At first Napoleon III was not a weak humanitarian, but a ruthless adventurer, shooting scores of people in the streets of Paris and sending hundreds to die in the hell of Cayenne. Not a change of his personal residues, but a change of conditions forced him into liberalism, which preluded his fall. The French revolutionaries won, according to Pareto, because, in contrast to Louis XVI they understood how to apply force. But one group of them after another failed finally to do so, and after being for a time decried as ogres, were ridiculed in their fall as weaklings. Robespierre himself, the very symbol of terrorism, was probably in reality somewhat less bloodthirsty than was generally supposed in his time, but he certainly did not lack energy and the capacity of applying force. But on the 9th Thermidor, this capacity suddenly failed him; he hesitated for hours and hours until the Convention had practically won. Had his residues suddenly changed? Or, in less paradoxical terms, had courage suddenly failed him? There are historians who believe it. We on our side would prefer to stress the impersonal factor

in this tragic event. In all former insurrections, Robespierre had had the masses of Paris behind him; they failed him on this last day of his career and it was the feeling of weakness growing out of his hopeless position and not any change of mentality which gave his last actions such a flavour of hesitancy. Napoleon I was never suspected of being a democrat, a humanitarian or anything similar. But after his return from Elba, he had to become a constitutionalist, renouncing direct application of force against his subjects, and a recent tragedy in which, as is well known, Mussolini himself has collaborated, makes this sin the reason for his defeat. In reality, Napoleon would have liked best to employ one of his generals instead of Benjamin Constant, but no choice was left to him on account of the weakness of his position, there being no hope in force, but some in seeking consent. It is true that in some cases ruling groups break down simply on account of their weakness, and well-considered application of force at the right moment could have saved them. But there is certainly no general rule or "law" in that.

An equal mixture of residue I and residue II would be ideal in the elite, but it seems impossible to keep; it is essentially transitory. Sometimes, this "law" of the circulation of the elites assumes in Pareto's mind the dignity of an objective principle, governing the feelings of the members of the society. If residue II, to the detriment of society, is superseded by residue I "that is felt instinctively rather than demonstrated rationally, and there begins a movement in a direction contrary to the one which gave domination to residue I: then the pendulum swings to the opposite side and the

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

opposite extreme is reached." In another place he contends that religion in nineteenth-century England gained more importance than in any other country at that time, *because* England had first passed through the age of enlightenment.¹ Here the very fact of the domination of one form of society at one time seems to be the cause of the domination of the opposite form of society in the next period. Assertions like the ones just quoted show that behind Pareto's theory of circulation there is something more than mere observations and hypothetical deductions. The circulation of elites in his mind has the dignity of a metaphysical belief very much akin to Nietzsche's "everlasting cycle of happenings." If the rather clumsy term "cause" is used, then, says Pareto, the ascending part of a curve of development, and nothing else, is the "cause" of the descending part.²

Some historical examples are adduced to demonstrate the axiom. One is a diagram showing the increase of residue I in Athens from the Persian wars onwards to the battle of Chaeronea.³ One decisive moment in this development is the overthrow of the Arcopagus in 458 B.C. The beginning of the Peloponnesian war and the trial of Anaxagoras mark one of the instinctive but futile attempts at reaction in the process of decline. But soon the destructive movement takes on new strength and it is only after the final defeat that the trial of Socrates marks again a short reaction.⁴ Thenceforward residue II continues slowly to decline and with it the Athenian community, until the final catastrophe of the battle of Chaeronea.

¹ 2340.

² 2386.

³ 2338.

⁴ 2348.

A comparison between Sparta and other Greek cities as to the relation between residue I and residue II is added.¹ The instinct of combinations was paramount in Athens and lost the Athenians the Peloponnesian war, as it drove them into ill-considered acts like the Sicilian expedition. Still worse, they put Nikias in command, a man typical for residue II and who with his superstitions spoilt even the rational plans of his collaborators. On the other hand they drove Alcibiades, the most accomplished type of residue I, to join the Spartans. The Spartans on the other hand, were extremely prudent and conscientious, but without Alcibiades' instinct of combinations they could hardly have won the war. A certain combination of residue I and residue II is desirable, but it cannot work in cases like that of Nikias in Sicily, when residue I is strong among the commanded and residue II among the commanders. The opposite combination, as in the case of Alcibiades with the Spartans, is excellent, but the best of all is a certain mixture of both elements in the governed as well as the governing, only with residue I prevalent among the rulers and residue II prevalent among the ruled. This was the case with Thebes and Macedonia. At the battle of Leuktra the Spartans were defeated because their conservatism hindered them from adapting themselves to the new tactics of Epaminondas. But Thebes fell, when by the death of Epaminondas and Pelopidas the balance between residue I and residue II was upset. In 1870 and even later, Germany played the part of Thebes or Macedonia, whereas France was in the position of Athens. Since then, Germany has acquired much more residue I,

¹ 2424 ff.

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

while France has remained much the same.¹ But he seems to believe, even at the time of the accomplishment of the "Sociology" that Germany was stronger on account of the unbroken power of the "Junkers." Here he was certainly wrong, as events have amply proved.

Another example is provided by the history of Ancient Rome.¹ We know practically nothing about it before the time of the second Carthaginian war, but we may assume that the alleged simplicity of life in olden times is a fairy tale. The later developments may be divided into three periods, the first from the end of the second Carthaginian war till the end of the republic, the second from Augustus till the Antonines, the third from the Antonines till Gallienus. In the first period, the legal obstacles to the circulation of elites have just been abolished. Such a legal change encouraging the circulation of elites always brings with it a sudden increase of wealth, as for instance in the above-mentioned period of Roman history, and in Athens at the end of the sixth century B.C. The circulation, however, is not yet excessive, the individual families rise only slowly, the whole elite consists of true-born Romans, later on of at least indigenous Italians. The elite is still a caste of warriors. But a differentiation begins as soon as the army is recruited from amongst the poor. In the second period decadence begins, but we are still near the optimum point. Again force rules, but the Pretorians are not yet masters. The speculators are kept in subjection, they can work good but no evil. But "crystallization" begins. The *ordo senatorius* and the *ordo equester* are

¹ 2539 ff.

closed, the circulation of elites is artificially handicapped. Residue II increases. But industry and commerce attract many forces formerly wasted in political intrigues. Nevertheless the intrusion of the foreign element into the elite begins, and residue II is again increased in the process. The "liberti" composing the bulk of the intruders are still the most able among the slaves. But on account of the new character of their masters they now want more residue II in order to succeed. Then the ruling group becomes a bureaucracy with all the narrowness of outlook characteristic of this class. The differentiation between civilians and soldiers continues to increase. The military governs. "It constitutes a brutal force, not an elite. The latter becomes more and more civilian." In the third period, finally the breakdown ensues. Crystallization is accomplished, guilds or castes are introduced. The effective circulation of elites diminishes every day. Impoverishment excludes any new elements entering the elite, the division of castes being even more real than legal. The foreign element prevails. The speculators disappear and residue I with them. Military and civilian organizations are completely separated. Finally the barbarians break the crystallization, this being their principal achievement. They are even more superstitious than the conquered Romans, increase once more residue II, and then the cycle begins again.

The Italian, Greek and Roman examples discussed by Pareto are, however, sufficient to show the merits and the shortcomings of his theory of circulation. As to the facts themselves, there is certainly no doubt about their exactitude, as they are simply taken from

the best known parts of history. But the interpretation given adds hardly anything to the understanding of them.

It is remarkable that all these examples are rather illustrations than proofs of Pareto's theory, and there is not one of them which could not be interpreted in a very different way. It is undeniable that sometimes conservative periods are replaced by periods of rapid change, and that this transformation often goes coupled with a decline of the old religions and of public spirit on the one hand, and with an increase of economic activities on the other. But this, in the first place, is certainly not a general rule. The longest continuous historical development known to us is ancient Egyptian history, and it will be found extremely difficult to apply to it the concept of the circulation of elites. Neither do we see any possibility of applying it to India or China. These cases are left out by Pareto as being too far off to be well known, but it is precisely they, or rather all civilizations, classical antiquity and our own culture excepted, which are refractory to the formula of change between residue I and residue II. For that very reason liberal history preferred to treat these civilizations as stagnant, and not to consider them in detail. Here, as in so many other instances, Pareto, in spite of violent attacks on his predecessors, has by no means improved on their views himself. Secondly, Pareto knows extremely well, that the downfall of an established religion does not mean necessarily the decrease of religious spirit. Just the contrary, abandonment of the old creed is very often simply a prelude to the acceptance of a new one, more living and more in accordance with changed conditions. In Protestant

Germany, in the last half century, religious belief among the working class seems practically to have broken down. But in reality Lutheranism as the dominating religious belief has simply made room for socialism, the latter being not less but much more religious than the former in its state of decay. Pareto ought to have known this first, as he himself insists upon the religious character of modern apparently empirical beliefs. In Catholic Germany, on the other hand, the old religion was sufficiently living and adapted to changing conditions to resist the socialist attack, and in this part of Germany the socialist creed made only little progress, in spite of the great similarity of the practical programmes of the Catholic and the socialist workers. In England, the existing religions, at variance with Catholicism, have not directly opposed socialism. But they were sufficiently strong not to cede their position to it, but combining with it, added their mutual strength to one another. In the working classes, there was, in the middle of rapid industrial progress, no decrease but a violent increase of religious beliefs. This is not the case with the ruling classes of ancient Greece and Rome, and in our modern Western civilization it applies only in part. But this part is the most important side of the phenomenon, as we have already had occasion to remark. For the exception is Puritanism, which infused a new zeal into the decadent religious life of the Renaissance, and from the very beginning got hold of a large part of the ruling class, namely the squirearchy, and presided over their transformation into the modern industrial ruling group. In India the phenomenon is still more conspicuous. The great religious revivals, beginning with

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

the great philosophies, through Jainism and Buddhism all seem to be connected with the urban upper classes as opposed to the rural groups and the lower castes. Even Puritanism, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was enforced upon reluctant masses by a fanatical bourgeoisie. The whole theory of the connection between industrialization and decline of religion, between religion and the lower classes, is a precipitate generalization. Some cases may be quoted in favour of it, but just as many cases contradict it.

Thirdly, in many cases it is clearly evident that the changing of the spirit of the "elite" is not due to a change in its personnel. Pareto himself stumbles over the case of Venice, where the "elite" was entirely closed and completely changed its habits nevertheless. He attributes the change to the commercial character of Venetian life. But this character is itself the most stable element of this life, and if its constant influence brings about a profound change, then the theory of the stability of the residues is untenable and with its downfall the hypothesis ascribing any change in habit to a change in the personnel of the elite becomes superfluous and artificial. As a matter of fact the natural explanation, which in many cases can be proved, is that changing conditions of life change men. In some cases, certainly a change in the personnel of the "elite" is of great importance, as in the case of the victory of Christianity; in others changing conditions of life have called forth a new personnel, as in the rise of the soldier emperors in the third century A.D.: but cases like Venice demonstrate that deep changes arise even when all change in personnel is artificially excluded. Pareto himself, in linking up industrialism with

pacifism, humanitarianism and so on, hits on the right explanation. Only, even then facts are much more complex than he assumes, and he need only have observed carefully the Swiss society in which he lived to realize that even industrialism, though extremely penetrating in its psychological effects, need not in all cases be a mollifying factor. The various consequences following upon industrialism in different cases seem largely to be accounted for by the degree of pressure bound up with the existence of this (as well as of any other) form of social organization. The explanation given first by Nietzsche and in these days brilliantly developed by A. J. Toynbee, ascribing hardening and softening to the degree of pressure weighing on the institution or group in question, sufficiently accounts for the facts Pareto tries in vain to explain. It accounts even for the puzzling variation in detail of the effects of the same type of social organization, as pressure is not always brought to bear upon the same point and the hardening and softening in different respects depend on the specific character of the pressure experienced. Physical courage is certainly not the outstanding virtue of Jews, as for centuries they were exposed to physical attacks with no possibility of defence. But intellectual independence is one of their outstanding characteristics, as they were forced at one and the same time to live in a milieu deeply opposed to their mode of life, and to tolerate it. In the same seventeenth century the English manufacturers, in the struggle against the crown, developed a proud sense of independence, whereas their French colleagues, dependent on the protective measures of the mercantilist government, had a bad reputation for servility,

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

and many of them went so far as to renounce their religion to gain the favour of the administration. Examples could be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

But we must return once more to Pareto's presentation of Roman history.

In this, the ambiguity of the concept of "elites" is really remarkable. *Ex definitione*, elites are taken simply as the groups which prove their ability to rule by the very fact that they manage to rule. But in the sketch just given Pareto does not understand it like this. The military government of the third century, which certainly had an enormous amount of vitality, sufficient to deal with tremendous difficulties, is not taken as an elite but as a "brutal force," whereas in other places of the "Sociology" the inclination to make use of force is the main characteristic of a vigorous elite as opposed to a decadent one. Now, it is precisely the downfall of the government of the Antonines, who certainly were "humanitarians," which is taken as "decadence." And hardly any other interpretation would be possible, as the third century A.D. is certainly the period of decadence of the Roman empire. Moreover, Pareto hates the Byzantine empire as the type of stagnant bureaucratic regime, the return to which is the menace of our times. So he hesitates continuously. His concepts being expressions of violent political passions rather than of detached research, they change their meaning with the political sympathies and antipathies evoked by every change of subject-matter. At one time, the "elite" is an "aristocracy," and then the theory of elites tends to prove that inevitably the best govern any society. At another time, this aristocratic argument is dropped in treating

of unpleasant forms of government, and then the elite is simply the group having managed to hold government efficiently. But those unpleasant elites introduce "decadence." Unfortunately, Pareto's sympathies are not clear but contradictory, (we have already had occasion to remark that this is what gives to his conceptions a veneer of "objectivity") and what in one place is desirable is decadence in another. Throughout his lifetime Pareto fought for liberalism as a system encouraging quick circulation of elites and increase of wealth. So the contrary of liberalism, "brutal" military government and bureaucratic stagnancy of the Byzantine type, are "decadence." But at the same time he hates democracy, hates finance, and now the humanitarian stage in the development of society becomes "decadence" to him. Finally he decides that a mixed regime would be best. But this superficial compromise between the two contradictory tendencies of his thought proves inadequate where a definite attitude towards extreme cases must be taken. It never becomes clear what really is decadence: the Antonines or the warring barbarians, the democratic humanitarians or the dissolving force of violent trade-unionism. The most characteristic sign of this fundamental contradiction is Pareto's attitude towards Fascism, which he welcomed, but at the same time advising it to carry out a liberal policy! Vain desire to combine the incompatible!

Some considerations about the "war cycle" and the "industrial cycle"¹ may find their place here, because they throw light on the same attitude from another angle. Military as well as industrial states, says Pareto,

¹ 2225.

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

alike need neighbours weaker than themselves, the one for an object of plunder, the other in order to be superior in industrial competition. But the industrial cycle is more self-sufficing. If poor neighbours become richer, they become more valuable *debouchés*, at least at first. On the other hand, a military state wants ever new objects of depredation. Rich prey in war reinforces the warrior element and residue II with it, accelerating at the same time the circulation of elites and being therefore a very favourable condition of society. But the scope of this system of social organization is limited by the number of possible objects of depredation. On the other hand, the industrial cycle depends on a high amount of saving, but the increase of residue I tends to diminish it. Moreover, the industrial cycle tends to break down in humanitarianism, revolution or defeat in war. This, however, is not an absolute rule. In modern times, industry is of such importance in war, that industrial peoples may prove themselves superior to military ones, even in war. There is hardly any doubt about the justification of some of these remarks. We call attention, however, to the pessimistic undertone of all these considerations. Finally, it is this pessimistic assumption, that in reality there is no satisfactory solution for the problems of society, which gives the theory of cycles its most characteristic stamp.

Pareto is convinced that history proceeds by cycles or undulations. In this he agrees with Hegel, without, of course, being aware of it. There is only one essential difference between the two. Hegel insisted upon the recurrence of the same problems and of the same forms of social life in different civilizations, but he considered

the differences as well, believing every civilization to be characterized by one specific dominating concern, which made its mark on all activities of this civilization. Taking into full account the sameness of recurrence of social facts, he equally stressed their difference or—which comes to the same thing—in stressing the differences between different forms of expressions of the “spirit” he insisted on the profound sameness of all aspects of social life. Difference in sameness and sameness in difference is the essential point of Hegel’s dialectics. The logical method applied by him in order to cope with this task is certainly unsatisfactory, but the essential problem seems to us to be well marked. Any sociology stressing exclusively either difference or sameness is doomed to failure from the very outset. Now Pareto, here as in other instances stresses exclusively sameness. And in the case of the cyclic movement, where experimental evidence is and must be lacking, this assumption takes the aspect of a metaphysical axiom overtly proclaimed. He distinguishes three types of cycles—accidental, short, and long undulations.¹ The phenomenon of undulations, to him, is general throughout social life, but he starts the consideration of it with economic cycles. Accidental cycles are initiated by transitory facts, such as the revolution of 1848 and the war of 1870. Their causes being transitory, their effects are also. Short cycles are the well-known trade cycles, which, in pre-war times, generally extended over a decade. They are well studied and Pareto does not give them further consideration. Long cycles are less well observed. But it is clear, that 1852–1873 was a time of general good

¹ 2293.

business, 1873-1897 a time of depression, while 1898-1911 again had an ascending trend. In former periods, on account of lack of data, the long cycles are less discernible. But we observe that 1806-1810 and 1816-1824 were years of depression, whereas 1832-1846 were years of rapid economic development. For earlier times some vague notions about the quantity of money metals may give a rough indication of prosperity.¹ But the whole of modern times is contained in one still larger trend of economic ascendancy, beginning with the discovery of America.² This fact in itself was accidental, but it gained tremendous importance through the incentive it gave to residue I. So finally economic cycles seem to be determined by the movement of residues and elites, though in the short cycles, it is quite impossible to trace them, even hypothetically. Some considerations as to the political effects of economic cycles are added. Short as they are, they constitute one of the most interesting parts of his work. It is easier, he says, to govern in the ascending trend than in the depression.³ The successes of Napoleon III coincide with economic progress and the decline of the regime with stagnation. Probably, the crisis of 1873 had put an end to his regime, even without Sedan. This crisis initiates throughout Europe the heroic period of socialism and anarchism. Since the good business times beginning in 1898 reformism has prevailed in the labour movement; in Britain, Irish home rule has since found its task easier. In Italy the opposition adopted different attitudes towards the Abyssinian war of 1898 and towards the Lybian war of 1911; in France different attitudes towards the

¹ 2296.² 2289.³ 2302.

Tonkin and the Morocco expeditions; towards Panama and Dreyfus. "Naturally, in this second case, many people, thinking of the financial pirates, thought: Poor fellows, certainly they have made a lot of money, but after all there is something left for all of us, for them as well as for us." Formerly, bad harvests deeply influenced politics, including the French Revolution.¹

As we have already remarked, the ascending part of the curve for him is the "cause" of the descending one. And if somebody were to hint at the undeniable fact that a definite increase of differentiation and of aptitude seems incontestably to be the result of the universal history of mankind as a whole, Pareto would answer that probably we have here the longest of all cycles, a cycle whose descending part has not yet appeared. But this belief in the complete recurrence of "essential" facts, only the formal appearance of things being believed to change in the long run, is not held without hesitation. In one place, Pareto makes a comparison between classical antiquity and modern society, with the result that residue I is stronger in the latter, its increase seeming to be the general trend of history. There are other passages of his work, where a hesitant belief in progress seems not to be completely lacking. In this case as in almost every part of his teaching, passages in favour of contradictory opinions will be found, and sometimes it is difficult to make out which tendency is really prevailing in his mind. Nor is this astonishing in the light of the violent political passions, which underlie his research, and are contradictory in themselves. In the case of undulations,

however, there seems no doubt that the belief in the recurrence of similars is the essential element, and that belief in progress or even in any sort of fundamental change for good or for evil is only an undercurrent, never even clearly expressed.

Such a belief, as we have already pointed out, has nothing in common with objective science; it is mainly philosophical and ought to be treated as such. A deep realization of the contradictions in human life and of the unattainableness of real balance is the essence of this belief. As metaphysical beliefs are unprovable *ex proposito*, it is certainly not unfair to relate them not so much to the objective facts brought forward in their favour as to the personal external and inner experience of their author. But for such a belief in the contradictory character of human life no special reason need be given. The fact that real and lasting balance is impossible and a contradiction to life itself, only synthesizes the most obvious sides of human experience. Real equilibrium is equivalent to death. The personal aspect begins with the interpretation of this fact. Compared with Hegel, Pareto is conspicuously pessimistic, as a result of his hatred for progressivism. In this case, social pessimism need not be accounted for by a melancholy temperament. For pessimism in this context is rather a formula directed against political adversaries than a personal psychological experience. But the personal element is not lacking. It is present in the disillusionment at the defeat of his cherished cause, liberalism, and it is really this defeat which has driven him into the emphasis on the vanity of all attempts to find the best society. In one respect his pessimism is definitely superior to Hegel's

optimism. It preserved Pareto from the perverse deformation which Hegel's philosophy has undergone by the conception that the philosopher's own system was the final achievement of the human mind. But it is difficult for system-builders to avoid an undue appreciation of their activities. In one place Pareto hesitatingly proffers the idea that a right insight of the elite into the facts concerning residues (i.e. into his own theory) may stop the vacillations of their attitudes and enable the elite to effect an optimum combination between residue I and residue II.

The individual side of Pareto's theory of cycles may best be evidenced by a comparison with another modern historian-philosopher, A. J. Toynbee. As to the present moment in the history of mankind, Toynbee is hardly less pessimistic than Pareto, even more so, as Pareto finally hoped some solution would be arrived at through Fascism, whereas Toynbee seems rather to be inclined to emphasize the transitory character of the present Fascist phase of European history. But Toynbee makes up for his pessimism concerning the present by a world-wide conception of the development of mankind, accepting the fact that this development proceeds in long and short cycles, the former constituting one civilization each, but the whole development tending towards ever renewed forms of adaptation to the human and natural environment, each at a higher level than the previous group of adaptations. Possibly, supermen will be the result of this continual breaking of the balance and the attempts to re-establish it. For Pareto, however, there exists nothing but the impossibility of establishing a balance. Man is continually shaken between extremes, without

progressing. Here Pareto is very near Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence, but Nietzsche's hope in the breaking of the eternal cycle through the appearance of superman is absent, even in the hypothetical and defiant form given to the ideal of superman by Nietzsche. Essentially, Pareto is a man whose political and social ideal has been broken, and who, opposed to the dominating ideal of his day (or rather to the declining ideal of his day) is unable to oppose another ideal to it and makes pessimism his programme and his belief. For the characteristic fact is that pessimism in this context is not simply a contemplative attitude and an unfavourable judgment on life, but gives rise to a political ideology intended to act, an ideology of force, suppression and conservatism.

Neither Hegel's nor Nietzsche's, neither Toynbee's nor Pareto's appreciation of the cycles of human history is open to scientific proof. They are all hypotheses and cannot be more than that. But we believe that any hypothesis omitting the undeniable profound change in human life from paleolithic men to modern society ought to be ruled out from the start.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARETO'S SOCIOLOGY

AT the end of our résumé of Pareto's sociology, a feeling of bewilderment may arise. Is this sociology worth careful study? Taking into account only the objective scientific value of his theories, one might be entitled to doubt it.

The importance of Pareto's new method has been emphasized. His sociology has been described as an attempt to apply behaviourism to social science. Such an attempt though hardly sufficient to exhaust all the main problems of sociology, may certainly be important. But Pareto's sociology is not really behaviouristic. We tried to show that at every important point of his deductions an axiom enters in. Sometimes these axioms are introduced in the form of hypotheses, sometimes they are not expressed at all, but nevertheless constantly made use of. The hypotheses are never really tried out in the way every scientific hypothesis must be. Some cases which at first sight seem to be in their favour, are adduced, but never is a systematic survey tried in order to find out whether there are no cases contradicting the hypothesis. The limitation of the study to antiquity and Western civilization, to cultures nearly related to one another, makes any serious test of his hypotheses impossible from the outset, but even in the narrow historical limits defined by himself no earnest test is attempted. As to the appear-

ance of behaviourism partly produced by his theories, it can be mainly accounted for by his assumption of a great number of wholly unconnected psychological impulses. But this assumption, far from being due to observation or thorough sifting of the materials available, is in reality itself metaphysical; it is mainly the expression of an axiomatic pessimism about man in terms of an observation which, in reality, has never been made systematically. Though of course not entirely devoid of empirical elements, Pareto's sociology is in reality a philosophy of society, a social creed, determined mainly by violent political and even purely personal passions.

Nevertheless, his sociology ought not to be rejected entirely on this ground. Social science is in most cases debarred from the use of the most powerful instrument of empirical research in natural science—experiment. For this reason alone, if not for any other, no social system is as thoroughly empirical as any ordinary physicist research is in our days expected to be just as a matter of course. Moreover, in natural science interest is in most cases confined to the simple task of finding the truth, whatever it may be: for to the groups encouraging this kind of research, and with them the greatest and most influential part of society, it will always be useful to find the truth. This, of course, is not the case in social science. Because of the peculiar character of the subject matter as well as the peculiarities of the methods to be applied, there will hardly be found any social theory completely free from axioms induced by the personal sympathies of the author. We may be content if these axioms are more useful than harmful, and open our eyes to sides

of social life formerly hidden, without biasing our outlook upon them to an excessive degree. The more the sociologist is aware of his personal biases the better chance there is of attaining this goal. In this respect, Pareto's sociology certainly does not rank very high.

But let us consider the objective value of the new elements introduced into social science by Pareto. The theory of cycles is not to be counted in this respect, as it is by no means Pareto's own. There remains the theories of residues, derivations and elites as the essential elements of his system. It is characteristic of its axiomatic character, that it can be reduced to such a very few items. If we were to give a judgment on their value, we should probably stress the importance of these three concepts themselves more than the merit of their application in detail. The theory of residues is apt to focus increased attention on the study of sentiments in themselves, before considering their transformation in the processes of social adjustment. Pareto does not want to be a psychologist, and he certainly is not one. But the real merit of the theory of residues lies in the stressing of the axiom that there can be no satisfactory sociology without psychology. But as Pareto on the one hand neglects psychology itself and on the other not only temporarily makes abstractions from adjustments but excludes them from his theory of residues, the practical applications in detail are almost valueless. In the meantime, others have taken up the consideration of psychology in social contexts.

The theory of derivations is very valuable indeed in putting us on our guard against accepting "ideologies" at their face value. Here, Pareto has followed the indi-

cations of Marx and Nietzsche, two authors who deeply influenced him, the latter at least not finding sufficient recognition in Pareto's work. Justly he insists upon sentiments as the essential element of ideologies, but the deductions from his theory in detail are utterly unsatisfactory, as he starts from the premise that there is no essential difference between different religions, different codes of morals and so on. Here, his axiom about the unchangeability of mankind steps in, hardly his own, but certainly the most harmful of all his pre-suppositions, biasing his whole outlook on social life.

He is most original and most consistent and successful in his theory of the elites. He certainly does not stand alone with the idea implied in this theory, as even romanticism professed it and Carlyle and Nietzsche developed it splendidly, not to mention a group of brilliant French scholars. But he has given the theory a more systematic development than any of his predecessors and has demonstrated more clearly the paramount importance of the fact concerned. His applications in detail, however, are again unsatisfactory, on different accounts explained above.

Generally speaking, his talent seems to be essentially a critical one. His negations are almost consistently well justified, a thing which can hardly be said of his own theories. The theory of residues and derivations gives a real knock-out blow to dying rationalism, whereas the theory of the elites pierces the shades of egalitarianism. It was his violent hatred of humanitarianism and democracy which was at the root of these critical theories, and the creative power of the author seems to reach exactly as far as his hatreds, and

to vanish as soon as they are exhausted. There would be hardly any reason, from the merits enumerated in this survey, to number Pareto among the important sociologists.

But as a matter of fact, he is very important. For it would be entirely misleading to estimate the importance of a social philosopher (and only as such, and not as a social scientist, can Pareto be treated with regard to his sociology) exclusively in terms of his contribution to objective scientific knowledge. There are very few points in Pareto's teaching worth including in the common stock of our knowledge of society. But social philosophy is at least no less an expression of the aims and views of certain social groups and of certain new tendencies of thought and behaviour which transform society, than a contribution to science. It is as the precursor of an attitude to social life becoming more powerful every day, that Pareto is of the greatest interest to us, whatever the objective value of this attitude as to its content of scientific truth may be. In Pareto's work for the first time the powerful tendency towards a change of political machinery and social organization since embodied in Bolshevism, Fascism, National-Socialism and a score of similar movements has found clear expression; clearer here than in the work of Georges Sorel, who alone could be ranked with Pareto as a precursor of the political and social changes we behold in our days. The central points of Pareto's theory, open to doubt as to their objective correctness though they are, appear in a quite different light and gain enormous importance as soon as they are put into the context, not of scientific research, but of political

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARETO'S SOCIOLOGY

struggle. The theory of the biological selection of the elite and of the circulation of its two main types is hardly an instrument adapted to explain the manifold types of political and economic rule existing in different societies. But we have only to look at the innumerable groups which won in our days political power by their ruthless use of force, without any title to legitimacy, and which substituted a regime of violent oppression for the mild rule preceding them, and we realize at once that Pareto's "Sociology" is simply a political manifesto in scientific guise, expressing not only one among the leading tendencies of our time but probably the overriding one. The theory of residues and derivations is entirely unsatisfactory as regards the explanation of the motives guiding human actions in society. But it is most relevant as an attack on the cool rationalistic mode of arguing and utilitarian approach to politics, by the emphasis laid upon "irrational," apparently senseless sentiments. It is indeed this appeal to violent sentiments which has most contributed to the success of the new "elites" in their attempts to win the support of the masses.

Across Pareto's considerations of residues cuts one frequently repeated idea, hardly compatible with the rest of this theory. It is the idea that residues, though non-logical, may be extremely useful to society. This is meant mostly to apply to Residue II, but Residue I is not excluded in so far as it produces economic progress. The idea of utility of residues for the society is scarcely in line with Pareto's strictly subjectivistic outlook on utility. Residues can contribute nothing to the utility *for* the society, as this consists mainly in the satisfaction of the needs of its members. And these

needs are precisely defined by interests and residues. There is no sense in saying that residues are useful for the gratifying of residues. Utility in this context can only be meant as utility of the society or, in other terms, certain residues may favour power, wealth or other qualities of the society, and others may not. But here the ambiguity of the term utility, recognized by Pareto himself in other places, makes itself felt. Has not he himself proved by a convincing logical demonstration, that the utility of a society will always be determined by the subjective evaluations of its members? Or, in other words, does it not precisely depend on the "residues" prevailing among the members of a given society or its "elite," whether wealth, or military power, or morality, or democracy, or conservatism, or progressivism, or anything else, is regarded as the paramount concern determining the objective value of the society as a whole? In a conservative society, the fact of this society being conservative will appear to its members as the main utility of this society, whereas the progressivist minority, precisely on account of the prevalence of conservative attitudes in their society, may doubt of its utility or, in other words, of its objective value, and may go so far to doubt whether their society is worthy to exist at all. In the discussion of the revolutionary club in Dostoievsky's "devils" as to whether "Holy Russia" has any "right" to exist, this feeling has found a pathetic expression. In one word, such a thing as objective utility of any feeling does not exist; there only exist utilities of certain feelings for a certain social organization, determined by these feelings themselves. It is Pareto himself who has made this point quite clear, and his considerations

about the usefulness of residues cut straight across the main point of his relativism.

But the whole aspect changes at once if we consider politics instead of social theories. Let us put Pareto's thought, not into scientific terms, but into the language of a rather heated political discussion, say of a Fascist with his democratic or liberal adversaries. "Our violent political passions," he would say, "are not suited to be expressed in such nice public addresses as your humanitarian gossip. They may be illogical, nonsensical and what not. But let me tell you, your logic, your arguing, your talk is nothing but one of the symbols of your inefficiency, your weakness, your cowardice. You may shout and cry to the God of Reason for help, but you will be forced to realize that your deity is too weak to protect you. And my deity, though perhaps less literary and refined than yours, will give me victory. And I say, it is a blessing that we are doing away with your excellent logic and your refined argument. For they have brought society to the verge of destruction and we are now faced with the task of restoring the shattered organization you have brought to such a mess." At this point the democrat will certainly begin to argue that under his rule society was not at all on the verge of destruction, but on the contrary, never felt better than with his government. To that, the Fascist may roughly answer: "What you call prosperity, we call dissolution." And it is doubtful whether his adversary would find any time for a further answer. For the Fascist would probably remind himself of Pareto's argument, that force in the long run is stronger than cunning, and would put a violent end to the discussion he is scarce able to win on the plane

of logical argument. In the light of this controversy of our days, or, more precisely, of Italy two years after the publication of the last volume of Pareto's sociology, the theory of the social utility of non-logical actions makes sense.

At this juncture it may be as well to call attention to certain analogies between Pareto's sociology and Hitler's "Mein Kampf." Though the traditional elements and the general attitude of each are completely divergent, one claiming to be science and the other a mixture of autobiography, doctrine and prophecy, there is more similarity between them than may appear at first sight. Hardly anyone has denied objective value to one peculiar part of Hitler's work, that dealing with the principles of mass propaganda. They are written by one of the most successful propagandists of all times. The rules laid down in the famous passage which has provoked scandal as well as admiration are well known; we do not repeat them. But here are Pareto's considerations on the same subject, embodied in his theory of derivations. "Speaking briefly but without scientific exactness, ideas must be transformed into passions in order to influence society, or in other words, the derivations must be transformed into residues." This is achieved if the agitator only expresses clearly what is felt by the many. If you want to refute an agitator, you must mobilize sentiments opposed to the ones voiced by him, be your sentiments absurd or intelligent. The launching of the charge of sexual immorality against one's adversary is usually very successful. You must repeat your statements over and over again, not prove them. "Repetition works principally upon the feelings, proofs upon reason, and

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARETO'S SOCIOLOGY

then, at best, modify the derivations, but have little influence upon feelings." If governments or big business want to push a thing through, they do not use the best, but mostly the least sensible, most primitive derivations, pure verbal symbols or authority. Simplicity and continual repetition are essential in order to make the slogan understood by everybody. It is an illusion to believe that it is "truth" that obtains in such contests.

So far Pareto. There is certainly an element of truth in this teaching. In the heyday of rationalism, political arguments were assumed to be as scientific as possible. In reality, a political movement could never renounce the appeal to emotions. The Corn Law league utilized certainly a good deal of emotional belief in heaven on earth. But its agitators felt bound, on the other hand, to prove their argument with figures: a propaganda exclusively based on uncontrolled emotionalism would in their time have provoked nothing but disgust. But for the mob of modern industrial urban agglomerations, shaken by the violent ups and downs of business and contemplating those developments with a mixture of hatred and bewilderment, this entirely emotional mode of political propaganda seems really to be well adapted. As usual, Pareto has generalized one aspect of his own time and applied it to the history of mankind, thus taking away from the argument all scientific value. But for certain conditions in his own time he is right. We have already remarked on the similarity of the biological theory of elites and of Hitler's theory of race. Here, we find a surprising similarity in the theory of residues. The two essential theories of Pareto, both hardly intelli-

gible from the standpoint of objective science, become full of meaning as elements of the trend towards Fascism.

Pareto shares in an illusion, common to many social theorists, religious prophets, political leaders and men in general who wish to influence the social life of their time. He believes himself to be entirely alone or almost alone in his opinions, because he for the first time expressed them clearly. In reality, however, he forms part of a powerful trend of thought in his own time. The paradox is more striking than usual in Pareto's case, as he believed in the approaching dissolution of society by a trade-union feudalism at the very moment when Fascism was preparing for its final stroke, to be carried out a few months later.

Pareto is a precursor of Fascism, but he certainly is not a Fascist or an agent of Fascism. In studying his sociology we have time and again had occasion to remark that his thought is almost entirely dominated by his negation and criticism of the attitudes and convictions of his predecessors, and that his constructive ideas, scientifically and politically, have far less power to convince than his criticism. Even this statement requires a qualification. Not only is he more critical than constructive, he even is less critical and more conservative than he believes himself to be. "Conservative" here is not meant in the sense of belonging to the conservative party. On the contrary, it means keeping to liberalism as the prevailing traditional outlook in Italy. The liberal ideology had gradually broken down in his days, first the liberal Utopia, "Humanitarianism," then liberalism even as an economic principle. Pareto step by step follows the general movement.

But he does it reluctantly, keeping to liberal ideas as much as possible, never overcoming some of its essential principles. This seems to put him apart from the Fascist movement. In reality it is the most important feature Pareto and Fascism have in common. Fascism itself is a reaction against the decomposition of the old liberal world, but a tentative, hesitating, spontaneous reaction, violent in the criticism of the old but not knowing very precisely what new world to put in its stead. Fascism as a matter of fact, has introduced a new social order. But it has done it unconsciously, hesitatingly, not really knowing what it was doing. Only the negative side of its activities, the destruction of the liberal-democratic political body, was clear. It is even more in his contradictions than in the clearer sides of his teaching that Pareto is the true precursor of Fascism. But a few remarks on this relation between Pareto and Fascism will not suffice. It will be necessary to survey the revolutionary changes after the war in the light of his theory and to criticize his theory in the light of these events, in order to understand the real importance of his philosophy. We start with the special case of Bolshevism as a test of his theory of elites and to a certain degree of his theory of residues and derivations. Then we will consider the broader problem of Fascism in this context.

CHAPTER IX

BOLSHEVISM

BOLSHEVISM puts Pareto's theory to its strongest test. Socialism is egalitarian throughout and loathes all domination of men over men, but Bolshevism took this egalitarianism much more seriously than any other socialist school, insisting on the abolition of the state as a necessary preliminary to the abolition of all domination or rather as its essential element. Moreover, Lenin believed he had found the instrument of this abolition in the Soviet organization. The state always was and essentially is, according to him, the domination of a minority over a majority. The Soviet system is the direct domination of the immense toiling majority over a small minority of exploiters, and so far is no longer quite a state in the ordinary sense of the word. It is real self-government of the masses, which are no longer dominated, because they themselves are armed, can directly suppress counter-revolution, and govern themselves directly and not through a bureaucracy. As soon as the resistance of the bourgeoisie is suppressed, and attacks from foreign powers ruled out through the generalization of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the Soviet system itself will disappear and instead of domination of men over men, there will remain only the domination of man over things, in the sense of a technical administration of industry.

Here is certainly the strongest possible challenge to the first element of Pareto's theory of the elites. He contends that domination is a natural fact, and here rises an adversary, protesting that domination is exclusively built on economic differentiation and exploitation, and will disappear with them. Pareto answers that economic differentiation is as natural as political differentiation. What is the result of the contest of these two in the light of historical experience?

The result is, that each is wrong precisely in the essential element of his theory. There has not been in Russia, and probably never will be, a complete equalization of income. But income differences have been diminished to a degree which would appear impossible to the orthodox liberal in a modern industrial society. And it would be absolutely futile to speak of an exploitation of men by men, in Russia, in spite of the terrible hardships bound up with economic reconstruction. Thus, economic differentiation seems not to be a natural fact. Domination in the political sphere seems to be due to some reason specific to this sphere and not to the simple fact of biological differentiation of men, which ought to make itself felt in the same way in economics as in politics. On the other hand, the idea of the abolition of political domination, as embodied in the Soviet theory, has experienced a crushing defeat, in all its elements. The economic levelling down has not produced a decrease but has gone together with an enormous increase of political oppression, even in comparison with Tsarism. *Some* political and military organization the Soviet republic must have, according to its own theory, as a protection against the surrounding capitalist countries. But it

demands all the credulity usually given to derivations bound up with strong inclinations to take the danger from abroad as a satisfactory explanation for the dictatorship of Stalin. Other countries have met stronger menaces to their safety without a political organization of the Bolshevik-Fascist type. And as to the danger from political opponents within, it is really not worth mentioning. The Soviets, however, have practically disappeared, and it is suggestive as to the theory of derivations, that Sovietism lustily continues to be the official and generally accepted theory in a country where Soviets themselves are virtually nonexistent. So every element of Lenin's theory of the state has been refuted by experience. It is not true that economic equalization means abolition of political domination. It is not true that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" tends towards the abolition of the state, and the ideal of anarchism remains entirely destitute of any contact with reality. Finally, it is not true that the Soviet system best guarantees direct mass self-government.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet idea took root in Lenin's mind late in his development. In 1905 he opposed Soviets, then being launched by the Mensheviks, as endangering the discipline of the masses under the leadership of the party. There is another concept in Leninism, much older and more deeply rooted than the Soviet idea, the idea of a vanguard or elite as a necessary element in the socialist revolution. The social-democratic (later the Bolshevik) party, was asked to form itself into such an elite; there was in later years, a continual contradiction in theory and conflict in practice, between the Soviet and the vanguard idea.

Paradoxically enough, egalitarian socialist revolu-

BOLSHEVISM

tionaries were the first to introduce Pareto's theory of elites into practical political life. Lenin launched the idea of the elite between 1900 and 1903 (it is not probable that Pareto knew of the event either then or later on) in connection with his fight against "opportunistic" social-democrats (Mensheviks) as a means of preserving purity of doctrine in the party. A strict selection of party members was prescribed by the clandestine activities of the party, but the Mensheviks wanted to enlarge the party as far as conditions allowed. Lenin on the contrary advocated a narrowing down of admission to the party, since to open its gates would bring, besides technical disadvantages, weak and opportunist intellectuals into its ranks. The argument about intellectuals was, however, rather a piece of demagogy than the real reason for his attitude. For in the Bolshevik group intellectuals were in an overwhelming majority and it was the Mensheviks who, during the revolution of 1905, had the stronger appeal to the proletariat. Lenin really did not believe in the spontaneous forces of the labour class and said so openly. In a capitalist society, he contends, men are naturally imbued with a capitalist mentality, and "opportunism," lack of revolutionary sense, is the consequence of it. Among intellectuals, this state of mind is directly rooted in their class situation; but even workers, by themselves, can only form a trade-unionist movement or a political movement of trade-unionist mentality (of which the British Labour Party is the best specimen) but never a socialist revolutionary movement. They are able to realize their immediate interests as a group *in* the capitalist system, they are unable spontaneously to transcend this system

in action and consequently to fight for another system. As their whole life is imbued with capitalism, they will continually deviate from their revolutionary task. For this task can be clearly viewed not from the angle of the interests of individual groups but only from the point of view of the laws of development of the community, as developed in Marxism; and Marxism, as a consequence, is the one guide against opportunist deviations. The elite must be a group strengthened in their revolutionary activities by a deep Marxist conviction and training. It is this elite which was really created in the shape of the Bolshevik party and which, though several times considerably transformed in personnel and convictions, was the leading force of the Russian revolution and of the dictatorship which followed it.

Marxism, in this group, definitely had from the very outset, the function not so much of a scientific method as of a religious creed. Here again, Pareto is entirely right. When it came to theoretical training the Menshevik leaders were certainly superior to their Bolshevik competitors, with the one possible exception of Lenin himself. Bolshevism was always distinguished by a lack of concern for dogma, very similar to Fascism in that respect. Marxism, in the Leninist group, simply meant revolutionary belief, and as to the means applied in the carrying out the revolution, its rôle was a small one. As a creed, it defined the general attitude of the members, and gave absolute authority to the party which alone really possessed the creed which carried salvation. Indirectly, it conferred the same absolute authority on the leader, who had formed the party.

BOLSHEVISM

In the minds of Lenin and his party, Marxism was essential as the one possible guide to socialism, socialism being mainly conscientious organization of the society in the interest of all, and Marxism being the one theory which gave man an insight into the laws of social life, thus enabling him to organize it according to his intentions. But as in reality Marxism in the Bolshevik movement did not play this rôle of an objective scientific theory intended to procure special kinds of machinery for practical purposes, but acted as a religion, making for self-confidence in action, the question arises whether the rôle of conscious thought and planning of the elite is not greatly overrated in the Bolshevik theory. As a matter of fact, at every important moment of the Russian revolution Marxism had to be abandoned. The very idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat in backward Russia is anti-Marxist, since Marxism regarded the socialist revolution as the result of the last stage of the development of capitalism. Lenin provided for this objection by denying the possibility of constructing socialism in Russia alone, regarding the Russian revolution as a mere element of an international socialist revolution, the first act of which was incidentally played in Russia. But the international revolution in the sense intended by Lenin did not come about. Socialism in Russia, however, came nevertheless. The revolution won its cause through the help of the peasant, whose support was secured by the distribution of the large estates of the aristocracy. Here, in the most essential tactical question, Bolshevism simply took over the programme of the "social-revolutionaries," decried for two decades as "petty-bourgeois," and acted

directly against the Marxian programme, which was pledged to the encouragement of large scale management. These few examples could be multiplied *ad libitum*. In reality, from the outset Marxism played almost the same rôle in the revolution (in the preparation of the revolution its rôle had been considerable; but this is not the place to discuss the subject in detail) as did the parliamentary doctrine in the English and Rousseau in the French revolutions. It was a belief and not a scientific guide. In reality, Lenin acted by ingenious intuitions, based on close knowledge of facts, as all great political leaders of all times have done. And the main function of Marxism was to hold the elite together, in the same way as Congregationalism had linked up the Ironsides and the belief in Rousseau the Jacobins.

It seems not to be scientific knowledge which differentiates the elite from the masses. The function of the former in the Bolshevik revolution was essentially the function of a religious sect, preserving the revolutionary ideal through good and bad times, supplying the personnel for revolutionary leadership, guaranteeing through iron discipline unity of action—one overriding need in every revolution, whatever its social content. We could leave the problem here, if there were not one essential difference between the English and French revolutions on the one side, and the Bolshevik (and Fascist) revolutions on the other. In the former cases, the revolutionary elite emerged, slowly, during the struggle, and never achieved the degree of ideological cohesion and intellectual discipline attained by the Bolsheviks who had gone through fifteen to twenty years of preparation for the

decisive battle. In the case of Fascism and National-Socialism the preparatory stage in the formation of the revolutionary elite was shorter and less intense, but even there the formation and the development of the party preceded and conditioned the revolution.

The reasons for this difference have been explained by theoreticians who sympathized with or believed in Bolshevism, in a way somewhat distorting the real situation but without losing sight of the essential point. In the English revolution the city of London rose in defence of its religious beliefs, but also in the defence of its most urgent economic interests. The French Revolution was chiefly made, *by* the bourgeoisie in the immediate interest *of* the bourgeoisie. This identity of the group carrying through the revolution with the class whose interests the revolution serves in the first place, seems to be characteristic of the upheaval of the bourgeoisie against the remnant of the feudal regime. The first word of Lenin, in the creation of Bolshevism, is, on the other hand, the denial of the then general belief, that the pursuit of the immediate interests *of* the proletariat *by* the proletariat leads to socialism. And here Lenin's theory, though not at all Marxist, is in complete accordance with facts, as innumerable events have since shown. It is fairly clear what in this context Lenin indicates by the magic formula "Marxism." Marxism here is the deduction of the inevitable downfall of the capitalist system, necessitating the construction of a new social order. Marx had believed this downfall to be inevitably associated with the upheaval of the proletariat, bound by all its interests to introduce socialism. Lenin denies the inevitability of

this coincidence of the ruin of capitalism and the upheaval of the proletariat, and demands instead a vanguard, fitted by its religious creed to build socialism and to utilize all tendencies in the masses which could to support it, without, however, giving way to all their instincts. And certainly here he is entirely right. The bourgeois revolution could be carried out by the bourgeois themselves, because to a very large extent it was intended to give and practically did give free play to the individual interests of the single bourgeois individuals. (Of course, this identity of the interests of the single bourgeois individuals and of the needs of the new social order was not absolute, and it is precisely their partial divergence which produces the crises in the bourgeois revolutions; but both lie roughly in the same direction.) Socialism, however, is a social order wherein the interests of the community, or the interests reputed to be such, must precede individual interests from the start. Socialism is essentially not built on simple individual interests, as capitalism or a free trade regime essentially is. Therefore appeal to interests can not be its paramount method of action, though of course, interests remain one very important element in its policy. This might be different, if the interests of all single individuals or of the great majority and the interests of the community could be made coincident in a very short time. Such an idea about the coming of socialism was prevalent in pre-revolutionary socialism. We all imagined, said Zinovieff in effect at the congress of the Independent Socialist Party at Halle, in 1920, that the victory of the socialist party would bring an immediate alleviation of the lot of the

masses; in that we were greatly mistaken. As a matter of fact, socialism has demanded an enormous amount of sacrifice from the masses before, during and after the revolution, and there is no likelihood whatever that this state of things will soon change. Bourgeois revolution, on the contrary, asked for no sacrifice before and after, and for very little sacrifice during the revolution, from the bulk of the bourgeoisie. In the latter case the appeal to interests was efficient and sufficient, in the former it was only partly efficient and never sufficient. The socialist revolution is not a spontaneous result of individual interests, as socialism is not built upon individual interests. Therefore, the religious forces were only episodic in the bourgeois revolution, but they are absolutely supreme in the socialist (and the Fascist) revolution in spite of the apparently secular character of the religions in question.

This was not only apparent before the Bolshevik revolution. It has become increasingly obvious since then and at present is the dominating attitude in Russian politics. Before the revolution, the problem simply was whether the workers could preserve their group interests better by co-operating with the bourgeoisie against Tsarism or even with Tsarism against the bourgeoisie, than by taking an independent line leading towards the revolution. This situation was characterized by the struggle between Bolshevism and "opportunism." During the revolution, the clash between the group interests of the workers and the interests of the revolution evolved into the fight between the Soviets and the party. Lenin, having discarded Marx's belief in the spontaneous proletarian

upheaval, retained, however, one element of it in his Soviet theory, believing in spontaneously arising and acting workers' committees as an essential element of socialism. He found a sort of salvation in this belief. From 1903 to 1917 he had bitterly opposed spontaneous mass movements, opposing to them party discipline. Now he believed for one moment he had found in the Soviets an instrument ensuring complete harmony between the masses and the party. His sure instinct, however, preserved him from sacrificing the party to the Soviets, a tendency lurking behind the ideas of some of his followers. But even in his appreciation of the Soviets he was deceived. They proved excellent instruments for the reversal of the old order, but as soon as they had succeeded in that, they proved utterly undesirable in their activities, and had gradually to be destroyed. They were guided almost exclusively by the narrow group interests of their town or their branch. They forced Lenin in 1918 unwillingly into the experiment of complete expropriation of industry. They supported the worst kinds of ill-considered expropriation of cereals. In the army they were the focus of lack of discipline and sectionalism. Among the peasants, they organized the storing and retention of food which had been intended for the starving towns. There was only one remedy to this nuisance. From independent organs of local workers and peasants the Soviets had to be transformed into organs of the party, by the ejection of all adversaries of the Bolsheviks and by a strict, terrorist control of non-party elements. As the revolution proceeded, the struggle between the party and the Soviets increased in intensity, until, in 1921, it flared out in the Kronstadt revolt

of the navy under the slogan "Soviets without communists." The revolt was crushed, thousands executed, and there was virtually an end put to the Soviet regime.

The Soviet experiment itself is extremely instructive as to the phenomenon of the formation of the state, so entirely overlooked in Pareto's theory of the elites. The Soviet regime in 1918 and 1919 actually presented the exceptional phenomenon of a sort of anarchy, of absence of the state. Thus we are in a position to study the formation of state power in a case belonging to our own time and our own period. Lenin's ideas about the Soviet system as an introduction to the disappearance of the state had been justified by events, only this disappearance of the state, far from being the prelude to socialism, had proved to be simply a downfall of civilization itself, and the first thing in order to find the way back to socialism had been to reorganize the state. On the other hand, the state thus emerging out of the chaos of the Soviet regime was certainly created by the Bolshevist elite, but not at all as a consequence of its mere existence. It was the result, on the contrary, of a far-reaching reaction against anarchy, a reaction guided and utilized, but not produced, by this elite. In 1918 Bolshevism, though hesitant and rather discouraged through the strange doings of the Soviets, was entirely unable to oppose them, whereas it could virtually destroy them in 1921 under the overwhelming pressure of famine and dissolution, bringing people to a glad acceptance of even a very hard party dictatorship. The teaching of this event is trivial, but the triviality implied in it has been overlooked by Pareto. The state power—force, domination—holds society together. This power can be relatively weak in a

society where most things are left to the care of individuals, and it must be extremely strong in an order like socialism, where most things are done by the community direct. But in both cases, the function of the state is essentially the same, and it is this function and not the simple *desire* of the elite which makes the state a going concern. If the masses did not *want* the state, for very practical reasons almost coincident with the preservation of their lives, no desire of the elite and no capacity of the individuals composing it could hold it together in the long run. But as it is inevitable, even the most disturbing revolutions can only change the group handling the political power, without abolishing political power itself. In other words, the state arises out of the contradiction of a part of the immediate interests of the individuals with the interests of the community, the latter, however, being an indispensable condition of the very existence of the individuals. To say it once more: this is trivial, but it is overlooked by Lenin as well as by Pareto. It is this absolute necessity of the predominance of some communal interests over individual interests, which in times of anarchy soon becomes the overwhelming concern of every individual and fosters dictatorships, even in an individualistic social order. But in the Russian case, the dictatorship was not only the reaction against anarchy, but had deeper roots in the new economic system which was then in process of creation.

So the struggle between the interests of the masses and the necessities of the dictatorship, tending towards socialism, went on. Now Lenin was already intensely aware of it. He was afraid of seeing the dictatorship completely override the immediate interests of

the masses, he was haunted by the nightmare of a dictatorship turning itself against the masses, crushing them and building up socialism by oppressing them. He wanted the trade unions to be independent of the party apparatus, he struggled against the bureaucratization of the regime. In vain! The struggle of his last years was hopeless and he died in time to save his glory. Was it not he himself who had declared that in the period of economic and social reconstruction, not the slightest opposition to the party regime could be tolerated and Mensheviks ought to be kept in jail? Had he not given his consent to the persecution of the "labour opposition," a group composed of some of the best and oldest members of the party itself? The growing tyrannical bureaucratization was only the logical result of the crushing of every opposition, which, however, was inevitable if the dictatorship was to be upheld. For conditions in the post-revolutionary period had become still more complex. The peasants had to be granted free trade in cereals, and with the re-introduction of private trade in agricultural commodities, the party and bureaucracy respectively had assumed the task of keeping the balance between the peasantry and the proletariat of the slowly recovering state industry. Neither could this balance be allowed to produce itself automatically by the free play of economic forces, as such free play would have led inevitably to the victory of the peasants over industry, finishing in a breakdown of the whole system. But on the other hand, the interests of the peasants must be safeguarded to a certain extent, to avoid rebellion. The one means of keeping this difficult balance was to crush every independent political

movement in both classes, and to hold all decision exclusively in the hands of the bureaucracy. Nevertheless the system failed. It worked as long as the old, half-destroyed factories of Tsarist times had simply to be put into operation again, but it failed the moment the problem of the construction of new industries arose. Then, the increase of industry became too slow in comparison with the accumulation of wealth in the peasantry. The balance was upset, only a violent crushing of the peasantry afforded a possible solution. The policy of the Five Years Plans was introduced.

The policy of almost complete equalization of income, abandoned after the civil war, was reintroduced. The rich peasants were expropriated, the mass forced into agricultural "collectives." But equalization of income proved not to lead to a diminishing of political power. Just the contrary! With the introduction of the Five Years Plan the personal dictatorship of Stalin asserted itself. It meant essentially an enormous concentration and centralization of the power of the state. And, in spite of equalization of income, one need not seek far to find out why this is needed. The necessity of keeping a balance between workers and peasants has hardly diminished since the former period, since in the place of the rich peasant it is now the community of all peasants of a village which defends its interests against the state, and is able to do so more efficiently than was the rich peasant, who was often bitterly opposed by his poorer neighbours. In addition, a new task has emerged for the bureaucracy, or rather a task existing since the revolution has enormously gained in importance, that of enforcing

labour discipline. This task is incumbent on the manager of a factory in any system, be it based on private property or on state or communal property. Where private property is abolished, it automatically merges with the other duties of the bureaucracy. And one should not believe that much is changed in this respect by the equalization of income and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Such facts may considerably influence the political loyalty to the regime (though a certain amount of success of Fascist regimes in securing willing support by their respective working classes shows clearly that this factor is often overrated in relation to others) but they influence very little the habits of daily life. Here, accuracy, speed of work and discipline, are dependent on two factors almost exclusively: on the traditional degree of conscientiousness in labour on the one hand and on the material standard of life of the workers on the other. Where the situation is unsatisfactory in both respects, harsh repression must enter in, regardless of the state of juridical ownership existing. It is of no avail, or almost none, for workers in Russia to work "in their own interest," for this argument, besides its moral content, contains a reality only with respect to a relatively remote future. And as, according to a law well known in political economy, present goods are valued much higher than future ones, especially if the population in question is unused to acting on its own responsibility, this "working in one's own interest" is not sufficient to avoid the necessity of being forced to work by direct means, that is administrative pressure. As the conditions of the Russian proletariat have much in common with the deplorable state of

things prevalent among the Western proletariat of early capitalism, their treatment must be somewhat similar as well, with this difference, that the odious task of plying the whip was in the one case incumbent upon the mill-owner and is in the other upon the state or party bureaucrat. And the importance and harshness of this task has enormously increased with the tremendous sacrifices conditioning the success of the Five Years Plans. Juridical ownership, in one word, far from being the clue to the phenomenon of domination itself, only determines the group exerting domination, while the standard of living and moral tradition decide in the long run the amount of suppression necessary. Complete identity of individual and community interests, and complete abolition of suppression, however, belong to Utopia. Again, the domination of the elite is conditioned not simply by the biological differences between the elite and the masses, but first and foremost by the function exerted by domination in social life.

This is evident in the change of character and personnel of the elites, conspicuous in the history of revolutions. We had occasion to hint at the rôle of the "independent elite" in the English and of the "Jacobin elite" in the French revolution. These came relatively near to Pareto's conception of elites. The main element in them was not organization, they were first spontaneous groupings of the ablest and most active of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. In this sense, the biological criterion may be better applied to them than to the elites acting in the Russian revolution. But on the other hand they were characterized by their complete dependence upon the support of the class whose

protagonists they were. The policy of the Jacobins oscillated with every oscillation of bourgeois opinion. The Leninist elite, however, was not the result of a spontaneous process of natural selection, but the result of careful and conscientious selection and training from above, the natural qualities of its members being only a vague guide to the choosing of them. On the other hand, it was much less dependent on the public opinion of the proletariat than the Jacobins had been on the opinion of the bourgeoisie.

But during the revolution the Leninist elite underwent a complete change with the change of its functions. This change coincides with the superseding of the group of Lenin's partisans by the group of Stalin's partisans. The two types are absolutely opposed to one another and hate each other with the deepest possible hatred. The Leninist type is the revolutionary, the traditions of which are upheld in vain by Trotsky in a period no longer needing revolutionaries. The Stalinist type is the rude, dominating, narrow, unidealistic but efficient bureaucrat. With the personnel, the function of the leader has changed. Lenin was a superior personality, wielding enormous personal authority in the party, but authority to a large extent based on confidence and not on silent obedience. His policy was challenged in the party over and over again, seldom successfully, but never with the consequence of persecution of his opponents. For the masses, Lenin was a symbol not far from a God, synthesizing the need for submission to the common goal, work in hardship and discipline. Stalin has never attained to being really worshipped, has never secured the confidence of the bulk of the most experi-

enced members of the party, but has instead erected a personal dictatorship, the opposition to which means immediate destruction for the opponent. And this is not the result of diabolical cunning (though Stalin is certainly first and foremost an able manager of the party machine, like Hitler and Mussolini), but mainly the consequence of the situation itself. Without swift industrialization the downfall of the whole system is inevitable. Swift industrialization is bound to be purchased with an immense amount of sacrifice. This amount of sacrifice requires an iron hand at the helm of the state. Stalin is this iron hand. But he could not achieve his task without crushing all dissensions in the party, and only absolute unity of leadership is a safeguard against dissensions. Because of its inevitability, the personal dictatorship arose with the Five Years Plan. The mechanism of its victory is only of secondary importance. In 1921 the victory of the bureaucracy as a group over the Soviets was assured by a general reaction against chaos, combined with the ardent desire to put an end to the civil war. In 1928 Stalin's personal dictatorship was assured by a deep reaction against the revolutionary tradition, together with a general demand for swift improvement of economic conditions (which, ultimately, did not ensue) and an equally general feeling of fatigue, and other factors which need not be mentioned. But as long as a society has not lost its capacity to live at all, ways and means to guarantee the executing of the functions most important to its existence will always be found. And it is their function in the context of social life which ought, repeatedly, to be taken as the explanation of the rise of institutions and groups of

BOLSHEVISM

persons. Personnel and group dictatorship in our time seem to have a specific function partly independent of many divergences in the social organization of different countries, a function yet to be determined. This function then would give the clue to the true theory of "elites" in our time.

CHAPTER X

FASCISM

IT is rather paradoxical that the first political movement consciously to develop a dictatorial elite did not proceed from the camp of the dominating groups but from that of the dominated: it did not spring, as Pareto might have hoped, from the anti-socialist, but from the socialist camp. But this is only a minor fact. It has often been observed that in Fascism and Bolshevism along with an evident antagonism in social policy, there goes a surprising similarity in political institutions. From the point of view of the theory of domination and of elites, Bolshevism and Fascism can only really be treated as slightly different specimens of the same species of dictatorship. Is this similarity only superficial? Or does it indicate, according to our theory of domination, a similarity or even an identity of the function of government in the two states? If it is the latter, something in the social body of the two communities must be similar or identical, some common trend of development asserting itself throughout very dissimilar ideologies and interests. If we are able to discover such a common trend, then a general explanation of the tendency towards the absolute regime of elites, as expressed in Pareto's sociology, will have been discovered.

Fascism, as a matter of fact, has been much less conscious of itself than Bolshevism. Bolshevism pro-

claims the creed in an elaborate theory, Marx-Leninism. Fascism denies all fixed beliefs and puts instead unlimited confidence in the Duce. Practically, as is well known, under the present Russian regime of authoritative but changing interpretation of the official creed, the Russian situation is not very different from the position in Italy. Nevertheless, the different starting point is important. Bolshevism wanted to create an entirely new social order and had to trace its outlines. Fascism intended no such thing, but simply wanted to change the existing political regime in order to preserve the existing social structure, and its main institution, private property in the means of production. Fascism, in the first years of its reign, was much more liberal in economic policy than the governments previous to it, abandoning state enterprises to private capital, abolishing a good deal of state subventions, and so on. On the other hand, the Italian governments of pre-war, and still more of post-war, times had been particularly inefficient, carrying with them the whole burden of the times of national disunion and oppression, and, above all, of pre-capitalist habits. From the government, corruption and mismanagement spread to all sides of social life, or rather, there was an obnoxious interaction between the backwardness and ineffectiveness of private and public life. In the light of the regime of its forerunners, Fascism seemed objectively, and believed itself to be, mainly a vigorous reaction against the backwardness of the country, which was shamefully conspicuous during the war, and its main function seemed to be the modernizing of all aspects of Italian life. No doubt, Mussolini has achieved a good deal in this direction. The author

of this study has in a former work set forth this view of Fascism as a phenomenon specific to backward countries, and only the victory of Fascism in Germany and the strong Fascist trend in some other important countries has convinced him that this is merely the specific national aspect of it in Italy, a minor fact contributing to its earlier complete development, whereas the forces driving towards Fascism seem to be of much wider reach.

In reality, Fascism is evidently connected with important changes in the economic structure of the world. Here we mean neither the famous "imperialism," which in reality was pretty well developed already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, nor "monopoly capitalism," which as a matter of fact is a specific feature of our times but only one aspect of a broader development. The better to explain it, we will take Pareto's view of economics, the view of orthodox liberalism. We do not insist upon any deficiencies of the free trade system. We assume on the contrary, what we believe is the real position, that entirely free competition assures the highest possible amount of wealth to the community and in the long run even to the overwhelming majority of its individual members. We do not concern ourselves with crises, assuming them to be only superficial cyclical disturbances of a definitely upward trend. What then will happen? As in this system, productive commodities continually accumulate in the hands of the best managers of them, at the expense of less capable individuals, a continual process of elimination of the worse adapted in favour of the better adapted will go on. At the outset, it may be largely a competition between individuals

only. Where a high stage of accumulation is reached it will, however, be not only individuals who are concerned. The technical outfit of enterprises due to former efforts will count as well, and in the result the enterprise best fitted in every respect will prevail. As they grow, there grow with them the destruction produced by the process of continual elimination. There need not be any structural change in the system. The change intervening is purely quantitative. First single individuals, then small mill-owners with a few hands, then large owners, then syndicates, then industries of whole countries and finally the entire economic equipment of whole countries not at the top of the movement are eliminated. As long as only single unadapted individuals are eliminated, the process is entirely beneficial. If one unadapted individual carries with him a number of individuals without any responsibility in the management of the enterprise in which they are engaged, then the results become more doubtful. But we may assume that the selection of the leaders is more important than the selection of the executants, and that better leaders, as secured by the selective process of competition, will afford work for the dependent individuals displaced not by their own fault. But no such selective value can be attributed to the process of elimination when it is determined overwhelmingly by technical equipment due to the efforts of former generations, and to the general economic conditions of different countries competing with one another. The mechanism of selection may still secure continual increase of wealth. But its effects on the selection of men are now definitely undesirable and, in the long run,

probably these effects must react upon the productive process itself. But what is still more important, the costs of the selective process have enormously increased. The elimination of a few thousand or ten thousand hands in former bankruptcies was undesirable, but those displaced had every chance of finding work in an improved economic structure. The elimination of millions from the productive process gives no such chance. Theoretically, it is true, they must find work again in an economic order which, it is supposed, when left entirely alone to steer itself, will procure not less but more possibilities of production after the selective process. But before this change has intervened, the displaced millions must starve. The countries left behind in economic development must be left to their fate; the political units existing in those countries must go down. No society in the world could accept such consequences of even the best and most ascertained theories of economic progress. Now at this very moment, the process above outlined is going on under our own eyes. Only it is going on, not in the form of scattered individual selections, but of cyclical crises. And even more it endangers the very existence of continents. Eastern Germany, for instance, being an essentially agricultural area, can by no means enter into free competition in wheat with Canada or the Argentine. So it ought to be abandoned, as Eastern America was abandoned by the farmers some decades ago. But to-day, even the farmers of the Middle-West are not able to sustain competition. And now the thoroughly liberal American community has had to change its mind and intervene on their behalf. The question of Eastern Germany eventually contributed

to Hitler's coming into power. The question of the Middle-West was essential in the institution of the N.R.A. in America. The political forms are different in both cases, but they have in common an enormous increase of the discretionary power of the executive, springing from the same causes in Germany and America.

This process of quantitative increase of destruction by the selective agencies of free competition, was probably envisaged by Marx in his famous formula, that "productive forces become incompatible with productive relations," that is with the existing order of property. There has been a continual process of growing state intervention in circumstances where the disastrous consequences of the most efficient types of free competition could no longer be endured. Such state intervention is characteristically strongest in belated countries, menaced from the outset with destruction by their more powerful competitors. The countries more advanced and oldest in the process of modern industrialization are more reluctant to adopt this change of regime, without, however, escaping it in the end. In France, at present, the ministry organizes compulsory "cartels" in order to provide for the return of free trade, if we believe its declarations. Democracy itself, as distinct from parliamentary government and understood mainly as universal suffrage and active participation of the masses in politics, cannot be understood apart from the process indicated. It is the continual revolutionizing of their existence by the change of industrial processes which has driven the masses into public life, and, under the conditions of parliamentary government originally intended to

serve the higher classes exclusively, made the extension of the franchise inevitable.

With democracy and state intervention in economic life the whole function of the state on the one hand and of the economic system based on private property on the other, changes. More and more, income is not determined by economic effort but by law. In the present state of things, this determination of income by law is practically omnipresent. The fact is sufficiently well known not to need further explanation. One ought, however, to insist upon the deep significance of this fact for political life. The state assumes the function of an arbitrator, fixing the income of classes and individuals. The process, though entirely unavoidable (it is naïve to believe that all social evils are avoidable, and to look out for the "guilty") has very undesirable effects on economic life, hampering the efficiency of the process of selection without completely eliminating destruction in the process of competition. Crises become greater, not less, but state intervention remains necessary, as less intervention would not mean minor crises but still more terrible effects of crises. The point is soon reached, where the mass of the population of important communities is faced with the danger of losing its very existence. The state is the arbitrator. And in general distress and downfall, it must decide who shall go under and who survive. The more the state becomes an economic arbitrator, the more politics become economically important. And the more economic life is shattered, the more the state becomes important for the very life of every one of its citizens, who fight a desperate battle for the domination over

it, in order to preserve their existence and make the others perish. Theoretically the struggle may lead to the complete victory of one group of citizens over all the other groups, ending in a complete unification of society. Bolshevism pretends to tend towards this solution. But Bolshevism proves precisely that even in the case of the physical destruction of whole classes, the social body is never really unified, and finally the state remains as an arbitrator, bound to exert absolute discretionary power over all its subjects, in order to stop a bloody strife which otherwise could have no end except the destruction of society itself. Usually, this absolute power of arbitration is granted after some violent convulsions leaving the social body in a state of great fatigue and thus affording a chance to the small groups which have preserved their capacity of action in the disaster.

Generally speaking, Marx was right in his analysis of the trend of the development of capitalism, and this trend can be described in terms of subjective economics as well as in the terms of the Marxian economics. But he was essentially wrong in his belief that contradictions in the social body are always overcome by some "Synthesis" radically solving them. This is the Hegelian element in his doctrine. As private property has largely lost its selective function and increasing state intervention is entirely unavoidable, it seems logical to abolish the institution of private property and to create a state economy instead, as the result of the struggle of those most handicapped in the present system. In reality, this logical result constitutes an ideal, the practicability of which may be doubted. The state assumes the function of control, but the

classes do not disappear and dictatorship is the consequence, only not "dictatorship of the proletariat" but dictatorship of an "elite" independent of all classes and tyrannizing over them. Even where something like a dictatorship of the proletariat is reached first, it later on transforms itself in line with the other dictatorships. Where the direct intervention of the state in economic life is particularly strong, dictatorships even assume an additional function, that of direct economic supervision, which carries with it a still greater independence of the control of the masses. Here is the essential common trend creating a common function of a common new, dictatorial form of government.

This trend, as a matter of fact, is not absolute. There exist differences between "Soviet" Russia and Italy, of less account than either of these countries likes to assume, however important they may be for both the advantage and the disadvantage of each. There exist differences between Germany and Italy. It is evident already that the Anglo-Saxon world, less akin to these countries in habits and traditions than they are to each other, will develop different forms of government, without, however, escaping the general trend towards increased state power. Nevertheless, in these countries three important facts oppose Fascism: wealth, social discipline, and liberal tradition in political and religious life.

In order to bring these general considerations into line with the sociology of Pareto, we have now to consider the subjective aspect they take on for the individuals implied in them. In so far as they are not socialists, they keep to the institution of private property. Why are they not socialists? Here Lenin has given the answer, though probably not in suffi-

ciently general terms. Socialism is the result of some general considerations about society. And how should the ordinary labourer be able to make these considerations, not in the abstract—that he frequently does—but in a way making them useful to the understanding of a world becoming every day harder and more puzzling at the same time? So private property, whether accepted theoretically or not, guides the consideration of all in everyday practice. But confidence in free trade slackens. It is mainly Pareto's age which here puts him in a special situation. He belongs to the generation which still believed in free trade with a religious zeal, and he does it all the more, because free trade means just the contrary of the corruption prevailing in his country. Besides, there is no consistent view except the free trade view for an anti-socialist. So he is torn between his theoretical belief in free trade and his practical experience leading him to the acknowledgment of the relative utility of state intervention. Here he behaves exactly as Fascism did in its early years. But in the political field reactions can be more clear-cut. The political machine, assuming the function of arbitration for which it was not at all intended, becomes more and more inefficient, and the new corruption introduced by state intervention unites with the old traditional Italian corruption. The cry for the strong man, able to clean up this Augean stable, becomes universal. But this reaction is not well understood. It is not meant to lead to the construction of a new social order, but to preserve the old one and to clean it up. In reality, however, a regime where the market has lost its essential functions and the state is

the real arbitrator over the distribution of income is radically different from the society of the nineteenth century, and it is only a natural consequence that in the political sphere command and force should take the place of voting and convincing. So the two ideals clash. On the one hand, the ideals connected with private property and liberalism as its most complete expression, remain absolute, and society continues to be viewed under this dominating aspect. On the other hand, the political forms correlated with the new social order are accepted, whereas this new social order itself is overlooked. The economic tendencies of the nineteenth century, or in Pareto's misleading language, of classical antiquity, continue to be exalted, whereas the political forms of the twentieth century, or, according to Pareto's terms, of Byzantium, are welcomed. But liberal ideas in economics are only tolerated as long as they do not clash with the *raison d'état*, and the dictatorial political ideals are only accepted with the proviso that it shall never become apparent that they are really the political ideals of a military dictatorship similar to the political structure of the late Roman empire. Unfortunately, in practice, liberalism now is always against the *raison d'état*. Fascism in practice, in common with its most advanced precursor some years earlier, has slowly and reluctantly to acknowledge that a *laissez faire* policy is no solution for the pressing problems of the moment.

In Italy, the change from liberalism to an economic system entirely based upon state control has been relatively sudden. Before the world economic crisis of 1929 Fascism knew only one kind of state intervention in economic life, an all-round encouragement of the

creation of industrial large-scale enterprise, through protective tariffs, wage-cutting and all sorts of direct state help. Then followed at the beginning of the crisis, the "cereals-campaign," intended to make the country independent in its food supply on military and exchange reasons. But then came the breakdown of the banca commerciale, on which, under every kind of state encouragement, had devolved the whole business of financing industry. From one day to the next, in order to avoid a complete breakdown of the whole national economy, the state had virtually to take over the organization of financial reconstruction. Private ownership in large-scale industry has not been abolished in Italy and will not be abolished. But since 1931 the whole industry works under the closest possible kind of state control, and as it is now the state which exclusively controls the distribution of credit, the amount of capital granted to the various industries respectively is determined by the state, thus introducing the most thorough and efficient kind of planning without admitting it. Until then, the corporations, institutions intended for self-government in industry, were hardly more than a bluff. Now, they seem likely to become machines for direct administrative control of business. Italy is evidently drifting towards a state-controlled, planned economy, and the one (though certainly not unimportant) difference between Russia and Italy lies in the different principles of distribution of the produce. It is mainly this difference in distributive principles which is meant to-day when partisans and opponents of private property argue on this matter. As to the policy of industrial construction pursued by the U.S.S.R., it is probably less essentially "socialist" than

is supposed by the Bolsheviks. Is it not rather due to the destructions of the civil war on the one hand and to the peasantry's increased capacity for consumption through the expropriation of the landlords, on the other? In deciding the true character of an economic system, Marxism is able to give a lead. According to Marx, an economic system is defined by the "Produktions-verhaeltnisse," productive relations, a concept meaning not only the juridical notions about property but the real principles of management as well. The juridical principles of property are contradictory to-day in Italy and Russia and this has its importance for the distribution of wealth. The principles of management, however, are to a very large extent the same: distribution is no longer determined by free competition, but by state ordinances. The essential function of private property in the productive process has gone.

In tracing the trend of economic and social developments of our day, we do not intend, however, to suggest that private property, the essential function of which has disappeared, could be done away with without loss. The Russian experiment, on the contrary, seems to suggest that this is the most costly way of meeting the economic changes which intervened in the last half century by creating a new type of social organization. If the market loses its function of distributing wealth in the best selective way, that unfortunately does not mean that the state is really capable of undertaking efficiently the business which thus has become incumbent upon it. Even in our period of state-planned economy, an intelligent mixture of state intervention and private control seems to be an opti-

FASCISM

mum solution. The most logical way is not necessarily the best way to deal with industrial problems.

The tendencies prevailing in Italy and Russia are making headway in Germany as well. Again, German Fascism has begun with vague ideas about the absolute power of the "racially superior" chief of industry in his business, and has, in practice, swiftly developed a regime of state intervention unknown even in Germany under former governments. National-socialism at the moment of its advent was more of a victorious regime of the upper classes than Italian Fascism had been, not to mention Bolshevism. But it is now evident that the essential change of which Fascism is the political expression, namely the change from market competition to state planning, is independent of the secondary group interests implied in the revolution. These group interests may be proletarian in one case, bourgeois in another and petty-bourgeois in a third; the transition from marketing to planning is always the same. In some cases, under socialist regimes, this transition is emphasized in official theories, but unfortunately without guaranteeing a higher practical efficiency of planning. In other cases, under anti-socialist "Fascist" regimes, the economic difference between the old and the new regime is rather understated (on account of "derivations" connected with the ideal of private property) but nevertheless may be extremely thorough and efficient. In this latter case then, the whole economic change is more or less neglected, and in theory and public consciousness there appears exclusively the political change, that is the replacement of an old leading group which has become inefficient and

"decadent" by a new "elite." The differences in "ethos" between the two elites (the former being inclined to mild methods, compromise, regard for individual rights and interests, and the latter being just the opposite) is not correctly ascribed to the change of function of the state, but this difference in "ethos" itself appears the cause of the transformation of the state. This is the social context, which renders the contradictions of Pareto's theory of elites intelligible.

To formulate it once more in different words: the transformation of the effects of competition transforms the antagonisms existing in modern industrial society into bloody and destructive strife. If the basic transformations are overlooked, the change appears simply as a decline of the whole society on account of the "weakness" of the leading group. The necessity of putting an end to the internecine struggle, on the other hand, works for the ascendancy of groups relatively independent of the existing interests, with an iron centralization within and a crude method of violent command without, under a personal chief embodying in his person the principle of unity. This coming about of a new type of government then is taken as the result of the reaction of people who would not longer suffer the weakness and decline of the existing government and who saved society by their tremendous vigour.

Again, here lies the explanation of Pareto's theory of non-logical actions and residues. It is in profound agreement with the prevailing trend of the Fascist movements against intellectualism and in favour of "vigorous" and natural sentiments. And again, it is not the officially accepted theory which is most impor-

tant. The fact is, that sentiments uncontrolled by reason *have* really played an enormous rôle in the ascendancy of Fascism, and in addition, in the later developments of Bolshevism the same sentiments come to the forefront, though in the official Bolshevist theory this trend is neglected or rejected. Bolshevism of course has to take over many elements of the age of enlightenment, and of rationalism as an ideology, in order to fit the Russian population for a modern industrial order. The common trend, however, the acceptance of authority instead of rational consideration, the eulogy of activity in the place of thought, the unconsidered acceptance of a few metaphysical principles taken for granted and the rejection of any "problems" not solved by these official axioms, is conspicuous. In Fascism as well as in Bolshevism, rationalism is banned from the most important spheres of human life and relegated to matters of pure technique. One may doubt whether, in the long run, a rationalistic technique can coexist with thoroughly anti-rationalist habits of life.

In exalting the importance of non-logical actions, especially those embodied in Residue II, that is authoritarianism, traditionalism, patriotism, military spirit and physical courage, Pareto again formulates the dominating current of his day. And in order to close our discussion of Pareto's relation to the practice of Fascism, we have only to enumerate the causes of this trend prevailing in the history of our own time. First and foremost stands in this connection the arguments given in Pareto's theory of utility, the possibility of a wide gap between the necessities of the communal life and the interests of the individual. Liberal-

ism was able largely to base the well-being of the community upon the care of its individuals for their true interests. Individual interest and the common good was connected through the selective mechanism of free competition in all spheres of life. This mechanism in our days, has become more destructive than selective. It breaks down, but it draws into its downfall the close connection between individual and communal interests. To-day, common interests are largely opposed to individual interests, and the society would literally disappear, if they could run wild in internecine warfare. That group interests are still prevailing exclusively in the arena of international relations, no paramount world power existing, is a definite menace to the existence of our society, as is the internecine warfare of groups in the single states as long as no absolute power of the state over the groups of vested interests is achieved. No government, of course, is free from all bias of interest. But the connection of Hitler with the Junkers, of Mussolini with big business, and so on, constitutes precisely the weak point of their regimes, the strong point being their relative independence of all vested interests, as compared with the direct dependence of most parliamentary parties of the nineteenth century on one or several vested interests. In the Bolshevik as in the Fascist regime, appeal to interests is only secondary and in most cases inapplicable as a method of government. Appeal to impersonal ideals takes its place. That certainly does not imply that the new type of regime is more "idealist" than the old one. This consequence is generally drawn by the partisans of the new type of regime, but is hardly justified in the light of

facts. High development of the sense for the higher forms of life, including sense of social responsibility, is perfectly compatible with an individualist economy and the appeal to interest in politics. On the other hand, the "ideals" appealed to in the new type of regime are very often only the meanest and most undesirable specimens of crude and primitive instincts. Not appeal to interest or appeal to ideals decides on the objective "value" of a social system. But unfortunately, this question of objective value is of no avail at all, as the appeal to interests has simply ceased to work for the maintenance of social bonds and has become, in our days, almost exclusively a dissolving force.

The antagonism between public and private interests is basic for the increased importance of "non-logical" sentiments in the new era. There is, however, one subsidiary factor. The needs of social life become more and more complex and unintelligible. To the change in the working of instincts is added deficiency in the working of reason. In reality, the existence of the society is the primary need for each individual. But even if the ordinary man were capable of understanding the complex facts, which are fundamental for the antagonism of private and public interests, he would hardly be prepared to accept with his reason such an undesirable state of things. But he cannot even be aware of it. He tries to act and to fight according to his interests. But the more he acts and fights, the more his bewilderment grows over the intellectual incomprehensibility of the social world he is living in. He is puzzled by the amazing experience that the more he fights, the worse things

become. And in the moments of social catastrophe, under the pressure of imminent annihilation, he is exposed to the working of the most atavistic, primitive and rudimentary instincts, as all reasonable judgment has proved to be misleading. Only the abstract theoretician can take up an attitude more or less detached from his interests. For action in life, reasonable action and just evaluation of interests are one and the same. If this acting according to interest proves to be a dissolving instead of a constructive element of social life, man in action is left without any guide at all. It becomes impossible to fit actions into the functioning of the individual and the society, and the functional aspect of the single acts of the individual and the community, so conspicuously conscious in all sound civilizations, loses its convincing power and is lost from sight, and the belief in non-logical instincts (non-logical, because their social function, though existing, has become unintelligible) is the one remaining faith.

“Goetterdaemmerung!” The established links between instincts and institutions, as expressed in the dominant forms of religion, break down. The sense of the importance of the single molecular acts may increase (as is conspicuous in the theory of non-logical actions) but the sense of fitting them into a whole is lost and the accidental interaction of dispersed individuals driven by unrelated instincts is proclaimed as the last and final content of history. This our tragical present, however, is not without precedents in history. The fall of the old Gods has ever been the prelude to the accession of new ones, the disbanding of unrelated instincts the prelude to a new functional correlation of them in a new civilization.

INDEX

INDEX

A

- Actions, logical, 21 ff., 73, 92,
94, 98, 103-4
- Actions, non-logical, 21 ff.,
34-5, 43, 53, 55, 56, 58,
64, 65, 73, 88, 91 ff., 129,
172, 210-11, 214
- Aggregates, persistence of, 35,
37, 62, 69, 72
- Alcibiades, 148
- Ammon, 116
- Anaxagoras, 147
- Aquinas, 26
- Aristocracies, 116, 140
- Aristotle, 26, 43, 85
- Art, 112 f.
- Asceticism, 54
- Augustus, 149

B

- Behaviourism, 160, 164
- Bolshevism, 19, 51, 87, 131,
168, 175, 176 ff., 196 ff., 203,
207, 209, 210-12
- Bousquet, G. H., 9
- Buckle, 26

C

- Capital, Das*, 16
- Carlyle, T., 167
- Cœur, Jacques, 137
- Comte, 26

- Condoicet, 26
- Conservatism, 56, 174
- Constant, B., 146
- Cours d'economie politique* 16,
- Crispi, 14, 15, 134
- Cycles, 156 f., 166

D

- Decadence, 156
- Depretis, 12, 134, 140
- Derivations, 25, 41, 78 f., 166
- Dictatorship, 188, 194, 204
- Dostoievsky, 170
- Dreyfus, 137

E

- Elites, 106 ff., 167, 192 ff., 209
- Elites, circulation of, 55, 99,
108, 121, 127 ff., 169
- Epaminondas, 148

F

- Fascism, 18 ff., 51, 115, 131,
156, 162, 168, 171, 174-5,
180, 182, 185-91, 196 ff.
- "Fattie teorie" 87
- Force, 143 ff.
- Freud, 40

G

- Galileo, 74

INDEX

Gallienus, 149
Giolitti, 134, 135,

H

Habits, 44 ff.
Hegel, 74, 157-8, 161, 163, 203
History, 47, 72
Hitler, 172-3, 194, 200, 212
Humanitarianism, 11, 88, 130,
157, 167, 174

I

Ideologies, 80, 84, 86, 88, 166
Instincts, 42, 77
Instincts of combination, 35,
37, 62 ff., 74
Interests, 56, 80, 82, 87, 94-5,
98, 184, 212 f.

J

Joan of Arc, 137

K

Kent, 74, 103

L

Lapouge, 116
Law, John, 137
Law, Natural, 83
Leaders, 199
Le Bon, G., 142
Lenin, 176, 178 f.
Liberalism, 16, 99, 103-5, 123,
124 f., 145, 161, 206-11
Logic, 65
Louis XVI, 144-5
Luzatti, 135

M

Mach, 103

Malinowski, 40
Manuel d'economie politique, 16,
109, 118-19, 140
Marx, 16, 110, 167, 201, 203,
208
Marxism, 87, 123, 180, 208 f.
Marx-Leninism, 197
Mazzini, 9, 12, 26, 36, 53, 88
Mensheviks, 178 f.
Michelet, 24
Mill, J. S., 25
Mussolini, 15, 18-20, 135, 146,
194, 197, 212

N

Napoleon I, 146
Napoleon III, 144-5, 159
Nazism, 115, 168, 209
Newton, 74, 103
Nietzsche, 147, 154, 163, 167
Nikias, 148

P

Pantaleoni, 14
Pareto, biography of, 9 ff.
Paxal, 74
Pelopidas, 148
Pessimism, 161 f.
Plato, 26
Poincaré, 103
Progress, 24, 27, 53, 60-9, 84,
160, 161
Psycho-analysis, 39
Puritanism, 152-3

R

Race, 115
Rationalism, 25, 69, 77, 93,
100, 163, 167, 211

INDEX

Religion, 102

"Rentiers," 139 f.

Residues, 25, 33 f., 88, 99, 101, 166, 169, 210 (*see also* Aggregates, persistence of, and Instinct of combinations)

Robespierre, 145-6

Rousseau, 85, 182

S

Sex, 39 f.

Social Contracts, the, 82

Socialism, 87, 121, 176, 184

Socrates, 147

Sonnino, 135

Soul, 168

Speculators, 137 f.

Spencer, H., 26, 53

Stalin, 190, 193-4

Systèmes Socialistes, Les, 14, 16, 124

T

Taboo, 23, 44, 74, 77

Toynbee, A. J., 117, 154, 162-3

Trasformazione della Democrazia, La, 17

Trotsky, 193

U

Uniformity, instinct of, 44-5, 73

Utility, 64, 130-2, 169-70

V

Voltaire, 28, 100

W

Walras, 14, 15

Weber, Max, 89

Z

Zinovieff, 184

